Saudi Shiite clerics reject violence, call for political dialogue

A Saudi Shiite Muslim man beats his chest during Ashura commemorations in the mostly Shiite Qatif region, Dec. 6, 2011. (photo by AFP/Getty Images) Author: Hasan al-Mustafa Posted March 24, 2014 It seems that the “statement of the scholars of Qatif and Al-Ahsa” in Saudi Arabia rejecting armed violence against the state is still attracting more supporters, who believe in the importance of stopping violence and clashes with security forces in the city of Al-Awamiyah in the east of the kingdom. Around 100 Shiite social activists and intellectuals from Al-Awamiyah declared their support in early March for the statement, as well as for a similar nonviolent initiative by Sheikh Jaafar al-Rebeh, a prominent Shiite cleric from Al-Awamiyah. Summary⎙ Print A statement by Saudi Shiite clerics rejecting armed violence against the state has been welcomed in Gulf media. Author Hasan al-Mustafa Posted March 24, 2014 Translator(s)Pascale Menassa Rebeh, also one of the signatories of the Shiite scholars' statement, has been seeking to find a peaceful solution to alleviate tensions that have been lying heavy on this Shiite town. The area has witnessed sporadic clashes over the past three years that have claimed the lives of locals and security personnel. The instability prompted security forces to erect checkpoints at the entrances to Al-Awamiyah. The checkpoints have aroused much discontent among locals, who complain of a lack of services and discrimination. Advocates against the security measures such as Shiite cleric Abdul Karim al-Habil stress that the demands of the Shiite population for economic, political and civil rights are legitimate, while accusing armed elements of hijacking the issue. The statement by the scholars suggested releasing those who have been arrested and are not involved in murder cases, and reducing the number of checkpoints at the entrances to Al-Awamiyah. On the other hand, work would be carried out to convince those wanted by the authorities to turn themselves in, on the condition they get fair and transparent trials. Rebeh has also been trying to present this initiative to authorities. Local newspapers in Saudi Arabia showed particular interest in the scholars’ statement. Major newspapers — such as Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Hayat, Al-Riyadh and Al-Iktisadiya — dedicated a remarkable amount of space on their pages to this statement. Saudi Sunni intellectuals wrote several articles in which they lauded the voice of reason that rejects violence. They considered the statement a “brave” step that deserves “appreciation.” This wide acceptance of the statement raises the question of what comes next. The next stage is one that suggests cooperation among official and local parties to create a road map that sets the stage for the optimism introduced in the statement. The road map should be the first step to saving Al-Awamiyah and its surroundings from violence and tension. However, this cannot happen unless the solution includes components for each of the political, social, economic and security levels. Limiting the solution to one of these aspects will not lead to the desired results that everybody is looking for. The statement also included a significant intellectual dimension, which is just as important as the political and social aspect of the statement. The statement interestingly accepts the notion of citizenship to a particular country instead of the traditional Islamist notion of belonging to a transnational "ummah," or community of Muslims. The state of “citizenship” mentioned in the statement contradicts the notion of a state for Islamists, who emphasize religious jurisdiction, and thus religious exclusivity should non-adherents to the particular creed reside within the said state. The modern state, however, is one in which the individual practices his rights without any racial, sexist or religious discrimination. This form of state, which joins the different components of society, can be read between the lines of the scholars’ statement. The statement praised this notion through mentioning an important factor — ensuring security and stability. After all, stability is a condition for development and sets the stage for legislation guaranteeing civil peace and the respect of human rights. However, the most important point in the statement was the clear call for “not politicizing religion,” which means removing any confusion regarding religion and politics. This call conforms to the Western definition of a civil or secular state. The statement clearly mentions political Islamic groups and armed organizations, which the signatories believe are “extremist groups and movements practicing terrorism and violence under religious and political slogans.” The scholars not only included this description but they also issued a cognitive and moral judgment when they declared that “Religion is not responsible for terrorism” and “Political violence destroys countries.” They emphasized, “The confessional scholars and society refuse and condemn any use of weapons and violence against the state or society, and they do not provide any political or religious cover for such acts.” The intended audience of the Shiite scholars’ statement was not only Shiites, rather it was directed to all citizens in the kingdom in particular and in the Gulf in general. Through the statement's "civil" language, it can surpass the narrow sectarian atmosphere and reach a wider audience. The statement reflects a positive image for Gulf Shiites, in their capacity as part of their nations — to which they are loyal — and working within a legal framework. The statement reflects that they are not "agents" or a "fifth column," as some extremist Salafists have tried to portray them. The latter have often claimed that the Shiites of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are agents for Iran, and this statement comes to prove the inaccuracy of this view and its malicious intent. The statement appeared to have begun to help break this perception, as evidenced by the attention it was afforded in Gulf newspapers, such as Al-Ittihad in the United Arab Emirates. Sultan Al Nuaimi, an Emirati academic specializing in Iranian affairs, wrote an article noting, "The lines of the statement issued by scholars of the Shiite community in Qatif and Al-Ahsa in the brotherly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an epic of cohesion and solidarity within the community, and an example to be followed for standing in the face of foreign ambitions." The positive reception of the statement in non-Shiite circles shows that nationalist, nonsectarian positions are able to garner support from figures and groups that have different intellectual, sectarian and political orientations. It is very important that the statement rejected the use of violence as a means to achieve societal objectives or demands. Legitimate power is the faculty of the state alone, and it can exercise its power in compliance with legal limitations that abide by human rights, without trespassing or abusing these rights. Otherwise, if violence were legitimized by any other party, chaos would prevail over society. The statement of Saudi Arabia’s Shiite clerics aims at paving the way for future steps that are based on the consolidation of the civil state and on dialogue and communication between the government and the components of society. Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/saudi-shiites-qatif-clashes-scholars.html#ixzz2wykfEW6U ========================================= Resurgence of Jihad Inc Zahid HussainShare Email Receiver Email Sender Name Your Email Cancel 0 Comment(s) Print Published at 2014-03-26 06:04:58 OUR resurgent jihad factory seems to be working overtime, supplying well-trained and highly motivated fighters for the Syrian and Afghan war theatres. There’s no dearth of radicalised volunteers to take part both on the internal and external front. Though theoretically still proscribed, the militant groups are back in business exploring new frontiers for jihad. Pakistanis form one of the largest contingents of foreign combatants in Syria and their number is likely to rise with the growing Saudi influence in this country. Meanwhile, the Afghan front is also heating up with the approach of the 2014 deadline for withdrawal of the US-led foreign forces, attracting a greater number of militants for what is described as the most critical phase of the battle for Afghanistan. A peace deal on their terms may give the Pakistani Taliban the crucial space to recoup and focus more on their activities across the Durand Line. Radical seminaries have long been the source of an uninterrupted supply of volunteers for the Afghan Taliban fighting the occupation forces. There’s a long history of Pakistani holy warriors fighting foreign wars from Afghanistan to Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, even getting involved in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region in Azerbaijan. But the avenue for external jihad shrank after 9/11, with Pakistan pulling back from its policy of using militancy as a tool of regional policy. Outraged by this change of tack, militant groups turned to internal jihad by declaring war on the Pakistani state. The ban on Pakistani militant groups, however, could never be fully enforced. Afghanistan remained a major battleground for jihadists. Now even that pretence seems to have been completely blown away with the state closing its eyes to the resurgence of militant and sectarian outfits. Militant fighters from Pakistan started joining the rebel forces fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime as Syria became the new centre for global jihad. Beginning as a movement for democracy the Syrian civil war has turned into a wider Shia-Sunni conflict drawing surrounding countries into the bloody power game. The Syrian civil war also heralded the resurgence of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups as a major force in the war-ravaged region. These groups now control a large part of Syria as well as the Sunni heartland in Iraq. The development has given the jitters to the West and to those Arab countries that have been actively backing the Syrian rebellion. To offset Al Qaeda’s rising power, these countries are trying to build a so-called moderate Sunni coalition. But the attempt seems to have failed, as those moderates depend on the support of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, the official Al Qaeda affiliate. Fearing Al Qaeda’s growing influence, the Saudi government has asked its nationals to return home. A major fear is that more radicalised warriors may turn their weapons on the Saudi rulers. But this has not stopped the Saudis from funding and arming the rebels and fighters from other countries. There are two categories of militants from Pakistan in Syria: those belonging to Sunni sectarian groups like Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and others from militant outfits including the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The presence of Pakistani fighters in Syria first made headlines last year after the detection of poliovirus which was traced back to Pakistan. It is apparent that the main motivation behind Sunni sectarian groups like the LJ is to fight the Shia-dominated Assad regime. Most of these fighters are believed to have been recruited from Balochistan, which has become the main sectarian battleground. Others belong to Punjab and Karachi. According to a top provincial police official, many from Balochistan were recruited through Saudi-funded groups, and the administration conveniently closed its eyes to this. Some reports quoting TTP commanders said the group has also set up a base in Syria. It is also an anti-Shia ideology that has driven the TTP to join the Syrian conflict. The Taliban have close ties with the LJ and other radical Sunni groups. A Pakistani Taliban fighter in Syria was quoted by a foreign news agency as saying that there was a higher reward from God for fighting evil at home as well as outside. All these groups have close ideological links with Al Qaeda and are most likely to be fighting along groups like Al Nusra. The most dangerous scenario presents itself once these fighters return to Pakistan. The involvement of Pakistani jihadis in Syria will have serious repercussions and fuel sectarian violence. The widening of the sectarian conflict in the Middle East and its spill-over effect inside Pakistan raises fears of radical Shia recruitment to join the war on the Syrian government’s side. That may also lead to an escalation in the proxy war in Pakistan. With the extremist narrative dominating the national scene and the state in denial there could not be a better environment for a thriving jihad industry. The so-called peace talks with the TTP have already taken off whatever pressure there was on the militants, giving them licence to venture into other jihadi arenas. A highly volatile situation in the Middle East calls for a more prudent policy approach by the government and for maintaining strict neutrality on the widening sectarian war. Instead, the prime minister has decided to take sides, with extremely grave consequences for the country. That gives a huge boost to the jihadis. The resurgence of Jihad Inc and the increasing involvement of Pakistani militants in foreign conflicts presents a grave challenge to the country’s stability and security. The writer is an author and journalist. zhussain100@yahoo.com Twitter: @hidhussain ====================