Debunking three dangerous myths about the conflict in Libya

Debunking three dangerous myths about the conflict in Libya For the first time in years, there is a new hope that the fragmentation of Libya can be averted, thanks to new rounds of UN mediation efforts. There is a danger, however, that the media coverage accompanying these talks will actually fuel the conflict by perpetuating three fictions about the ongoing strife. Reports of the situation in Libya usually describe a war between two groups. On one side is the anti-Islamist “internationally recognised government”, based in the eastern city of Tobruk and, on the other, “radical Islamists” who control a Tripoli-based government in the west. This simplistic account empowers hardliners on all sides of the conflict, making a negotiated settlement less likely. The truth is far more complicated. Fiction one: this is a two-sided conflict International coverage of the situation in Libya assumes that decisions are made from the top down, as they so often are in the west. But in fact, Libya’s political groups are organised less as hierarchies and more as networks. Their leaders are only one voice among many and decisions are based on consensus. Near the end of the 2011 revolution, there were 236 fighting groups operating in Misrata, the country’s third-largest city. Each had its own command structure and identity, and ranged in size from nine to 1,727 fighters. On the western front of Misrata, 146 groups co-ordinated attacks and defence, but there was no leader. Instead, a group of 14-20 prominent commanders met every night to discuss strategy and decide on next steps. Members would voice different opinions, and a consensus would emerge through hours of discussion. Some voices carried more sway, but there was no leader making choices on behalf of the group. The political parties in Libya function in a similar way. They rely on consensus-based decision making among relative equals. The Tripoli-based coalition (sometimes called the Libya Dawn) is in fact a temporary alliance between dozens of political factions and hundreds of military units, each with its own identity and interests. It only decided to join the UN mediation efforts after days of group consultations and side discussions. The Tobruk-based government is no different. There is an alliance of convenience between its political and military factions but the two have competing interests at times. And even within the military forces there are further divisions. What is often described as the Libyan National Army, is better understood as a coalition of local federalist-leaning militias, tribal-oriented confederations, disaffected military units, Zintani revolutionary battalions and Qaddafi-era military personnel. Neither “side” in the conflict should be seen as a cohesive bloc, even though it is in the interest of these coalition leaders to portray themselves as unified groups. Fiction two: the issues are national Thanks to the densely networked and relationship-based makeup of Libya’s different political groups, the violence there is almost exclusively fuelled by local, not national, concerns. The 2011 revolution may have appeared to be a single uprising but it was actually more like a series of parallel, city-based armed revolts. Each had its own particular historic and political tensions. Today’s violence is just as balkanised. The unrest in southern Libya, for example, plays out between two ethnic minorities – the Tebu and Tuareg. They clash over lucrative smuggling routes and control of oil installations. Similarly, the clashes in Benghazi between General Khalifa Haftar’s coalition and an array of armed groups – ranging from Islamist-leaning militias to outright religious extremists – have parochial roots. ((Narrowly restricted in scope or outlook; provincial: parochial attitudes.)) General Khalifa Haftar. EPA Click to enlarge . The only purely national conflicts are political, not military. These include disputes over who controls the nation’s oil and its central bank. The battle for legitimacy between Libya’s two duelling parliaments is being fought in the national and international media, which makes improving the accuracy of reporting crucial. As things stand, few Libyans see either parliament as legitimate. Fiction three: Islamists v anti-Islamists With the help of a partisan national media and a largely uninformed international press, Haftar has successfully demonised all his opponents as Islamist terrorists. Many Misratan military commanders are now equated with Islamic State – something they find comical and baffling. The international media’s fixation on this simplistic dichotomy between anti-Islamists and religious extremists is problematic. Many Misratan commanders argue it trivialises the very real threat posed by Libya’s various extremist groups. There are varying degrees of conservatism between the political and military groups on all sides. The commanders in Misrata acknowledge that many of its members are more conservative. But as one Misratan commander explained Some of the groups are more conservative but they believe in democracy, which is all that matters to me. Besides, I would say most are less religiously conservative than the Republicans in the US Congress. Most Libyan leaders occupy a middle ground and this tendency to pit two extremes against each other reduces their chances of negotiating a settlement. It empowers hardliners who use the rhetoric to justify their own aspirations for power. A negotiated settlement is Libya’s only hope at this stage. Without one, violence will escalate. And with the increased media attention paid to UN mediation efforts, it is critical that we take more care in writing and reading about the situation there. This will empower moderates on all sides, increasing their chances of success. An opportunity like this is unlikely to appear again soon.

