The Headaches Facing the Appointed President

July 24, 2009

Saeed Razavi Faghih



Three years ago, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had spent just a year at the presidential apex of power in Iran, the problems of his administration became apparent to the conservatists. His controversial and impractical proclamations over domestic and international politics, endless accusations against all groups and political factions in the country - including the conservatists which constitute his own power base - and most importantly his serious failure to properly run the country demonstrated well that Ahmadinejad as president was trouble not only for the public, but even the conservatists. Conservatists who had for the first time after a long time gained access to the executive branch and who supported Mr. Ahmadinejad and his administration. Perhaps the most serious issue that Ahmadinejad presented was the rift he had created within the ranks of the conservatists almost killing the prospects of a possible unity for ever.

Now, after the passage of four years into Ahmadinejad’s first administration, and especially after his election for a second presidential term, it appears that the appointed administration will have to expect problems that whose roots it itself planted in the first four years of its work, in other words it will be sowing whatever it planted in its first term.

The most important issue that Ahmadinejad has created for his co-thinkers, is the controversial election. He intended to bury for ever the idea of free elections in Iran, and by removing the republican aspect of the system, remove what ever little power and sovereignty the Iranian nation had. The result of this strategic faux pas(A social blunder.) was that a huge political crisis took over the country because of massive and million-man public protests, which now questions the very legitimacy of the presidency and the executive branch, and even the whole system of governance. The evidence for the continuation of this crisis is the very words and remarks that the head of the Expediency Council and the Experts Assembly recently made in public.

Today, not only is Mr. Ahmadinejad and his administration in serious legitimacy crises, but the whole regime is under question. Sooner or later it will be questioned over the natural consequences of its own actions and will have to respond to the other institutions of the state. These institutions have till now of course supported Mr. Ahmadinejad, and the “results” of the elections, but in the inner circles of power they are certainly holding him responsible for the current crisis. This lack of legitimacy and credibility will most certainly manifest itself in the domestic and foreign policies of the country.

In the coming weeks, the president will have to battle with the national assembly, the Majlis, over his choice of new cabinet ministers. He will have to either concede to the pressures of the Majlis and the powers outside it, thus reaching some form of compromise with the larger conservative power groups, or take the fights inside the conservative camp - which incidentally are not few and small - out into the public through the Majlis debates, thus worsening the already-bas political situation in the country. These same issues will come up during the debates of new bills that the administration will start to present to the Majlis for its approval and passage into law. And since Majlis still has a list of bills that the administration has sent it to be debated and passed into law from the past, even those will be engulfed in the same discussions and debates. Just this week, Ahmadinejad’s nomination of a new Vice-President,
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei ran into problems indicative of the kind of posture even conservative Majlis deputies have regarding the president’s initiatives and decisions. His move prompted strong criticism and resulted in the intervention of the leader of the Islamic state, ayatollah Khamenei to drop the nomination.
In foreign affairs, the president has already registered two negative points: the first was that he was forced to cancel his previously accepted trips to the OAU in Libya and the Non-aligned movement meeting in Egypt, both indicating a depreciation of the stature of Mr. Ahmadinejad (and the country) domestically and on the international scene as noted by observers. These cancellations become even more important when one considers the importance that Ahmadinejad has been giving to his foreign trips where he usually makes his controversial and bombasting remarks, and then attempts to build domestic credibility for them.

In conclusion suffice it to say that Mr. Ahmadinejad has in the past been a source of headache for the Islamic republic and his own conservative faction, but with the new crises evolving in the country, it is clear that he will be dealing with even more serious challenges stemming from his own conservative colleagues and even supporters. And now, he must also respond to the serious issues that have been created for the regime as a whole in recent weeks.