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Thursday, November 26, 2009

Iraq inquiry's game-changing evidence

Sir Christopher Meyer's evidence has surely made it impossible to claim that Iraq was about WMD and not regime change



At the Iraq inquiry this morning, Sir Christopher Meyer has let so many cats out of the bag that it is hard to keep up with them all. He has confirmed that by the time Tony Blair met George Bush at Crawford, Texas in April 2002, Blair had already agreed to regime change. Meyer and others had told the US administration about this change of heart in March 2002. The "UN route" was a way to justify the war but the inspectors were never given the chance to do their job.

Or did we know all that already? Ever since the war, there has been a massive gulf between what various leaked documents have shown and the official version. Previous inquiries have failed to close that gap. Now Meyer, who was the UK ambassador to Washington at the time, has done exactly that.

The government's version of events was always that it was taking action to deal with the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Leaked documents, most notably the Downing Street documents, show that the policy was to go along with the US desire for regime change and use weapons of mass destruction as a pretext. This version of events was confirmed by what Meyer said this morning. I don't think it could be more explosive.

The inquiry committee gradually brought Meyer to early 2002, when it became apparent that the hawks in the Bush administration who wanted regime change had won the argument in the aftermath of September 11. He said that the UK had been against regime change, mainly on legal grounds. But by the time Tony Blair visited George Bush at Crawford, he was supporting the policy, but had to be discreet about it.

There was a perception that there was no point trying to go against the Americans. Was it the case that UK policy was changed in the US? It was not as poodlish as that – Blair was a true believer in the evil of Saddam Hussein.

Asked when his instructions changed, Meyer said that he got a chunky set of instructions from Sir David Manning, Blair's foreign policy adviser, in March 2002. Manning came over with a set of instructions to prepare the way for Blair's visit. One of the main things he was seeking to do was to say to the US, if you want regime change, you can do it by yourselves, but if you want partners, do it with an alliance, preferably taking "the UN route".

Meyer said at times that regime change did not necessarily mean invasion but at other times he made clear that this was seen as the inevitable outcome. He confirmed, as he did in his memoirs, the validity of his March 2002 note to Manning, in which he recorded how he had told Paul Wolfowitz, a leading US hawk, that while Blair backed regime change, there had to be a clever plan to wrongfoot Saddam over the return of weapons inpectors.

Meyer said that the plan initially worked perfectly, with the passing in November 2002 of UN security council resolution 1441, which put the emphasis on Saddam Hussein. The US hoped that it would provide a tripwire to justify war but it did not. As we know now, there were no WMD.

This turned 1441 on its head. The military timetable, with war slated for March 2003, did not allow the inspections to work. There was a desperate scrabble for a smoking gun and attention turned to claims of Iraqi non-co-operation. Unfortunately, in March 2003, Hans Blix reported increased co-operation.

I suggested before that Meyer's and Manning's evidence could be a game-changer, that given the clear evidence of the Downing Street papers, it would be impossible to claim that Iraq was about WMD and not regime change. I don't think Meyer's evidence could be any more damning.

It looks as if Sir John Chilcot was right – in Meyer's case – to expect candour, given the mountain of evidence that the inquiry has. Meyer made clear that he was aware of these papers, none of which have yet been officially published. Unfortunately, Meyer said that many of his dispatches, warning of problems to come, are missing from the inquiry's otherwise excellent archive, which is of course dependent on disclosure by the government.

It looks as if the cover-up is continuing, but being botched this time.

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