Clashes hit Yemen capital again as Houthis pursue political gains

7 shocking facts about Saudi Arabia under ‘modernizing’ reign of King Abdullah Published time: January 26, 2015 07:47 Edited time: January 26, 2015 13:54 Get short URL Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud (Reuters/Zainal Abd Halim ZH/DL) Al-Qaeda, Human rights, Law, Modernization, Opposition, Politics, Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Taken aback by the fulsome praise the recently deceased King Abdullah has garnered from world leaders, RT has decided to assess whether his record stands up to scrutiny. READ MORE: Saudi King Abdullah dead – state TV The majority of eulogies went beyond the requirements of diplomatic etiquette, while some epithets used by Western politicians made people believe they had stepped through the looking glass. UK Prime Minister David Cameron said the monarch, who died at 90, “strengthened understanding between faiths,” while IMF chief Christine Lagarde called him “a strong advocate of women,” albeit a “discreet” one. And almost all political grandees seemed to agree that the scion of the House of Saud, was – in the words of Tony Blair – “a skillful modernizer,” who “led his country into the future.” READ MORE: #JeSuisAbdullah? Critics slam glowing Western eulogies for ‘reformer’ Saudi king One is invited to do a reality check and examine how far the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques really brought his country into the 21st century. 1. No elections, no parties, no parliament, no dissent Continuing its consistent decades-long record, Saudi Arabia received the lowest possible marks for civil and political freedoms in the annual Freedom House rankings in 2014. The countries placed alongside it were North Korea, Turkmenistan, and smattering of the most brutal African dictatorships. The regime’s disregard for any accountability to its people is brazen. There are no national elections, no parties, and no parliament – only a symbolic advisory chamber, known as Majlis al-Shura. Criticism is strictly forbidden: only last year, prominent opposition activist Abd al-Kareem al-Khoder joined hundreds of the country’s political prisoners, when he was sentenced to eight years for demanding the changeover to a constitutional monarchy. Just days before King Abdullah’s death, blogger Raif Badawi was given the first 50 of his 1,000 lashes – for calling for free speech on his blog. King Abdullah introduced municipal elections upon his official ascension to the throne – as a largely symbolic valve mechanism. At the same time, high-profile petitions demanding greater reform a decade ago landed their authors in prison. The country's sizable and restive Shia minority in the east - which led a series of public protests from 2011 onwards - is also systematically starved of political representation, somewhat inevitably, in a country led by a single Sunni family. 2. Equality: Jobs for the Saud boys – all 7,000 of them The grip of the House of Saud on the country’s levers of power and purse strings would be the envy of any medieval court. More than 7,000 princes bearing that family name are alive – with some experts speculating that the real number of titled family members approaches 30,000. Every single one has to be allocated a job commensurate with his lineage – creating hundreds of sinecures – while conversely, all talented candidates are shut out from key jobs if they do not bear the correct surname. Saudi Princess Lulwa Khaled Al-Saud (L) (Reuters/Fahad Shadeed) 3. Power transfer: Half Brezhnev-era USSR, half Game of Thrones Ironically, with such a large pool of descendants to choose from, the House of Saud is crippled by particularly outdated succession laws. Instead of primogeniture – where the title is inherited by the first-born son of the ruler – Saudi Arabia uses agnatic seniority, or the passing of power across to one’s brothers. This means that the 90-year-old Abdullah has been succeeded by 79-year-old half-brother Salman, while Crown Prince Muqrin turns 70 this year. Saudi King Salman (Reuters/Yuya Shino) Underneath the geriatric cadre of leaders, there exists a viper’s nest of intrigue, as the exponentially bigger younger generation plans to stake its claim on the throne, with factions aplenty split among the different branches of the sprawling family. It is not obvious how such a system guarantees the increasing prosperity and stability of a 21st-century state, and King Abdullah did little to reform its basic tenets. 4. Law: Scimitars and whips It may have become almost an online cliché to compare the legal systems of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State, but the links between the two are fundamental. Both use the same ultra-conservative Hanbali school of jurisprudence, and many of the IS “judges” are Saudis, due to their familiarity with this concept of justice. Among the punishments distributed is anything from hands and feet being chopped off for theft, lashes for adultery and other “social” misdemeanors, to beheading, which can be handed down for crimes as varied as sedition, carjacking, sorcery and drug smuggling. Eighty-seven people are thought to have been beheaded in 2014, which is in line with the national average over the past five years, despite ever-growing external pressure on Saudi Arabia. Only this month, a video emerged online, showing an executioner repeatedly hacking away at the neck of a screaming condemned woman, as people looked on open-mouthed. Unlike solving some of Saudi Arabia’s deep-seated problems, the curtailing of such “justice” would have just required one firm intervention from King Abdullah. It is clear, this was not a priority for him. 