Crucifixions and Gruesome Beheadings: Fear of Islamic State make Gulf monarchies set aside differences

ISIS daily profits from oil, theft, human trafficking exceed $3mn – report Published time: September 14, 2014 18:24 Get short URL Reuters / Alaa Al-Marjani Reuters / Alaa Al-Marjani Trends ISIS in Iraq Tags Conflict, Iraq, Military, Syria, Terrorism, Violence Islamic State radicals gain more than $3 million per day just from oil sales, while also earning huge sums from human trafficking and extortion, report US intelligence officials and experts. They are wealthier than any other terror group in history. The Islamic State group which seized huge terrorizes in Iraq and Syria, is now controlling eleven oil fields in both countries, US analysts told AP. They added that the militants are selling oil and other products via old established networks under the noses of Kurdish, Turkish and Jordanian authorities. Islamic State claims execution of UK hostage David Haines, releases video The resources of the Islamic State (IS) exceed that “of any other terrorist group in history,” a US intelligence official told the agency on condition of anonymity. According to the analysts, the illegal oil is usually transported in tanker trucks. “There's a lot of money to be made,” said Dr. Denise Natali, who worked in Kurdistan as an American humanitarian official and is now a senior research fellow at National Defense University. “The Kurds say they have made an attempt to close it down, but you pay off a border guard, you pay off somebody else and you get stuff through,” she added. IS reportedly gets for its smuggled oil about $25 to $60 per barrel. Normally the same amount of oil costs about $100. However the total profit of the extremist group exceeds $3 million a day, said Luay al-Khatteeb, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Doha Center in Qatar. A general view of an oil refinery in Al-Jbessa oil field in Al-Shaddadeh town of Al-Hasakah gorvernate. (Reuters / Stringer) The group also exports illegally the antiquities out of Iraq to Turkey and thus gets hundreds of millions of dollars, added al-Khatteeb. Millions more come from human trafficking as the militants are selling women and children as sex slaves. Other sources of income include extortion payments, ransom from kidnapped hostages, and any kind of theft from the areas taken by IS. “It's cash-raising activities resemble those of a mafia-like organization,” another US intelligence official said, again on condition of anonymity. “They are well-organized, systematic and enforced through intimidation and violence.” ISIS ‘making millions’ out of stolen oil revenues in Iraq According to US officials, the militants started imposing taxes on all kinds of economic activity in the city of Mosul, northern Iraq, even before it was seized by them in June. They threatened death penalties to those who were reluctant to pay. From Mosul alone, IS was reaping $8 million a month from extortion, said an analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations. When the group seized the city, it grabbed millions of dollars in cash from banks, though not the hundreds of millions as initially reported, US intelligence officials say. A general view is seen of Mosul Dam in northern Iraq (Reuters/Youssef Boudlal) A general view is seen of Mosul Dam in northern Iraq (Reuters/Youssef Boudlal) The IS fighters managed to take control of the Mosul Dam in early August. However, persistent US strikes forced the militants out of the area, marking the first significant defeat for them since the US re-entered the conflict with airstrikes. Islamic State jihadists seize Iraq's largest dam, 3 towns in offensive vs Kurds The Islamic State group “has managed to successfully translate territorial control in northern Syria and portions of Iraq into a means of revenue generation,” said one more US intelligence official. The border between Iraq and Turkey has long been a haven for smugglers, and that’s why the group has so much illegal activities, claim the analysts, adding that generations have illicitly moved various goods through the region. ‘Neither Islamic, nor state’: UK Muslim leaders object to extremist group’s name In the meantime, the US officials reportedly noticed one positive tendency as the IS violent tactics have subsequently drawn worldwide attention and funding has diminished. === U.S. sees Middle East help fighting IS, Britain cautious after beheading Sun, Sep 14 20:42 PM EDT image 1 of 6 By Will Dunham and Andrew Osborn WASHINGTON/LONDON (Reuters) - Washington said countries in the Middle East had offered to join air strikes against Islamic State militants and Australia said it would send troops, but Britain held back even after the group beheaded a British hostage and threatened to kill another. