Is Iran surrendering to the United States?

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a sociologist, award-winning author and geopolitical analyst. Published time: December 30, 2013 08:46 Reuters/Morteza Nikoubazl Is the interim nuclear deal signed at the end of 2013 a signal of Tehran’s surrender, or is it the opening of a new chapter in American-Iranian relations that could see the normalization of ties? If history is to be learned from, normalization with Washington will also come with risks for Iran. Rouhani won the 2013 Iranian presidential elections by gaining the support of the overwhelming majority of Iranians with approximately 51 percent of the popular vote. His main opponent and the candidate with the second highest number of votes was the mayor of Tehran. Mayor Qalibaf only received about 16.5 percent of the popular vote. The other four candidates (Jalili, Rezai, Velayati, and Gharazi) respectively earned 11.31 percent, 10.55 percent, 6.16 percent, and 1.22 percent of the vote. Many Iranian voters saw these candidates as virtual clones of one another and distinguished Rouhani as the one that offered an alternative program. The consensus president In Washington there has been a tug-o’-war between the neo-con and realist camps about how to deal with Iran. The realists have now come out on top. In Tehran there has also been a parallel tug-o’-war over Iranian foreign policy. The political tug-o’-war in Tehran has seen the reformists and pragmatists contesting the principalist and conservative camp about how to deal with the United States. With the election of Hassan Rouhani the balance in Tehran has changed and loosened the dominant hold of the principalists and conservatives in the Iranian political arena. Despite the fact that he received the endorsement of the reformist camp and all its supporters, Hassan Rouhani is not the Iranian reformist that some have portrayed him as being. His supporters said that Rouhani would undo the damage that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government had caused. Skeptics, however, phrase it like this: “Rouhani was the least bad candidate.” The fact that he was the only presidential candidate that had ties to all the different political groupings in Iran was what set Rouhani apart from the other candidates. His career as a security guru in Tehran, with deep connections to the national security and military structures of Iran, and his history of working with pragmatists and reformers made him acceptable or, at a very minimum, bearable for all the different political cliques in Tehran. In the sense that he has not excessively embraced reformist or conservative tendencies, he has been a genuine moderate so far. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani (Reuters/Adrees Latif) Iran's President Hassan Rouhani (Reuters/Adrees Latif) Rouhani made it clear that his administration would work for consensus among all of Iran’s political factions through a centrist political program. Since the 2009 protests over the re-election of Ahmadinejad the political divisions and polarization in Iran were sharpened. This is why Rouhani’s messages to the Iranian political establishment, as well as all of Iranian society, were ones calling for political unity and consensus politics. In his first speech as the president of Iran, Rouhani would highlight his platform of reconciliation and diplomatic recalibration: “Let our hearts be cleansed of resentment. Let conciliation replace estrangement and let friendship take the place of animosity. Let this take place. Let Islam’s compassionate face, Iran with its reasonable face, the Revolution with its human face, and the political system with its kind face continue to create epics.” Making sure not to aggravate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his supporters, he would also thank them during his speech: “At this point I must thank and express my appreciation to the previous administrations, especially the Tenth Administration and its honorable former president, and for all of them I have the desire of success day by day.” Iran’s “Yes, We Can” man and grand negotiator President Rouhani presented himself as a negotiator par excellence during the election campaign in 2013. His promise to negotiate with the US and to lift the economic sanctions by changing the dynamics of Iranian diplomacy proved to be very popular with the business class and most of the middle class. “Moderation in foreign policy is neither surrender nor conflict, neither passivity nor confrontation. Moderation is effective and constructive interaction with the world,” he announced as president-elect. Rouhani’s inauguration ceremony on August 3, 2013 even marked the first time that foreign dignatories were formally invited to an Iranian presidential inauguration ceremony, which signaled Rouhani’s intentions to launch his diplomatic charm offensive. Using a spiritual tone, Rouhani let it be known during his first speech as president that he intended to get results, would not let partisan politics get the better of him, and would not silence his political critics: “I feel the heavy weight of these votes and this endorsement. And I seek refuge in God and God alone. I sincerely and humbly ask the compassionate Lord: O Lord, save Thy weak servant from the ills of arrogance and conceit, greed, avarice and envy. O Lord I take refuge in Thee from autocracy in opinion, haste in decision making, putting personal or group interests ahead of those of the public, and from the silencing of the mouths of rivals and critics. O Lord, help me so that I can be Your sincere server and a competent servant of the people and not to forget what happened to those who came before