FACTBOX-Evidence from UK's Blair to Iraq War inquiry

21 Jan 2011

Source: reuters // Reuters


Jan 21 (Reuters) - Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair made a second appearance at a London inquiry into the Iraq War on Friday to clear up discrepancies in evidence he had already given. [ID:nLDE70I24X]

Here is a summary of some of the main new evidence the inquiry had been given or released before Blair's second questioning began on Friday morning.

* In a lengthy statement given to the inquiry before his appearance in response to specific questions, Blair wrote:

- He was aware that the British government's top lawyer Attorney General Peter Goldsmith had advised military action would be illegal until early 2003, but believed he would change his mind when he became aware of negotiations at the United Nations over the earlier resolution.

- On Jan. 30, 2003, Goldsmith advised military action would not be legitimate, a conclusion Blair said he did not understand. However the following day, he gave U.S. President George W. Bush a "strong commitment" that Britain would do what it took to disarm Saddam Hussein. In his statement Blair said he did not want to involve Bush in "a continuing legal debate, internal to the UK government".

- However, had Goldsmith not changed his mind, Britain would not have joined the invasion, Blair said.

"This would have been, in my judgement very damaging to the strategic interests of the country".

- Blair wrote that the United States had set a date for military action for March 2003 in late 2002 or early 2003.

- He knew that they would never get a second U.N. resolution specifically authorising the use of force. But the hope had been to get a "final" final ultimatum.

* In a declassified memo to his chief foreign policy adviser David Manning in March 2002, Blair wrote: "The persuasion job on this seems very tough. My own side are worried. Public opinion is fragile. International opinion -- as I found at the EU -- is pretty sceptical."

He added: "From a centre-left perspective, the case should be obvious. "In fact a political philosophy that does care about other nations ... and is prepared to change regimes on their merits, should be "gung-ho" on Saddam.

"People believe we are only doing it to support the US and they are only doing it to settle an old score. And the immediate WMD problems don't seem obviously worse than 3 years ago. So we have to re-order our story and message."

* In a report to Blair in July 2002, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote that United States had "no strategic concept for the military plans and in particular no thought apparently given to 'day after' scenarios".

* A memo from chief of staff Jonathan Powell to Blair in July 2002 says: "I think we need a road map to getting rid of Saddam".

"We need to establish a legal base. It needs to be based on WMD rather than terrorism or regime change.". It concludes: "lastly we should not rush this. We must do it right. if we are not ready in January 2003 then we may need to wait for autumn 2003." A handwritten message, apparently from Blair, on the document notes: "I agree with this entirely". (Reporting by Michael Holden; editing by Philippa Fletcher