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has been touring the Middle East to try to secure backing for U.S. efforts to build a coalition to fight the Islamic State militants who have grabbed territory in Syria and Iraq. The United States resumed air strikes in Iraq in August for the first time since the 2011 withdrawal of the last U.S. troops, fearful the militants would break the country up and use it as a base for attacks on the West. The addition of Arab fighter jets would greatly strengthen the credibility of what is a risky and complicated campaign. "We have countries in this region, countries outside of this region, in addition to the United States, all of whom are prepared to engage in military assistance, in actual strikes if that is what it requires," Kerry said. "And we also have a growing number of people who are prepared to do all the other things," he said in remarks broadcast on Sunday on the CBS program "Face the Nation." Offers of Arab air participation have been made both to U.S. Central Command overseeing the American air campaign and to the Iraqi government, a senior State Department official said. The official said the offers were not limited to air strikes on Iraq. "Some have indicated for quite a while a willingness to do them elsewhere," the official said. "We have to sort through all of that because you can’t just go and bomb something." As of Saturday, U.S. fighter jets had conducted 160 air strikes on Islamic State positions in Iraq. The United States will present a legal case before expanding them into Syria, U.S. officials said, justifying them largely on the basis of defending Iraq from militants who have taken shelter in neighboring Syria during its three-year civil war. Australia became the first country to detail troop numbers and aircraft to fight the militants in Iraq. It said it would send a 600-strong force and eight fighter jets to the region but did not intend to operate in Syria. Russia, at odds with the West over Ukraine, has said any air strikes in Syria would be an act of aggression without the consent of President Bashar al-Assad or an international mandate. Britain has often been the first country to join U.S. military action overseas and is under pressure to get much tougher with IS after video footage of the killing of Briton David Haines by the militants was released on Saturday. In footage consistent with the filmed executions of two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, in the past month, they also threatened to kill another British hostage. Speaking after chairing a meeting of the government's emergency response committee in London, Prime Minister David Cameron called the killing of Haines, a 44 year-old Scottish aid worker, callous and brutal and hailed him as a "British hero." "We will hunt down those responsible and bring them to justice no matter how long it takes," he said, calling IS "the embodiment of evil" and saying his government was prepared "to take whatever steps are necessary" against the militants. SUNNI 'ANVIL' But he did not announce any air strikes, mindful of war-weary public opinion, parliament's rejection last year of air strikes on Syria, and sensitivities surrounding Scotland's independence referendum on Thursday. U.S. allies are skeptical of how far Washington will commit to a conflict in which nearly every country in the region has a stake, set against the backdrop of Islam's 1,300-year-old rift between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Many fear there is not enough emphasis on ensuring the Iraqi government is strong and united enough to overcome sectarian divisions and run the country effectively after any intervention. Britain and the United States have ruled out sending ground troops back into Iraq and Kerry did not say which countries had offered. "We're not looking to put troops on the ground," he said. "There are some who have offered to do so, but we are not looking for that at this moment anyway." On the CNN program "State of the Union," White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough was asked if the coalition would need ground troops beyond opposition forces in Syria and Kurdish and government forces in Iraq. "Ultimately to destroy ISIL we do need to have a force, an anvil against which they will be pushed - ideally Sunni forces," he said, using an acronym for Islamic State. 