me. There is much to say, but time is short. It is best to cut the talk short and to walk the path. For the path to our goal is long and I am a new traveler.” In many ways, the fanfare and popularity that Rouhani has received and enjoyed in Iran can be compared to that which Barak Obama received in the US when he was elected. Rouhani carried a message of hope for many Iranians. The closing words in his inauguration speech were even turned into a song with a black and white video by Iranian artists just as how Obama’s speech at the 2008 New Hampshire primary was turned into a hit song by artists in the US. The video dedicated to President Rouhani was a copycat version of the Obama video that was produced by Hussein Dehbashi, who produced Rouhani’s election video ads. The Office of the Iranian President would later post the Iranian “Yes, We Can” video on Rouhani’s YouTube page. Tehran does business with Washington Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (2nd L) shakes hands with US Secretary of State John Kerry (AFP Photo) Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (2nd L) shakes hands with US Secretary of State John Kerry (AFP Photo) As soon as Rouhani became president, he selected Mohammad Javad Zarif to become Iran’s foreign minister. Jalili was replaced as the secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were taken over from the Supreme National Security Council by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Zarif was selected as foreign minister not only because he was an excellent diplomat; Rouhani shrewdly selected Zarif for his experience as Iran’s interlocutor with the United States. Before his appointment as Tehran’s foreign minister, Zarif had served as the permanent representative of Iran to the UN in New York City, from where he served as Tehran’s contact man with the US government and US officials. Foreign Minister Zarif himself has stated that he and US Vice-President Joe Biden share a friendship. As one of the pillars of the Iranian national security establishment, Rouhani himself also has had a long history of dealing with US officials. In the past it was Rouhani that held secret talks with US President Ronald Reagan’s government on behalf of Iran. In this regard, he was one of the Iranian officials who negotiated the arms transfer agreement with Washington during the Iran-Iraq War that led to the Iran-Contra scandal. More recently, Rouhani dealt with the US as the secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran during the presidency of Mohammed Khatami. It is no coincidence that US backtracking on attacking Syria led to talks with Iran and a warming of relations. In actuality the talks with Iran had started before the US backed down from bombing Syria. Rouhani’s government had begun dialogue with the US from the moment its mandate commenced. There are enough grounds to suspect that the threats to attack Syria also had the aim of working to gain traction in the secret talks that President Obama was having with Iran via the Sultanate of Oman. The political taboo of dealing with the US publicly has been broken by President Rouhani. Since the start of his term, Rouhani authorized Zarif to meet with US Secretary of State John Kerry. Rouhani himself held a brief, but historic, phone conversation with President Obama. Finally, an interim nuclear deal was reached between Iran and the P5+1, more specifically the United States. Iranian-American rapprochement In 1993, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the realist par excellence who served as US President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, announced that “Iran is clearly an aspirant to regional hegemony and it is prepared to outwait the United States.” Brzezinski explained that the Iranians had an imperial tradition as a great power and possessed both the religious and nationalist motivation to contest the US and Russia, and that Iran could count on the sympathies of its neighbors in such a rivalry. Because of Iran, in his own words, “the current American supremacy in the Middle East is built, quite literally, on sand.” Yet, that is not all Brzezinski has said about Iran. He stated that “it is not in America’s interest to perpetuate American-Iranian hostility.” He even went out of his way to warn US policy makers that Iran should not be antagonized by the US government to the point where Tehran would ally itself with Russia and China. Instead Brzezinski pushed for reconciliation as an aim of realist-driven US foreign policy. “Any eventual reconciliation [between the US and Iranian governments] should be based on the recognition of a mutual strategic interest in stabilizing what currently is a very volatile regional environment for Iran,” he explained. The “volatile regional environment” that Brzezinski mentions is formed by the three regions that are linked to Iran: the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. What he really meant was that Tehran and Washington should work together to influence these regions. Although it is unstated, what Brzezinski has in mind is a plan to get Iran to realign with the US in these regions against Russia and China. The possible negative ramifications of US-Iran rapprochement Critics of Rouhani see him and Zarif as surrendering to US demands as part of some type of internal regime change in Tehran. Such critics have argued that Iran has surrendered to Washington, whereas others have seen the interim nuclear agreement as a victory for Iran. Since Rouhani started negotiating with the US, Supreme Leader Khamenei has been forced to defend Rouhani and Zarif. Khamenei has warned the principalists and conservatives in Iran not to interfere in Rouhani’s negotiation efforts or to portray Rouhani and Zarif as traitors. “They are our own children and children of the Revolution,” Khamenei publicly declared on November 3, 2011. Among the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the political hardliners in Tehran, there are fears that the interim nuclear deal will lead to an even broader agreement and a normalization of relations with the United States that could potentially open the door for alterations in the political structure of Iran and give the reformists the upper hand. There were reserved statements released in November 2013 by Revolutionary Guard leaders, days before the interim nuclear agreement was reached, which assured the public that Iran’s ideology would not change, and that Iran would not bow down to any foreign powers. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (AFP Photo) Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (AFP Photo) As mentioned earlier, Rouhani’s government has pro-business characteristics. In this regard, there are legitimate concerns that go beyond politics which fear that restored relations with the US could see an opening up of the Iranian economy based on the neoliberal economic policies that many of the reformists—and pro-business conservatives—had embraced and favor that will see the state infrastructure and the public sector in Iran privatized further. If business ties are restored between the US and Iran, and there is a lot of talk about it, the Iranian government could entrench the Iranian economy on a path of neoliberal reforms and privatization. These would be similar to those that marked the Yeltsin years in Russia, which made an elite few rich and let foreign corporations plunder the Russian economy. Then there is the worst case scenario of Iran being used against its Eurasian partners. The insulation of Eurasia is incomplete without Iran. The Russian and Chinese need for a strategic Iranian partner is a component of any defensive strategy or viable alternative against US and EU encroachment into their geopolitical spheres of interest. The US may attempt to use its rapprochement with Iran to manipulate Tehran into hurting Russia and China. Iran’s ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and historic links with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia could be used to launch an offensive against Moscow in the post-Soviet space, whereas Chinese energy security would be jeopardized if Iran agreed to collaborate with the US in any strategy against the Chinese. Eurasia or nothing! Although the Iranian political establishment is immensely more sophisticated than Libya, Tehran should not ignore how American-Libyan rapprochement ended and at what expense. Colonel Qaddafi even predicted it when he told the Arab League many years ago that the US had no loyalty to any of its Arab clients or friends, and that one day it could execute him. The mere fact that the US government and its allies have a different interpretation of the interim nuclear deal from Iran, China, and Russia is reason to pause with caution too. Of course this could be posturing to appease certain segments of public opinion, lobby groups, and US allies (e.g., Israel and Saudi Arabia) that are threatened by any rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. Yet, the fact that the EU has also refused to lift certain unilateral sanctions is reason enough for Tehran to be cynical. Iran’s place is in Eurasia. It would be a disaster if any rapprochement between the US and Iran came at the expense of Iranian-Russian ties or Chinese-Iranian ties. To his credit, Rouhani’s first foreign trip as president of Iran was to Kyrgyzstan in September 2013 for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is spearheaded by Russia and China. While being realistic, one should always hold onto hope. Iran’s “Yes, We Can” Man and his endeavors will hopefully not end up being the epic disappointment that his American counterpart, President Obama, has been for the people of the United States. The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

Analysis: Saudi feud too bitter for new Iran president to fix

Tue, Aug 13 02:03 AM EDT By Angus McDowall and Yeganeh Torbati RIYADH/DUBAI (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah's disdain for Iran leaps from U.S. embassy cables. "May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil," he told U.S. officials, according to a cable released by WikiLeaks. According to another, he told his own diplomats he wanted Washington to "cut off the head of the snake". On the other side of the Gulf, Iran's contempt for Saudi Arabia crackles through a report on its hardline Mashregh website. The kingdom's ruling family, it said, was "drowning in corruption and prostitutes". Into this toxic environment steps Iran's newly inaugurated President Hassan Rouhani, promising to improve what may well be the single most venomous and destructive relationship in the entire Middle East. It is almost impossible to overstate the hatred between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'ite Iran, which has fuelled a decade of violence across the region. In Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, the two sides back sectarian proxy forces that are either at daggers drawn or openly at war in conflicts killing thousands each month. In Syria, each accuses the other of responsibility for a bloodbath, with Iran supporting President Bashar al-Assad and Saudi Arabia funding the rebels trying to overthrow him. In Iraq, sectarian violence is at its worst since 2008. Riyadh accuses Tehran of fomenting trouble in Bahrain and even Saudi Arabia itself. Tehran accuses Riyadh of plotting its destruction with Washington.