5. Human rights: Torture and gavel There is no legal code in Saudi Arabia, leaving it to individual judges to set the punishment for a crime in accordance with their interpretation of Islamic scriptures. This gives them unlimited power, creating arguably one of the most inconsistent justice systems in the world, in which crimes and punishments are simply made up, leaving the convicts no obvious way to appeal. In addition, much of the legal process hinges on a “confession” from the defendant, which in turn encourages torture. In practice, the information obtained this way is even less reliable than that received from inmates at Guantanamo, as instead of trying to extract provable data, the torturers are merely demanding admissions of guilt – by all means available. King Abdullah attempted to rationalize the system, by creating more appeal courts, and introducing a stricter selection of judges. However, he did not question the value of the legal system as a whole, and all judges that have been appointed in the past two decades have been personally approved by him. 6. Women’s rights: Female (non-)drivers Over the past decade, the battle lines have been drawn on the symbolic issue of women drivers in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf monarchy is the last country in the world, where women are still not allowed to drive. Reuters/Faisal Al Nasser The issue is not near resolution, and women caught behind the wheel – whether during a symbolic protest, or an ordinary drive – can still end up sentenced to lashings. In fairness, King Abdullah did intervene in at least one case in 2011, to commute a punishment. But of course, for the majority of Saudi women, driving is the least of their problems. Many would prefer to be able to leave the house, make a purchase, sign any legal document – in fact perform almost any official action, from agreeing to surgery, to signing up to a class – without the consent of a guardian, either the husband or the father. Yet, even these suffocating measures give only scant impression of the status of Saudi women in a society where even their court testimony is worth half of that of a man. King Abdullah encouraged more women to go into education, and allocated them a fifth of the seats in his advisory chamber, also allowing them to vote and run in the 2015 municipal elections. As with other reform areas, these are top-down symbolic gestures that have done little to affect most Saudi women, who - outside of warzones - remain some of the most disadvantaged anywhere in the world. Still, Abdullah’s admirers can hope that his first steps will lay the foundation to profound change, not patronizing concessions. Reuters/Faisal Al Nasser 7. Terrorism fight: Friend or foe? A voluntary $100 million donation to the UN’s counter-terrorism center last year was a show of generosity from Riyadh, but what the Saudis give with one hand, they seem to take away with the other. According to the diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks in 2010, the US regards Saudi Arabia as the biggest source of Sunni terrorism funding in the world, and a “crucial” piggy-bank for Al-Qaeda and other radical groups. While much of its funding comes from private individuals, their identity is unlikely to have been a secret to King Abdullah, who did nothing to rein in his family members. In fact, one could be tempted to feel that the House of Saud is only against the “wrong” kind of terrorist – mostly Shia, but also splinter Sunni groups that threaten its hegemony over the region. When the “right” kinds of terrorist – Russia’s Chechen militants, or anti-Assad rebels – appear, then those in Riyadh palaces not only support them with funds, but see them as a legitimate tool for spreading influence and the favored Wahhabi ideology. Fighters of al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant carry their weapons during a parade at the Syrian town of Tel Abyad, near the border with Turkey January 2, 2014. (Reuters/Yaser Al-Khodor) ========= Yemen crisis is first big test for Saudi Arabia's King Salman Mon, Jan 26 04:54 AM EST image By Angus McDowall RIYADH (Reuters) - The turmoil hitting Saudi Arabia's neighbor Yemen will pose the first big test for King Salman, and provide a glimpse as to whether his approach to hotspots in a fragmenting region will differ from that of his late brother. Yemen is at risk of breaking up with the ascent of the Houthi movement, a group whose main strategic alliance is with Riyadh's great regional foe Iran, in a country also home to Sunni al Qaeda's most active affiliate. In that respect, Yemen reflects what has happened across the Middle East, with Tehran's Shi'ite Muslim allies dominating war-torn Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia attempting to back Sunni groups without bolstering its Islamist militant enemies. Under King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia constructed a dual-track regional policy of attempting to contain Iranian influence while at the same time opposing the growth of Sunni political Islam which it saw as an ideological threat to dynastic rule. That does not look likely to change, although the arrival of a younger man may make for a more active approach, possibly including a new effort to reach out and engage local players in Yemen, analysts say. Foreign policy in Saudi Arabia is a team job for the clique of ruling princes, even though it is the king who has the ultimate say. Salman was an integral part of Abdullah's team, and he brings many of the same princes into his own. "They are not going to get involved in a quagmire. I don't think there will be major change. It's about containment," said a Saudi close to policymakers. However, the