Federalism and Decentralization in Libya’s Constitutional Proposals

#Libya | Family of Abu Anas al-Libi has received his body in #Tripoli. His son Abdullah says he won't forgive #Obama BREAKING: #Libya's factions agree to new round of talks in Geneva next week - UN statement ----------- Post : Federalism and Decentralization in Libya's Constitutional Proposals Link to Full Article : https://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2015/01/08/federalism-and-decentralization-in-libyas-constitutional-proposals/ Posted : Thursday, 8 January 2015 14:48 at 14:48 Author : Reidar Visser Categories : Federalism in the Middle East Excerpts: Constitutional drafts are emerging that make for some interesting surface comparison with the way federalism has been applied and continues to evolve in Iraq. on some subjects there are two competing proposals, again stressing the incomplete nature of the emerging charter. But at least some hints about the prevailing trends inside the constitution-writing committee are provided by the publication of these documents. On administrative structure, there are two papers. Reflecting the longstanding polarization in the Arab world between competing visions for state structure, there is one paper featuring decentralization and one paper using federalism as its point of departure. since the federalism position outlines a tripartite Libya consisting of Tripoli, Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic) and Fezzan, largely consisting of historical divisions that were also the chief organizing principle during Libya’s past existence as a federation in the 1950s and the 1960s. Conversely, the paper advocating administrative decentralization within a unified state sets out a map of 32 governorates. Most of those units are corresponding to Libya’s administrative map of 2001 which had the same number of administrative units before some mergers ensued in subsequent years. Provision is made for a cabinet decision on exact administrative boundaries, suggesting that at least some demarcation ambiguities remain. But unlike the Iraqi constitution – a Spanish-inspired hybrid of established regions (Kurdistan) and potential regions (elsewhere) – there is no suggestion that future federal regions in Libya will emerge based on popular initiatives. Whichever version is adopted, it is assumed that the administrative structure of Libya will be decided top-down, by the constitutional committee itself. Local services are in both papers described as the powers of the subunits, including in fields like agriculture, health and local police. However, unlike the situation in Iraq, some of the weightiest spheres of government including oil and energy, general security including the military and most education (not higher education) are implicitly kept for the central government to administer. In so doing, the Libyan proposals at least offer greater clarity than the Iraqi constitution does in terms of demarcating responsibilities for such areas of government as security and the oil sector, which will be controlled from the capital. Also unlike the Iraqi constitution, the question of dividing energy revenue is tackled head on, with a specific formula distributing income with 30% to the governorates according to population, 30% to the governorates on an equal basis, 30% to the central government, and 10% to the producing subunits. The last arrangement echoes the Iraqi petrodollar arrangement that has yet to achieve explicit constitutional confirmation. the paper on resource management is partially compatible with the federalism/decentralization papers as regards revenue sharing, but does not overlap entirely. For example, there is a stipulation that producing “areas” (manatiq, which could be anything but sounds like something quite local) should get 10% of the proceeds and “neighbouring areas”(similarly undefined) should have 3%. The latter stipulation would seem to be an attempt to micro-manage internal affairs of a potential autonomous federal region. Whereas this could be normal also in a federal system, other quotas of a non-territorial nature are referred to(ethnic minorities being specifically mentioned alongside the vaguer “components” – sharait and mukawinnat). The paper on the judiciary does not seem to relate to the federalism at all. For example, it does not include much in the way of guaranteed representation on a territorial basis. The decision by the new Abadi government to withdraw a legal challenge to far-ranging revisions of the provincial powers law passed by the previous parliament really does nothing to clear up the situation: Symptomatically, the move was coupled with an initiative to introduce revisions to the revised law. By comparison, these Libyan papers offer at least a modicum of clarity as regards the intended division of power between the centre and the provinces. Again compared to Iraq, Cyrenaica arguably has a more dominant role in the country’s oil production than Kurdistan has in Iraq, making the question of what will be acceptable in terms of a federal deal a potentially even more contentious issue. So far, the Libyan constitutional committee is offering far less to the provinces than the Iraqi committee dominated by the Kurds and one of the Shiite parties (SCIRI) did in 2005. All in all, it could offer a more viable formula for a unified state, but it could also prompt so strong reactions that the constitutional process gets aborted and separatism prevails.