'EXTREMELY ENCOURAGED' On Thursday, Kerry won the backing for a "coordinated military campaign" from 10 Arab countries - Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and six Gulf states including rich rivals Saudi Arabia and Qatar. "This is a strategy coming together as the coalition comes together and the countries declare what they are prepared to do," Kerry said in the interview, taped on Saturday in Egypt. "I've been extremely encouraged to hear from all of the people that I've been meeting with about their readiness and willingness to participate," Kerry added. France has offered to take part in air strikes in Iraq and is expected to give more details this week on what it is willing to do, although its financial resources and forces are already stretched with more than 5,000 soldiers in West Africa. Michael McCaul, a Republican who chairs the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, told the same CBS program that Prince Ali bin Al Hussein of Jordan told him "he is ready to put his troops into Syria to fight ISIS". Washington could also try to persuade Egypt to put troops in Syria," McCaul said. John Kerry will meet British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond during a conference on Iraq in Paris on Monday. The conference brings Iraqi authorities together with about 30 countries and organizations to coordinate their response to Islamic State. “It will also be the first time to really gauge what Russia thinks and is ready to do,” a French diplomat said. The diplomat said Syria was a different case. “The situation is not the same either legally or militarily. We do not want to strengthen Assad, so we have to be sure that strikes there don’t do that,” the diplomat said. “We are ready to help Iraq’s government, which has asked for our help, but not Assad’s dictatorship." (Additional reporting by Jason Szep and John Irish in Paris, Timothy Gardner in Washington, Morag MacKinnon in Perth, Australia and William Maclean in Dubai; Writing by Philippa Fletcher; Editing by Anna Willard, Peter Cooney and Mohammad Zargham) ============ INSIGHT-Islamic State's financial independence poses quandary for its foes Thu, Sep 11 01:00 AM EDT * Islamic State relies on mixture of taxation, oil sales * Hardline group turns away from private donor route * Militants control commercial centres to generate funding * Focus on blocking external funds will do little, for now By Raheem Salman and Yara Bayoumy BAGHDAD/DUBAI, Sept 11 (Reuters) - Sometimes they came pretending to buy things. Sometimes they texted, sometimes they called, but the message was always the same: "Give us money." Months before they took control of the Iraqi city of Mosul in June, Islamic State militants were already busy collecting money to finance their campaign of setting up a 7th century-style caliphate. The owner of a Mosul grocery store recounted how, when he hesitated to pay, militants exploded a bomb outside his shop as a warning. "If a person still refused, they kidnapped him and asked his family to pay ransom," he said. The shopkeeper, who declined to be identified out of concern for his safety, said he had paid the militants $100 a month six or seven times this year. In return, he was given a receipt that says: "Received from Mr. ...., the amount of ...., as support to the Mujahideen." The shop keeper's tale illustrates how Islamic State has long been systematically collecting funds for a land grab that already includes a stretch of northern Iraq and Syria. Another Mosul worker corroborated the account of IS tactics. "The tax system was well-organised. They took money from small merchants, petrol station owners, generator owners, small factories, big companies, even pharmacists and doctors," said the shop owner who, out of frustration and fear, closed his store and is now trying to make a living as a taxi driver. Learning from their previous incarnation as the Islamic State of Iraq, when they received money from foreign fighters, Islamic State has almost weaned itself off private funds from sympathetic individual donors in the Gulf. Such money flows have come under increased scrutiny from the U.S. Treasury. Instead the group has formalised a system of internal financing that includes an Islamic form of taxation, looting and most significantly, oil sales, to run their 'state' effectively. This suggests it will be harder to cut the group's access to the local funding that is fuelling its control of territory and strengthening its threat to the Middle East and the West. Nevertheless, financing from Gulf donors may prove more critical in months to come, if U.S. President Barack Obama's mission to "degrade and destroy" the group succeeds and the group loses territory and finds itself looking abroad for funds. CONTROLLING COMMERCIAL CENTRES In the eastern Syrian city of Mayadin, an Islamic State supporter who goes by the name of Abu Hamza al-Masri, said the militants had set up checkpoints in the last few months demanding money from passing cars and trucks. The money purportedly goes into a 'zakat' or 'alms' fund, but Abu Hamza admitted some sums go to pay bonuses or salaries of fighters. "Passengers are asked to open their wallets ... in some instances they are threatened at gunpoint if they resist," said another Syrian secular activist in Deir ez-Zor contacted by Reuters via Whatsapp. But extortion is not Islamic State's top money-spinner. Analysts and activists say the majority of the group's money comes from oil sales to