Iran: Marriage for Politics?

By Fathi al-Maraghy
Tue. Sep. 1, 2009
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The daughters of Rafsanjani entered the political arena after getting married to the sons of Ayatollah Lahouti.
After the June 12 elections, politics in Iran has become such a complicated game, and the rift between what are known as Reformists and Conservatives has widened considerably.



However, members of Iran’s political elite have more in common than what can be noticed by political analysts, and perhaps that is why they do not fight each other till death. Marriage relations have been used by politicians in the Islamic Republic to strengthen their positions and to form alliances.



The nations of West Asia in general and Iranians in particular deal with marriage as a family’s rather than an individual’s decision. There is no much difference between men and women in this regard as both of them act upon the collective desire of the family. And the more religious the family is, the more such a tradition is honored. Consequently, marriages in Iran resemble strategic plans, in which individual desires are rarely taken into consideration.



Marriages in Khomeini’s Family



Although no member of Khomeini’s family occupies a political position in the Iranian system’s power hierarchy, being related to the family of the founder of the Islamic Republic through a marriage relationship affects a politician’s political weight considerably.



The family of Iran’s former president Mohamed Khatami has the strongest marriage relations with Khomeini’s family, and they take both direct and indirect forms.



Mohamed Khatami’s wife is Zahra Sadeqi, the niece of Imam Mousa Al-Sadr, the famous Lebanese scholar who disappeared mysteriously in Libya; therefore, Mohamed Khatami is known as the in-law of Lebanon. And the wife of Ahmed Khomeini is the other niece of Imam Mousa Al-Sadr.



On the other hand, Mohamed Reza Khatami, the brother of the former president, is married to Zahra Ishraqi, the granddaughter of Imam Khomeini and the daughter of Ayatollah Ishraqi.



Interestingly, marriages of the Khomeinis have affected the political inclination of the family in general, drawing it closer to the Reformist side of the political spectrum.



Hassan Khomeini is married to the daughter of Ayatollah Mousavi Bojnordi, one of the prominent figures in Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez – the most distinguished group in the Reformist movement. Furthermore, Yasser Khomeini, son of Hassan Khomeini, is married to the daughter of Mohamed Sadr, the Reformist candidate in the eighth parliamentary elections.



The Reformist inclination of the Khomeini family were clearly manifested in the refusal of the Guardian Council to approve the candidacy of Shihab Ishraqi, the grandson of Khomeini, in the ninth parliamentary elections. Such a refusal deeply angered the late Imam’s family, which urged the Guardian Council to reconsider its decision.



The only exception in the marriage relations in Khomeini’s family is the marriage of Khomeini’s granddaughter Zahra Ishraqi to the son of Mohsen Rezaei, the former head of the Revolutionary Guards and the losing candidate in the tenth presidential election.



Khamenei’s Family



One of the most important marriage relations in Khameini’s family is the marriage of his son Mojtaba to the daughter of Ghulam Ali Haddad, the former parliament speaker. Mojtaba, who supports Ahmadinejad, proved his ability to influence the Iranian political scene during the last presidential election as he was in control of the anti-protest militia.



Masoud, the second son of Khamenei, is married to the daughter of Ayatollah Kharazi, the sister of Sadiq Kharazi, who served as an advisor for former president Mohamed Khatami. Also, Sadiq Kharazi’s son is married to the daughter of Khatami’s brother.



Thus, Masoud’s marriage to a member of a Reformist family counterbalances his brother’s marriage and his Conservative inclinations. Yet, Khamenei’s eldest son Moustafa is married to the daughter of Ayatollah Khoshoqt, one of the leaders of the Sweet Scent of Service group, the main supporter of Ahmadinejad.



It can be argued that Khamenei’s family has a fair share of political division. Just like his sons, the Supreme Leaders’s brothers and sisters also have varying political affiliations.



Badri, the sister of the Supreme Leader, is married to Sheikh Ali Tehrani, a member of Mujahedeeni-e-Khalq (MEK). Badri and her family fled to Iraq in the early 1980s while her brother was president. Badri and her husband did not return to Iran till 1995 after receiving a covenant of security from the Supreme Leader.