Nevertheless, Rouhani, a comparative moderate after the firebrand Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, says he wants to make friends with Saudi Arabia. Encouragingly, he brings personal experience negotiating with Riyadh. "God willing, I hope that we will have very good relations with neighbors, particularly with Saudi Arabia during the next government," Rouhani said at a June press conference.

Still, few believe he can draw the poison out of the Cold War-style rivalry at the heart of the Middle East. COCA-COLA VS. PEPSI Both countries have vested interests in talking to each other: Saudi Arabia wants Iran to end what it sees as meddling in Arab countries - supporting Shi'ites or their allies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia itself. Tehran wants Riyadh to stop urging military action against its atomic sites and helping Western sanctions by increasing oil supplies to make up for embargoed Iranian crude. Both Rouhani and King Abdullah have shown willingness to make peace in the past. As head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council in 1998, Rouhani sat up all night with Abdullah's late brother, the former interior minister Prince Nayef, to negotiate a security agreement with the kingdom after years of friction. In signing that deal, King Abdullah chose to overlook Saudi and U.S. suspicions that Tehran was behind the 1996 bombing of an American barracks in the Saudi city of al-Khobar. Iran put aside memories of the 1987 Muslim pilgrimage, when hundreds of its pilgrims were killed in clashes with Saudi security forces. "King Abdullah has known Rouhani for some time. I think they have a decent relationship. Much better than his relationship with Ahmadinejad. They will have some ability to communicate with a degree of respect," said Robert Jordan, U.S. ambassador to Riyadh from 2001-03. But while that history may indicate more of an openness on both sides to cooperation, analysts and regional officials and diplomats see little chance of rapprochement. The circumstances are far uglier now than they were when the security deal was agreed 15 years ago, with the region embroiled in civil wars and uprisings. In March 2009, Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Riyadh in a bid to cool tensions between the rival states, but his meeting with King Abdullah did not go well. Abdullah told U.S. counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan a few days later that he had told the Iranian foreign minister: "You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters". "Iran's goal is to cause problems... there is no doubt something unstable about them... may God prevent us from falling victim to their evil," Brennan said he was told by the king, according to a cable released by WikiLeaks. On Iran's side, foreign policy is determined less by the president than by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which means that the election of Rouhani is unlikely to fundamentally alter Tehran's positions. "Is it possible for anyone to do anything or say anything without the opinion of the supreme leader?" said outgoing Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi in an interview with the Mehr agency, adding he had been blocked from visiting Riyadh. Riyadh does not sound hopeful. Abdullah al-Askar, chairman of the foreign affairs committee in Saudi Arabia's Shoura Council quasi-parliament, compared the difference between Rouhani and Ahmadinejad to that between "Coca-Cola and Pepsi". "I don't think he'll do the same as Ahmadinejad, speaking out harshly," he told Reuters. "But when it comes to the main files I think he has to work within a framework that's drawn by Khamenei." The daily Saudi Gazette editorialized last week: "Tehran is up to the same old tricks, but with a different conjurer." TRIBUTE TO THE ENEMIES For Saudi Arabia, any improvement in relations would depend on Iran cutting its support for Syria's Assad, whose assault on rebel-held areas has been likened by Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, Abdullah's nephew, to genocide. Such a move would likely be a red line for Iran's leaders, who appear to see Syria as a key link in their ability to project influence across the Middle East as far as Lebanon and the borders of Israel. What irritates Iran more than Saudi Arabia's policy in Syria is Riyadh's decision last year to boost energy exports to replace oil taken out of the market by embargoed Iranian crude, effectively colluding with Western sanctions. "Instead of serving Muslims, they pay tribute to the enemies of Muslims and stand next to them," said Nasser Soudani, deputy head of the Iranian parliament's energy committee in January 2012, commenting on higher Saudi oil supply. Closer to home, Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of trying to foment trouble among its own Shi'ite minority, of planting a spying ring in the country and of attempting to assassinate its ambassador in Washington. Tehran has denied all those charges. The antagonism dates to 1979, when Iran tried to export its Islamic revolution to Shi'ites across the Middle East, including in Saudi Arabia, threatening the old balance of regional power. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states then made what Tehran saw as a pact with the devil by siding with Saddam Hussein after he invaded Iran in 1980, financing his war for eight years while he used chemical weapons on Iranian troops and civilians. After a gradual thaw, the U.S.-led ousting of Saddam in 2003 ignited a new struggle for mastery between Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis, with Riyadh and Tehran backing opposing sides. The sectarian edge to their struggle has sharpened in recent years. Both countries define themselves according to Islam and clerics in both regard the other with open disdain. Today, Iran's Persian-speaking rulers back Shi'ites across the Arab world, including the government and militia in Iraq, Lebanon's Hezbollah, Bahraini protesters against that country's Sunni ruling family and Yemen's Houthi rebels. Syrian President Assad is from the Alawi sect, a Shi'ite offshoot. Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and proponent of its most conservative Sunni school, Wahhabism, backs the other side in each of those regional struggles. The Wahhabi school denigrates Shi'ism as heretical. Its first Bedouin adherents rampaged through 18th century Iraq, smashing the sect's shrines. King Abdullah has tried to moderate that view. Last year he said he would set up a Riyadh center to study differences between sects. But he himself was recorded criticizing Shi'ites for "worshipping domes, statues and individuals" in a 2006 WikiLeaks cable. For their part, Shi'ites regard Wahhabism as a dangerous, radical creed that fuels militant sectarianism. The war against Assad has given a new foothold to Sunni al Qaeda fighters who use theology to justify attacks on Alawite and Shi'ite civilians in both Syria and Iraq. "Saudi Arabia has created the new al Qaeda," said analyst Mohammad Sadeq al-Hosseini in a July interview with Iran's conservative Fars News Agency, referring to Riyadh's support for Syria's opposition. Gulf diplomats say Riyadh has worked to avoid letting its arms or money go to militant Islamist groups within Syria's rebel coalition. PHENOMENAL DAMAGE With Rouhani unlikely to switch the Iranian policies that Saudi Arabia most bitterly opposes, there appears little scope for progress beyond a less aggressive public tone. "The level of damage done in the past eight to 10 years is phenomenal. It begs the question as to whether the Iranians think they can get away with window dressing or are willing to make real changes," said Ali Ansari, professor of Iranian history at Britain's St Andrews University. However, Iranian moves such as using more conciliatory language in media broadcasts about Bahrain and other Gulf states and ending support for Yemeni groups might cool the situation. "Syria may be a bridge too far, but it's certainly possible they could reach some sort of tentative understanding on the Shi'ite situation in Bahrain. The crown prince there is in a better position to negotiate and may be inclined to assist in a resolution," said Jordan, the former U.S. ambassador in Riyadh. Diplomats in the Gulf still say they expect little movement on even the more peripheral issues and little chance of Riyadh bending to Iranian overtures without big policy changes. But even such entrenched skepticism has not stopped Iranian reformists pushing for Rouhani to extend an olive branch to Saudi Arabia, a policy pursued by former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami. "The situation in Syria has become so complex that the Islamic world has practically been split in half, to the point that a proxy war is taking place," said Iranian reformist Saeed Hajarian in a newspaper interview this month. "We have to show them that this is not a Shi'ite-Sunni war. With all of our power we must stop the parties from religious incitement," he said. (Reporting by Angus McDowall and Yeganeh Torbati; Writing by Angus McDowall; Editing by Jon Hemming and Peter Graff)