local traders from wells under Islamic State control. Luay Al-Khatteeb, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center who has done extensive research into Islamic State's oil smuggling, says the group now has access to five oilfields in Iraq, each of which have between 40 to 70 oil wells. "They deal with a sophisticated network of middle men, some of whom are affiliated with the (Iraqi) oil companies. They have to pay various checkpoints to move around all these oil convoys and specifically to export the oil to Turkey," Khatteeb said. "It is estimated that now, after recent territory losses, they can produce give or take 25,000 bpd, easily getting them about $1.2 million a day, on and off, even if they sell at a discount price of $25-$60 a barrel," Khatteeb said. This volume of oil production would be on par with a small offshore field on the north slope of Alaska. A high-level Iraqi security official put the number of oilfields under the group's control at four, with a fifth in contest between them and Kurdish peshmerga forces. The group appears to have chosen areas of conquest carefully, with an eye to funding. In the Syrian province of Raqqa, a stronghold of the group, the militants made sure they could effectively manage the area before moving on to conquer territory across the border in Iraq. They moved into Fallujah in Iraq's Anbar province in early 2014, before reaching Mosul in June, a major urban centre. "It's about controlling financial nodes. It's controlling commercial centres, it's controlling roads for checkpoints and there's no surprise in that, because there's significant value in that control. And the more finance you earn, the more you can develop. It's a reinforcing circuit," said Tom Keatinge, a finance and security analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). "There's no point in controlling acres of desert. You want to control the financial nodes so that you can continue to expand. You don't want to spread yourself too thin financially before you can operate effectively in an expanded area." LESS RELIANCE ON PRIVATE FUNDS Documents from al Qaeda in Iraq captured by U.S. forces near Iraq's Sinjar town in 2007 included reams of finance and expense reports, showing the group, a predecessor of Islamic State, "relied heavily on voluntary donations", says a 2008 report by West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. The report, "Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout", said the "financial reports and receipts in the Sinjar documents show that the Islamic State of Iraq relied on three sources of funding: transfers from other leaders in al Qaeda in Iraq, money foreign suicide bombers brought with them and fundraising from local Iraqis." The study said it was unclear from the documents whether the funds from locals were given voluntarily. The bureaucratic obsession with accounting proved ironic - while it helped the group track funds, the documents, once in the hands of the U.S. military, helped Washington understand how the financing worked - from the operatives who moved money, to the ones who donated money, to how the money was spent. One lesson learned, the Sinjar documents show, was the need for more reliable financing, especially with countries trying harder to disrupt the flow of funds, Keatinge said. "If you have a sophisticated understanding of financial management like Islamic State or al Shabaab in Somalia, you know very well that relying on diaspora or private donations or funds that can be disrupted by the international community is a risky way to go," said Keatinge. By its own admission, Washington realises funds from outside donors are not as significant a threat as their self-financing methods, but the United States and its allies have been slow to move to cut those sources off. "(IS) receives some money from outside donors, but that pales in comparison to their self funding through criminal and terrorist activities," a senior State Department official said. Ransoms from kidnappings do not seem to compete with oil sales, and not much is reliably known about the amounts they have received. ABC News reported that one U.S. hostage held by Islamic State is a 26-year-old female aid worker, for whom the group has demanded $6.6 million in ransom. British Prime Minister David Cameron told parliament he had no doubt that tens of millions of pounds of ransom payments were going to Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. Focus, a German magazine said in April that France paid $18 million for the release of four French hostages who had been held by Islamic State, citing NATO sources in Brussels. French officials say the French state does not pay ransoms. Then there is crime. IS raided the central bank in Mosul and reportedly seized substantial sums of money, though the figures are disputed. The group apparently allows Iraqis in Mosul