Syrian rebels threaten to target Shi'ite villages in Aleppo

Syrian rebels threaten to target Shi'ite villages in Aleppo Mon, Jul 01 14:04 PM EDT 6 of 9 BEIRUT (Reuters) - Syrian rebels in the northern province of Aleppo on Monday threatened to seize two Shi'ite Muslim villages that back President Bashar al-Assad unless they surrendered to the opposition. Activists say both Nubl and Zahra villages had been reinforced by Assad's allies in the increasingly sectarian war, among them fighters from Iran and Lebanon's powerful Shi'ite guerrilla group, Hezbollah. "We announce our intention to liberate Nubl and Zahra from the regime and its shabbiha (pro-Assad militia), and from the Hezbollah and Iranian elements," the rebels said in an Internet video. The 27-month-old conflict, which pits mostly Sunni insurgents against Assad, from an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam, has already killed more than 100,000 people and driven 1.7 million Syrians to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Assad's forces, spearheaded by Hezbollah, have made a number of gains since they seized the border town of Qusair last month. There have also been heavy clashes in Aleppo and surrounding districts, fuelling expectations that Assad aims to re-establish control of Syria's largest city. On Sunday rebels shot down a helicopter close to Nubl, which activists said had been carrying supplies to the villages. Authorities in Damascus said they were taking Education Ministry employees to supervise school exams. Seven employees and the helicopter crew were killed, they said. A video released by activists a few weeks earlier showed an army officer apparently recruiting Shi'ite villagers in Zahra and Nubl to form fighting units to support the army against the rebels. "PREVENT A SINGLE DROP OF BLOOD" "In order to prevent a single drop of blood from being spilled and to find a peaceful solution, we have set the following conditions," the video statement by the rebels said. Among the demands were the surrender of Assad's forces and their weapons, followed by a power sharing deal between the locals and the rebels. "If there is no response (to rebel demands for surrender) there will be a major military operation on those two villages," the statement said. The sectarian nature of the conflict has set regional Sunni Muslim powers - notably Gulf Arab states and Turkey - against Assad's Shi'ite Iranian and Hezbollah allies in a deepening proxy war on Syrian soil. Deputy U.S. Secretary of State William Burns, speaking at the end of a visit to neighboring Lebanon, condemned Hezbollah's military intervention in Syria. "Despite its membership in the Lebanese government, Hezbollah has decided to put its own interests and those of its foreign backers above those of the Lebanese people," Burns said. "We condemn in the strongest terms Hezbollah's actions in Syria. They ... stand in direct violation of Lebanon's disassociation policy (from Syria) and place the future of Lebanon at risk." Hezbollah's role in Syria, along with Sunni Islamist fighters smuggled over the border to fight for the Syrian rebels, has exacerbated sectarian tensions in Lebanon which is still scarred by its own 1975-1990 civil war. Fighting has broken out in the Mediterranean cities of Tripoli and Sidon, while rockets have been fired at a Hezbollah district of southern Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley. Saudi Arabia, which has accelerated armed support for the rebels according to Gulf sources, urged the European Union on Monday to arm Syrian rebels without delay. Riyadh and its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council also called on the United Nations Security Council to meet to prevent a massacre in the central city of Homs, where Assad's forces have been waging an assault on rebel-held districts. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported heavy army bombardment and clashes with rebel fighters for a third day in the contested city, which sits on an axis connecting Damascus to the heartland of Assad's minority Alawite sect in the hills overlooking the Mediterranean. It said neither side appeared to be gaining any ground. (Editing by Andrew Heavens) ================================= Fatwa for make-up: Islamists target women in rebel-controlled Syrian territories Get short URL Published time: July 02, 2013 10:39 AFP Photo / Karim Sahib Share on tumblr Trends Syria unrest Tags Human rights, Law, Opposition, Politics, Protest, Religion, Syria Syrian rebels have issued a ban on women using make up or wearing “immodest dress” in a neighborhood in the city of Aleppo. Critics have blasted the move as another attempt by Islamists to impose Sharia in rebel-controlled territory. The fatwa (an order based on Sharia law) was issued by the Islamic law council in Aleppo's Fardous neighborhood. "Muslim women are banned from leaving the house in immodest dress, in tight clothing that shows off their bodies or wearing makeup on their face. It is incumbent on all our sisters to obey God and commit to Islamic etiquette," the statement on the Fardous council's Facebook page says as cited by Reuters, which reports that Aleppo residents have confirmed the news. Some of the comments showed support for the ruling, arguing there was nothing wrong in requiring that people follow “certain etiquette in public". Critics lashed out at the Islamist-led rebels for abusing their power. The women’s clothing fatwa has been viewed as the latest example of Islamic radicalism growing within rebel-controlled Syrian areas. A video released a few days ago features public beheadings of alleged Assad loyalists. The executed men were Christians according to some media reports, with one of the dead being a priest. Various local sources have accused Jabhat al Nusra – the Al Qaeda-affiliated radical Islamist group opposed to Syrian President Bashar Assad– of carrying out the killings. At the beginning of June a teenage boy in the northern city of Aleppo was allegedly executed for blasphemy in front of his family by an al-Qaeda-affiliated opposition group. But European MP Nick Griffin, who was in Damascus with a fact-finding delegation in June, argues Syrians are not going to accept the implementation of harsh Sharia laws. “We’ve been able to talk with ordinary Syrians at all sorts of different levels. Something that comes out from all those people who we speak to is that Syria wasn’t perfect, but it was a secular and tolerant state where no one even cared if someone was Sunni or Shia or Christian or Jewish,” Griffin told RT after his visit. Imposing Sharia could backfire against the anti-Assad forces as the most recent events in Egypt suggest. The 2011 revolt saw Islamists come to power in the North African state and attempt to push through a Sharia constitution. The move eventually sparked an even greater uprising, with millions now in the streets protesting the “islamization” of their country. “All [Morsi] has done is introduce or he tried to introduce that fundamental constitution that would turn Egypt into a Sharia state. Most Egyptians don’t want that. They want to have their religion in private, but not to have the state dictate to them exactly what it is going to look like,” political analyst and author William Engdahl told RT. ======================