fact that he is 11 years younger than Abdullah, and able to give more direct attention to the big issues, may mean Saudi policy will become more proactive, particularly in Yemen, where there have been years of quiet disengagement. "I think they're going to go to Yemen with open eyes and will try to contact all parties in the crisis and not exclude anyone," said Mustafa Alani, a security expert with close ties to the kingdom's Interior Ministry. After decades buying the support of tribes, politicians and clerics in Yemen, the Al Saud watched as their patronage network fell apart during a 2011 uprising and have now fallen back on a defensive security policy. Riyadh is constructing a tough series of border defenses to insulate itself from its turbulent neighbor and has cut off funding to Sanaa, hoping that will eventually persuade Yemen's new rulers to compromise. FOREIGN EXPERIENCE Sunday editions of the main Saudi newspapers ran at more than triple length, as companies bought full-page adverts to express their condolences for the late Abdullah and allegiance to King Salman and his two designated heirs. Both Crown Prince Muqrin, who was intelligence chief from 2005-12 and whose mother was Yemeni, and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is Interior Minister, have been closely involved in Saudi Arabia's Yemen policy. It is Prince Mohammed, whose main focus is on assuring the kingdom's domestic security, who has been most prominent in shaping its Yemen policy in recent years, working closely with Sanaa against al Qaeda, but also strengthening border defenses. "The Saudis are looking for a real partner. They are very, very confused," said a source close to Yemen's government, adding that they would not support any government that the Houthis shared in. A more proactive Yemen policy might mean reaching out to former leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Islah party, erstwhile allies of Riyadh but whose unreliable track record and ties to the Muslim Brotherhood later became anathema to Abdullah. Salman may feel less worried about Islah, which beside the Brotherhood is also tied to tribal players and street leaders of the 2011 uprising, and may consequently adjust Riyadh's attitude towards it as one potential partner in Yemen, say analysts. Any change in attitude towards Islah would be closely watched by Egypt, where President Abdel Fatteh el Sisi has ruthlessly crushed the Brotherhood with the vocal encouragement of Abdullah and still seeks Saudi economic support. However, Riyadh views Yemeni politics as distinct from those of the wider region, so its behavior towards Islah or the Houthis might not reflect wider stances towards the Brotherhood or Iran. "I don't think their policy towards Yemen is reflective of their policy towards the world. It's their back yard and very particularistic and idiosyncratic," said Bernard Haykel, professor of near east studies at Princeton. IRAN RIFT There seems little chance that the region-wide tussle for power with Iran will abate, despite brief visits by its Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Friday and Saturday for Abdullah's funeral and the formal paying of respects. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has pushed for better ties between the two countries, whose rivalry has been a factor in conflicts across the Middle East. Zarif and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal met at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September. Tehran has attacked Prince Saud for his harsh words towards Iran's policy in Syria, and diplomats say the Islamic republic views him as a hardliner who is obstructing detente. However, Prince Saud, who had an operation in the United States on Sunday, state media reported, does not set foreign policy alone. While his voice is important, he just one among several top princes who contribute, with the king having the final say. The senior ranks of the Al Saud regard Tehran's continued support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as an immovable obstacle to rapprochement, and the crisis in Yemen has only served to further harden them against Iran's call for detente. "Salman is quite hawkish on Iran. He's personally quite hawkish. The Iranians would have to do a lot for him to change his policy," said Haykel. (Additional reporting by Yara Bayoumy in Sanaa and William Maclean in Dubai; editing by Philippa Fletcher) ========= Yemen risks disintegration as south rejects Shi'ite group's takeover Sun, Jan 25 06:43 AM EST image By Yara Bayoumy SANAA (Reuters) - No sooner had Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced his resignation than his country's tenuous political fabric began to disintegrate. Provinces across a nation barely held together by a complex web of tribal and religious alliances said they would no longer take military commands from Sanaa after the Iranian-allied Shi'ite Houthi group besieged Hadi's home and palace this week. The emerging fragmentation of the Arabian Peninsula country has sparked fears of the "Somalization" of a state which is home to a revitalized al Qaeda insurgency as well as a neighbor to top oil exporter Saudi Arabia. For Washington, Yemen's splintering would make it hard to carry out a counter-terrorism strategy against al Qaeda plotters who have targeted it and its ally Saudi Arabia and claimed responsibility for the Jan. 7 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. Through Hadi, a supporter of U.S. drone strikes on al Qaeda, Yemen was a top U.S. ally in the Washington's fight against islamist militancy. For Yemen's neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, the rise of the Houthis resembles