to withdraw 10 percent of their bank deposits and give 5 percent of the withdrawn amount, as zakat, or Islamic alms. WHAT CAN BE DONE Kuwait has been one of the biggest humanitarian donors to Syrian refugees through the United Nations. It has also struggled to control unofficial fund-raising for opposition groups in Syria by private individuals. Ahmed al-Sanee, head of charities in Kuwait's Social Affairs ministry, said recently there was "strict monitoring" of unlicensed donation collecting. Finance minister Anas al-Saleh said on Tuesday Kuwait was "committed to international efforts in fighting this terror". "Whomever has been identified by the United Nations as a terrorist, we will be implementing our law on them," he said. Washington has moved to cut off sources of private donations. Last month it imposed sanctions on three men it said funnelled money from Kuwait to Islamic militant groups in Iraq and Syria. Kuwait briefly detained two of the men, both of whom are prominent clerics. "If I were the Chief Financial Officer of IS or ISIS as it was then, I would be watching that development very closely. Because if I were receiving money from the Gulf states, at that point I for sure knew that it would get harder," said Keatinge. NO SIMPLE SOLUTION In the end, squeezing the group's finances will involve a mixture of intelligence and force. Ending the group's control of a given area using military might would remove its ability to raise local taxes, for example. Tracking smuggling routes or Gulf donors, in contrast, would involve local informants. Khatteeb, who is also the director of the Iraq Energy Institute, says Turkey must clamp down on oil smuggling routes through southern Turkey. This would dent a revenue stream Islamic State has used to fund a significant recruitment drive. "Turkish authorities (need) to really pay attention in closing down these markets, put more work in intelligence and enforce the rule of law." In an op-ed last month published in the New York Times Patrick Johnston and Benjamin Bahney of the RAND Corporation argued that strategies that focused on sanctioning international financial activities were unlikely to be effective. The authors say that "the terrorist group's bookkeepers, its oil business and cash holdings" should be the targets of greater intelligence and scrutiny to help "disrupt ISIS's financing and provide additional intelligence on its inner workings." Johnston told Reuters that even with the rapid expansion of Islamic State and its need to pay a larger number of recruits, the group could still make an estimated $100-$200 million surplus this year, given the amount of money it is making. "They're making more money, they have less opposition militarily ... the question is what are they going to do with it?" (Additional reporting by Ned Parker in Baghdad, Suleiman al-Khalidi in Amman, John Irish in Paris, Mahmoud Harby, David French and Ahmed Hagagy in Kuwait; Writing by Yara Bayoumy, Editing by William Maclean and Janet McBride) =============== Fear of Islamic State make Gulf monarchies set aside differences AFP | September 01, 2014, 13.09 pm IST Share inShare0Printer-friendly version Send by email Wary of spectacular gains made by Islamic State jihadists, the oil-rich monarchies fear the militants could advance towards their own borders, where the extreme ideologies could find support. (Photo: AP) Wary of spectacular gains made by Islamic State jihadists, the oil-rich monarchies fear the militants could advance towards their own borders, where the extreme ideologies could find support. (Photo: AP) Dubai: Advances by jihadists in Syria and Iraq, and US calls for a coalition against them have made Gulf monarchies set aside disputes over Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, analysts say. Wary of spectacular gains made by Islamic State jihadists, the oil-rich monarchies fear the militants could advance towards their own borders, where the extreme ideologies could find support. "The biggest danger (in the Gulf) comes now from these (emerging) terrorist groups, and not from the Muslim Brotherhood," said Abdulaziz Sager, head of the Gulf Research Centre think-tank. Qatar's relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain sank to a new low in March when the three governments withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, accusing it of meddling in their affairs and supporting the Brotherhood designated as "terrorist" by Riyadh. For Sager, the UAE was "the strictest" against Qatar among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. UAE State Minister for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash wrote on Twitter Sunday that his country's interest lies "in a strong Arab Gulf... sheltered from regional differences." Speaking to reporters following a meeting of Gulf Arab foreign ministers, Kuwait's top diplomat Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al-Sabah said that the six-months spat with Qatar was on its way to being resolved. He said the ambassadors could return to their posts "at any time", without giving a specific date. The announcement came as Saudi King Abdullah underscored the threat posed by jihadists unless there is "rapid" action. "Terrorism knows no border and its danger could affect several countries outside the Middle East," Abdullah was quoted as telling ambassadors, including the US envoy, on Friday. "If we ignore them, I am sure they will reach Europe in a month and America in another month," he warned. Saudi Arabia follows a strict version of Islamic sharia law. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers who took part in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States were from the kingdom. Saudi authorities have long feared blowback from jihadist groups, particularly after a spate of Al-Qaeda attacks in the kingdom from 2003 to 2006. IS beliefs supported in Gulf Kuwaiti political analyst Ayed al-Manaa agrees that "we now have a fear which is much bigger than the differences in foreign policies, with IS taking over one third of Syria and Iraq". "IS as an ideology is not only present in (Iraq and Syria). It is present in our countries and is waiting for the opportunity to appear," said Manaa. "The political disputes (with Qatar) are no longer a priority... We live in danger from northeast Syria and northwest Iraq. This is an alarm bell for GCC nations to end their differences." GCC states on Saturday said they are ready to act "against terrorist threats that face the region and the world". The foreign ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE the six GCC states also pledged a readiness to fight "terrorist ideology which is contrary to Islam". However, "we are waiting for more details to understand what is needed" for the coalition proposed by US President Barack Obama, said Sabah. Obama said he was developing a broad plan that would involve military, diplomatic and regional efforts to defeat the IS jihadists who have sown terror through crucifixions and gruesome beheadings. Obama said he would dispatch US Secretary of State John Kerry to the Middle East to discuss the plan with regional allies, including the Gulf Arab states. Regional expert Frederic Wehrey said that "the GCC does not have the capacity for real expeditionary military operations outside the Gulf. "The question is what military value would they bring beyond the symbolic legitimacy of Arab participation," said Wehrey of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sagar agrees, pointing out that the participation of GCC leader Saudi Arabia, would be limited to "intelligence" and the kingdom's "ability in influencing public opinion in the Muslim world." Saudi Arabia's top cleric has already branded Al-Qaeda and IS jihadists as "enemy number one" of Islam and warned young Muslims to steer clear of "calls for jihad" issued on "perverted" grounds. ================================ http://www.zemtv.com/2014/08/31/dunya-news-special-transmission-azadi-inqilab-march-10pm-to-11pm-31st-august-2014/ Aaila Ji qadry aur pagal khan amrica ke aur yhoodyuon ke ajent hen jo pakistan ko iraq afghanistan lyebia aur serya bnana chahty hen .aur china se pakistan ke dostana taluqat ko khrab krna in ka mission he.pak army aur 20 kror awam mil kr is aalmy sazsh ko nakam bnayen gye IS wqt aalmy stah pr IMF KE muqabley main china rusia india aur brazil ne mil kr aik nya aalmy bank [brick]bnaya he qadry aur pagal khan amrica ke aur yhoodyuon ke ajent hen jo pakistan ko iraq afghanistan lyebia aur serya bnana chahty hen .aur china se pakistan ke dostana taluqat ko khrab krna in ka mission he.pak army aur 20 kror awam mil kr is aalmy sazsh ko nakam bnayen gye ============ Pakistan protests ease as rival leaders seek negotiated settlement Wed, Sep 03 03:36 AM EDT image 1 of 5 By Maria Golovnina ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Rival Pakistani politicians on Wednesday explored the possibility of a negotiated solution to weeks of protests aimed at the removal of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that eased after turning violent at the weekend. Thousands had tried to storm Sharif's house in protests led by former cricket star Imran Khan and firebrand cleric Tahir ul-Qadri, destabilizing the coup-prone nation. But by Wednesday, only a few hundred people were camped out outside parliament in the high-security Red Zone area in the center of the capital Islamabad, with the army protecting key government installations. Sharif has refused to step down, while protest leaders have rejected his calls to come to the negotiating table, creating a dangerous deadlock and prompting fears the military might seize power. But in the latest twist, Khan and Qadri agreed to talk to a committee of opposition politicians seeking