Federalism and Decentralization in Libya’s Constitutional Proposals

#Libya | Family of Abu Anas al-Libi has received his body in #Tripoli. His son Abdullah says he won't forgive #Obama BREAKING: #Libya's factions agree to new round of talks in Geneva next week - UN statement ----------- Post : Federalism and Decentralization in Libya's Constitutional Proposals Link to Full Article : https://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2015/01/08/federalism-and-decentralization-in-libyas-constitutional-proposals/ Posted : Thursday, 8 January 2015 14:48 at 14:48 Author : Reidar Visser Categories : Federalism in the Middle East Excerpts: Constitutional drafts are emerging that make for some interesting surface comparison with the way federalism has been applied and continues to evolve in Iraq. on some subjects there are two competing proposals, again stressing the incomplete nature of the emerging charter. But at least some hints about the prevailing trends inside the constitution-writing committee are provided by the publication of these documents. On administrative structure, there are two papers. Reflecting the longstanding polarization in the Arab world between competing visions for state structure, there is one paper featuring decentralization and one paper using federalism as its point of departure. since the federalism position outlines a tripartite Libya consisting of Tripoli, Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic) and Fezzan, largely consisting of historical divisions that were also the chief organizing principle during Libya’s past existence as a federation in the 1950s and the 1960s. Conversely, the paper advocating administrative decentralization within a unified state sets out a map of 32 governorates. Most of those units are corresponding to Libya’s administrative map of 2001 which had the same number of administrative units before some mergers ensued in subsequent years. Provision is made for a cabinet decision on exact administrative boundaries, suggesting that at least some demarcation ambiguities remain. But unlike the Iraqi constitution – a Spanish-inspired hybrid of established regions (Kurdistan) and potential regions (elsewhere) – there is no suggestion that future federal regions in Libya will emerge based on popular initiatives. Whichever version is adopted, it is assumed that the administrative structure of Libya will be decided top-down, by the constitutional committee itself. Local services are in both papers described as the powers of the subunits, including in fields like agriculture, health and local police. However, unlike the situation in Iraq, some of the weightiest spheres of government including oil and energy, general security including the military and most education (not higher education) are implicitly kept for the central government to administer. In so doing, the Libyan proposals at least offer greater clarity than the Iraqi constitution does in terms of demarcating responsibilities for such areas of government as security and the oil sector, which will be controlled from the capital. Also unlike the Iraqi constitution, the question of dividing energy revenue is tackled head on, with a specific formula distributing income with 30% to the governorates according to population, 30% to the governorates on an equal basis, 30% to the central government, and 10% to the producing subunits. The last arrangement echoes the Iraqi petrodollar arrangement that has yet to achieve explicit constitutional confirmation. the paper on resource management is partially compatible with the federalism/decentralization papers as regards revenue sharing, but does not overlap entirely. For example, there is a stipulation that producing “areas” (manatiq, which could be anything but sounds like something quite local) should get 10% of the proceeds and “neighbouring areas”(similarly undefined) should have 3%. The latter stipulation would seem to be an attempt to micro-manage internal affairs of a potential autonomous federal region. Whereas this could be normal also in a federal system, other quotas of a non-territorial nature are referred to(ethnic minorities being specifically mentioned alongside the vaguer “components” – sharait and mukawinnat). The paper on the judiciary does not seem to relate to the federalism at all. For example, it does not include much in the way of guaranteed representation on a territorial basis. The decision by the new Abadi government to withdraw a legal challenge to far-ranging revisions of the provincial powers law passed by the previous parliament really does nothing to clear up the situation: Symptomatically, the move was coupled with an initiative to introduce revisions to the revised law. By comparison, these Libyan papers offer at least a modicum of clarity as regards the intended division of power between the centre and the provinces. Again compared to Iraq, Cyrenaica arguably has a more dominant role in the country’s oil production than Kurdistan has in Iraq, making the question of what will be acceptable in terms of a federal deal a potentially even more contentious issue. So far, the Libyan constitutional committee is offering far less to the provinces than the Iraqi committee dominated by the Kurds and one of the Shiite parties (SCIRI) did in 2005. All in all, it could offer a more viable formula for a unified state, but it could also prompt so strong reactions that the constitutional process gets aborted and separatism prevails.