The calm before the storm

By Salman Siddiqui
Friday, 13 Nov, 2009
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Police officers search a car as part of an anti-terrorism drive in Karachi. - File photo
Pakistan
The ‘It-is-not-us’ syndrome
STATE OF DENIAL
The ‘It-is-not-us’ syndrome
KARACHI: Recently, when the top official of Sindh who also belongs to a leading political party was asked whether it was due to government and police ‘efficiency’ that terrorists had not been able to strike Karachi, he admitted, on condition of anonymity, that ‘although we have been successful in thwarting militants from targeting people and key installations here in recent times, the truth of the matter is that it is not because we are so much better than authorities elsewhere in the country. It is due to the fact that the terrorists themselves didn’t want to strike Karachi and that’s why we saw a period of relative calm here. The day the militants get frustrated in the northern areas, Islamabad, and Lahore and decide to target Karachi, it will be next to impossible to stop them.’

This fear of the inevitable was echoed by Fayyaz Khan, the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP Operations), Crime Investigations Department (CID) Sindh, who has been at the centre of media attention for nabbing ‘high-profile militants’ in the city.

‘The police force is limited in terms of man power and resources, and one can’t possibly secure every area,’ concedes Khan. ‘Still, due to our untiring efforts, we have been able to stop the terrorists before any damage could be done,’ he claims, citing various examples in which a number of militants were apprehended in Karachi with suicide jackets, C4 explosives, and AK-47s.

Modus operandi

Elaborating on the modus operandi of the militants, Khan explains that Karachi has always been a major source of funding for the terrorists: ‘Apart from collecting charity money from mosques, they conducted robberies and kidnapping for ransom, and now we have evidence that the militants also smuggled narcotics, which they sold overseas in the illegal drug market.’

He adds that militants also come to Karachi to get ‘medical benefits.’

Another advantage for militants in the city is that they can blend in with the local population. ‘It is very easy to hide in Karachi,’ Khan points out. ‘The city is hugely divided into Pathan, Sindhi, Bengali, or Urdu-speaking areas. Terrorists we have held hail from all ethnicities and choose to reside in places where they can easily dissolve among the local residents.’

Potential targets

Based on the interrogation of suspects, the CID has information that militants are planning to attack high-profile targets such as politicians and the police headquarters in Karachi. ‘The militants may also try to stir sectarian strife,’ he adds.

Schools and educational institutions might also be threatened, but for the moment they are not at high risk, says Khan.

Taliban in Karachi

Khan believes that more or less all radicalised militants in the city are now operating under the umbrella of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and one should no longer differentiate between groups. Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Khaliq Sheikh adds that the TTP and its supporters are the most active group in the city. ‘Not only have militants come from areas outside the city, but local handlers within Karachi also remain active,’ says Sheikh.

Previously, several groups were operating distinctly in the city: the sectarian outfit Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, which staged the Nishtar Park bombing that killed more than 50 people in 2006; the Jundullah group, which attacked the Corps Commander Karachi in 2004; Harkatul Mujahideen; Al-Alami; Harkatul Jihad-al-Islami; and Al Qaeda.

Police officials say the involvement of these groups in current terrorist ploys are evidenced by the fact that nabbed militants hail from a variety of backgrounds, including Pathan and Urdu-speaking. The notion that only people from the north-west of the country are involved in terrorism is a misconception perpetuated by certain political parties, insist the police officials.

Recently, the police also displayed explosive material allegedly manufactured in India. For that reason, DIG Sheikh says ‘the likelihood of India being involved cannot be ruled out.’

Counter measures

To tackle the terrorism threat, a dedicated police unit called the Special Protection Group under the supervision of a DIG and two SSPs is in place. This group is tasked with rapid reaction measures in the event of a terrorist attack, and will be in charge of investigations to identify the culprits.

Meanwhile, the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has released a document suggesting safety measures for educational institutes, including a control room with security cameras at entry and exit points; security guards at an elevated place; window panes preferably laminated with PVC film to prevent splinters in case of a blast; emergency drills in case of terrorism for teachers and children, and more.

CPLC chief Sharfuddin Memon suggests that the public should make arrangements on their own to protect their communities since the state is unlikely to provide for everyone in these difficult economic times. For example, Memon suggests that the administration of all shopping malls should start installing walk-through scanning gates, CCTVs, and security guards of their own.

Security loopholes

Recently, the CPLC signed an agreement with the local government to jointly monitor the feeds of surveillance cameras installed by the City District Government Karachi (CDGK). However, there are about 100 cameras, which are grossly inadequate for a city with an estimated population of over 17 million people.

Privately, police officials say the CDGK has no business running the camera network and suspect ulterior, political objectives. But the police department has only itself to blame for not implementing its own plan of installing between 2,000 and 3,000 surveillance cameras around Karachi under its ePolicing project.

Former Inspector General Police Jehangir Mirza, under whom the idea of a city-wide camera network was floated by the bureau in Islamabad, recalls that the meetings were all empty talks. ‘Apart from inadequate surveillance network, we also lack modern counter-terrorism techniques, and the courses offered by our police training academies are very far behind,’ he adds.

Junior police officer Waseem who was enrolled at one such course in an academy in Karachi informs that there were four main events in his three-to-six month long course, including judo, karate, jungle mission, 300-foot-tall tower climbing drills, and firing with various types of arms.

Mirza explains that most of the ‘trained’ policemen like Waseem lack motivation because of low pay. They also take no pride in completing courses because there is no guarantee that training will lead to promotions.

Another significant grey area is intelligence sharing between the CID, which is the intelligence arm of the police, the Inter Services Intelligence, and Military Intelligence. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, one senior serving police official says that inter-agency coordination on intelligence may be the biggest hurdle to clamping down on terrorism in Karachi.