Hadi Khamenei, a cleric himself, joined the Reformist movement in the 1990s and campaigned for Khatami. The younger brother of the Supreme Leader a pro-reform newspaper known as Hayat-e No, but the publication was banned in 2000 by a religious court. The former member of parliament was jailed several times.



The Khatami family is the luckiest in terms of the number of marriage relations it has with prominent families. Beside the family of Imam Mousa Al-Sadr and that of Khomeini, they are connected to Rafsanjani’s family through marriage relations. In addition, the Khatami family is connected to Khamenei’s family through his son Masoud who is married to one of the in-laws of Khatami’s family.



What is most interesting about Rafsanjani’s family, however, is that his daughters, Faezeh and Fatemeh, are the politically active members of the family.



The daughters of Iran’s prominent politician entered the political arena after getting married to the sons of Ayatollah Lahouti, a close companion of Khomeini and one of the ideologues of the Islamic Revolution.



On the contrary, Hashemi Rafsanjani’s sons have stayed away from politics, and both of them got married to women who do not belong to political families.



Ahmadinejad’s In-Laws



Perhaps all these marriage relationships seem normal because the founding fathers of all these families were religious scholars who accompanied Khomeini in his revolutionary struggle.



However, Ahmadinjad’s emergence on the Iranian political scene has produced a new phenomenon; family members and in-laws of politicians are being appointed to government positions, without any justification other than having family relations with the president.



Ahmadinejad’s decision to appoint his father-in-law, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as a vice-president angered all Iran’s political forces. Last year, Mashaai issued a number of provocative statements, describing the Israeli people as the friends of Iranians. Also, he attended a party in Turkey, during which dancers held copies of the Holy Qur’an on their heads. The controversial figure also has called for turning the Pilgrimage Institution in Iran into a part of the tourism agency.



All this urged the Supreme Leader to overturn the president’s decision. Ahmadinejad, however, tarried in implementing the Supreme Leader’s order, then announced later that Mashaai resigned. After some time, the hard-line president appointed his father-in-law as the head of his office and offered him all the vice-president’s privileges.



Although the media does not put Ahmadinejad’s wife Fakhr Al-Sadat in the limelight, her brothers are appointed to important governmental positions. For instance, Ismail Ahmadi, Ahmadinejad’s brother-in-law, is the head of Iran’s police force, and Alireza Ahmadi was the education minister during Ahmadinejad’s first term.



Other members of Fakhr Al-Sadat’s family were appointed to key positions.



Masoud Zaribafan was the cabinet secretary, and Mehrdad Bazrpash, the son-in-law of Alireza Ahmadi, is the Managing Director of Saipa – Iran’s auto manufacturer and one of the biggest industrial entities in the country. It is important to note that Bazrpash’s appointment was met by much criticism from Iranian politicians.



Furthermore, members of Ahmadinejad’s own family were appointed to senior government positions.



Dawood Ahmadinejad, the eldest brother of the president, was the head of the president’s inspectors office. Also, Hussain Shebeiry, Ahmadinejad’s brother-in-law, is head of the Reza Endowment.



On the other hand, Ahmadinejad’s sister is the chairman of the Women Affairs Center, which is affiliated to the president’s office, and her son, Ali Akbar Mehrabian, was the industry minister during her brother’s first term.



It is as if Ahmadinejad is telling Iran’s political elite that what he is doing is not a precedent and that they have been monopolizing power for three decades through a spider’s web of marriages. In such a context, what really matters is the ability of each politician to strengthen his position by appointing his relatives and allies to key positions in the system.



What still needs to be mentioned is that besides these major families, there are other important families, such as the family of Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebeli and the Larijani family. The Larijani family is in control of the Judiciary through its esteemed figure Sadiq Larijani.



Also, Ali Larijani was appointed to several key positions, including the Islamic guidance minister, the secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, and the representative of Qom. Also, Mohamed Larijani was the deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Members of the Larijani family have a fair share of power because of the marriage of Ali Larijani to the daughter of Ayatollah Motahhari, one of the closest companions of Khomeini.



The abovementioned applies also to the families of junior government employees, which turns marriage in Iran into a deal that should be planned carefully in order for the families to reap the benefits.



During the Shah’s time, there was one thousand privileged family because of their contribution to laying the foundations of the monarchy. And it seems that the situation under the Islamic system has not changed much.