yet another fallen domino in capitals where allies of regional rival Iran have risen to power - including Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad. The Houthi fighters, a guerrilla force drawn from a Shi'ite minority that ruled a thousand-year kingdom in Yemen's highlands until 1962, first seized the capital Sanaa in September. They managed to coexist with Hadi until last week, when fighters crushed the president's guards and deployed outside his home. Although Hadi signed a deal acceding to many of the Houthis' demands, that attempt to defuse the crisis failed and he unexpectedly resigned soon afterwards. ANGRY, SCARED His move sparked a chain reaction from other provinces, some home to powerful military divisions, to dissociate themselves with the capital, where the Houthis are ostensibly in control even if they have not quite figured out a way to govern. "People are angry, people are scared. The worst is that it could turn into a civil war," a diplomatic source said. "It's chaos," said another diplomat. In the southern city of Aden, once the capital of a Marxist independent South Yemen, the local security committee said it would no longer receive orders from the capital Sanaa. Yemen's north and south united in 1990 but civil war broke out four years later, with then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh crushing southern secessionists to maintain the union. Now, various leaders of a long stagnant separatist movement have announced their secession. None speak for the entire region, comprised of eight provinces, sparking fears of further localized fighting among southerners. "WE REJECT THE COUP" In Aden, local groups raised the flag of the south in the general security building. In Mukallah, the capital city of the Hadramout province, militia fanned out across the city. In Ateq, capital city of the restive Shabwa province, local media reports said joint patrols by a secessionist group and local security had also taken over security of the area. In the eastern oil-rich province of Marib, which has emerged as a flashpoint between the Houthis and Sunni tribesmen in recent months, local political and security officials denounced the Jan. 19 events as a coup and said they would no longer take orders from Sanaa either. In Taiz and Ibb, thousands of anti-Houthi protesters also took to the streets. "We reject the coup," they said, in festive street protests reminiscent of the 2011 "Arab Spring" demonstrations that brought down Hadi's long-serving predecessor, Saleh. Even in Sanaa, factional fighting is a possibility with the army torn in its loyalties to the ousted Saleh or to the orders of the Houthis. The political vacuum showed no signs of easing as parliament indefinitely postponed its session to approve or reject Hadi’s resignation as backroom political dealings carried on to negotiate a way out of the crisis. PARALYSIS In recent days the capital has seen the first serious rejection of Houthi rule since their takeover. Many Sanaa residents have complained as fighters have set up checkpoints, taken over government ministries and spray painted their green-and-red Iranian-inspired "Death to America, Death to Israel" slogans on mosques and the wall around the Old City. Initially there was little public action in a country that has gone through numerous cycles of instability. But this week saw the largest anti-Houthi demonstration since the movement took over the capital. "We say no to the coup. No to Abdelmalek al-Houthi," said Samar, 35, referring to the Houthis' leader, whose family name is carried by the group. In a sign the Houthis might be losing patience, witnesses said they broke up a small protest outside Sanaa University on Sunday, firing shots in the air and arresting eight protesters. For Ahmed Ali, an elderly corn seller on the busy streets of Sanaa, the protests are no use. "The Houthis are bulls. I support these protests but what is the use? The Houthis deal with force." (Editing by William Maclean and Peter Graff) ===================== Tue, Jan 20 17:13 PM EST By Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari SANAA (Reuters) - Fighters from the Houthi group battled guards at the Yemeni president's private home and entered the presidential palace on Tuesday, witnesses said, as a second day of violence in Sanaa raised fears the country was descending into chaos. In a speech on live television, Houthi leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi suggested two days of fighting involving his men, condemned by U.S. President Barack Obama and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, were part of an attempt to protect a power-sharing deal meant to steer Yemen to stability. His speech was repeatedly critical of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a U.S. ally with whom Houthi has been at odds over a draft constitution intended to help end decades of conflict and underdevelopment. He said no one, including Hadi, was above any steps when it came to implementing the power-sharing accord, which was negotiated after his men seized Yemen's capital, Sanaa, in September. Houthi prizes the accord as it grants his group participation in all military and civil state bodies. "We ... will not hesitate to impose any necessary measures to implement the peace and partnership agreement," said Houthi, whose Shi'ite Muslim group is widely seen as an ally of Iran in its regional struggle for influence with Saudi Arabia. TENSIONS The emergence of the Houthis as Yemen's top power in September has scrambled alliances and stoked tensions across Yemen's political spectrum, raising fears of deeper instability in a country that has one of al Qaeda's most active branches. Yemeni Information Minister Nadia al-Saqqaf said the clashes at Hadi's residence amounted to an attempt to topple Yemen's government, a charge denied by a senior official of the Houthi group. The clashes followed some of the worst fighting in Sanaa in years on Monday. Guards loyal to Hadi fought artillery battles near the presidential palace with the Houthi, which has been in conflict with Hadi over political and constitutional issues. "Yemeni president under attack by armed militias seeking the overthrow of the ruling system," Saqqaf said on Twitter on Tuesday evening. Residents said later the fighting had died down. A government official said two people had been killed. The minister did not identify the militias, but she said they were firing from nearby houses. Hadi lives in his private home and not in the palace. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthi politburo, said his group had no plans to target Hadi. "Ansarullah has no intention of targeting President Hadi or his house," Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the group's politburo, told Reuters, using the group's official name. He said what happened at Hadi's house was the result of a "provocation" by Hadi's security and that the incident has been contained. Earlier on Tuesday, Houthi fighters had entered Yemen's presidential palace after a brief clash with security guards, witnesses and security sources told Reuters. DENIAL Bukhaiti said the Popular Committees acted at the presidential palace on request from officers who had asked them to help stop a local officer from stealing weapons from the compound. In Washington, Obama's senior adviser Valerie Jarrett said the president was following the situation in Sanaa. "He's obviously is in touch with the folks on the ground, our embassy, he's getting regular updates from his national security team," Jarrett, said speaking in a television interview on MSNBC. Asked whether there was a plan in place to evacuate U.S. embassy staff or other Americans, Jarrett said she had no specific comment but added: "We are in close touch with our embassy." U.S. officials have expressed worries about Iranian support, including weapons, for Houthi's Shi’ite fighters. They had hoped that the power-sharing deal struck in September between the country’s political factions would calm the situation. Washington has made clear in the past that it sees chaos in Yemen as creating conditions that al Qaeda can exploit to strengthen its support and let it use the country for plotting attacks on Western interests. Even amid the growing turmoil of recent months, U.S. policy makers have considered Yemen’s government a model of regional collaboration on counterterrorism for its support of U.S. drone strikes and special forces operations against militants. (Writing by Sami Aboudi, Additional reporting by Matt Spetalnick; Editing by William Maclean and Angus MacSwan, Larry King) ==================== URL : https://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/the-federalism-dimension-in-yemens-draft- Excerpts from : Reidar Visser's analysis The partition of the north into four separate subunits is known to have prompted strong objections from the Shiite-leaning Houthi movement, which senses it will be left short-changed in a way that is not commensurate with its recent military successes. provisions for 40% representation of the two southern regions in the first parliament (article 139) and a requirement that senate decisions must enjoy support of at least a third of southern senators (article 143). The president (who, unlike Iraq, will be the main executive) and his deputy are to be elected on a single list representing more than one region (article 180), The most important issue concerns division of power between the different levels of government. The Yemeni draft is unsatisfactory in this respect, exactly like the Iraqi constitution that was adopted in 2005, and arguably a lot less clear than the recently published Libyan draft constitution. The problem is the unsatisfactory way in which the concept of residualism is tackled. In most federations, division of power is defined by a list of powers that are reserved for either the centre or for the subunits exclusively – with everything else (the “residual”) by implication being reserved for the other. There appears to be an attempt at establishing residualism in favour of the regions for anything not specifically mentioned at any level. On the other hand, a noteworthy item among the powers reserved exclusively for the regions (article 337) is the right to sign deals for trade and investment. But other “exclusive” areas are less exclusive in reality. On top of this, article 341 seems to establish the principle of residualism in favour of the regions for whatever competencies are not enumerated specifically for either the central government or the local subunits. One would think that oil and gas could be one such residual area but that is not the case in the Yemeni constitutional draft. Instead, separate sections (articles 357 and 387-90) address energy issues, but only by way of generalities, leaving the designation of revenue distribution and the management of the oil sector for future legislation. With vague concepts like “a just (adila) distribution” the Yemeni draft constitution offers even less in terms of guidelines than the hapless Iraqi one from 2005, and much less than the relatively clear Libyan constitutional draft that was released recently. It has been suggested that fury simply over the proposed administrative divisions and the six-way federal scheme was a contributing factor behind the recent moves of the Houthis against the Yemeni president. ===============