to mediate between the government and the protesters and help find a political solution. "The entire nation is disturbed by the ongoing crisis," Siraj-ul-Haq, a conservative Islamist politician leading the mediation effort, said. "(Khan's party) has accepted our request (to hold talks) with an open heart and we are thankful to them." The crisis has taken many turns since protests broke out in mid-August, subsiding at times and erupting in violence again, with most commentators saying it was too early to say whether a negotiated solution was in sight. Violent scenes in the usually quiet capital have alarmed many people in a nation where power has often changed hands though military coups rather than elections, with some officials accusing the military of orchestrating the protests as a way of sidelining or even toppling Sharif - a charge it denies. Few commentators think the army is bent on seizing power again but even if Sharif survives, he would emerge significantly weakened and likely play second-fiddle to the army on key security and foreign policy issues. On Tuesday, parliament threw its weight behind Sharif who has convened a week-long joint session of the chamber where he enjoys a solid majority following last year's landslide election victory. He chaired another session in parliament on Wednesday when more lawmakers were expected to deliver speeches in his support. (Writing by Maria Golovnina; Editing by Nick Macfie) ===================== An Egyptian man lights a flare in Cairo, April 2, 2011. (photo by REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh) Tangled web of alliances emerges as Middle East divides into blocs The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was vital for the restructuring of alliances in the Middle East. That is when the foundations for what were then the two main blocs in the region were laid, leading the way toward a new order that divided the region between pro-US and anti-US countries. Summary⎙ Print The Middle East is divided into three blocs, but all have a common enemy in the Islamic State. Author Ali Hashem Posted September 2, 2014 The fall of Saddam Hussein, the heightened and continuous Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Hezbollah’s rise in Lebanon amid the liberation of south Lebanon and the Syrian-Iranian alliance were all aspects forming the landscape of the resistance and resilience bloc; it raised anti-US mottos and gained grassroots popularity for expressing stances that tickled the dreams of a public that had suffered waves of disappointments during the past half a century. This bloc brought together Islamists, nationalists, leftists and anarchists; it connected Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance factions (for example, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). On the other side of the stage, the moderation bloc addressed the region with what it called realism. This grouping was ready for peace with Israel and had excellent ties with the West, mainly the United States, attracting the liberal elites, ex-leftists, Wahhabi Islamists and businessmen. The bloc presented itself as the only partner the West and the United States could rely on in the region in facing the axis of resistance; it brought under its umbrella Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Palestinian authority, Morocco, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Egypt, along with other minor countries that were on the sidelines of the events. The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005, was a turning point in the relations between the two axes. The moderation bloc, directly and indirectly, accused the Syrian regime of responsibility for the massive truck bomb that ripped apart the Lebanese capital and saw 22 people die along with Hariri. A year and half later, the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel widened the rift. Saudi Arabia accused Hezbollah of launching "uncalculated adventures" that precipitated the latest Middle East crisis. Amid the 2006 war, Qatar entered the resistance axis amid a campaign of support that it led on the diplomatic front, besides the extensive pro-Hezbollah coverage on the new Qatari-owned TV network Al Jazeera. Until March 15, 2011, the map of alliances in the region remained unchanged; however, from the moment people in Syria took to the streets, the resistance bloc started to show cracks. In a few months, Qatar and Turkey both wound up completely on the opposite side of the resistance bloc, though not with the moderation bloc. Before the Syrian revolution, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and Tunisia also saw people calling for freedom, where people took to the streets in a phenomenon that came to be known as the Arab Spring. In Egypt, Libya and Tunisia the Muslim Brotherhood helped lead the change, with obvious Qatari support. An unannounced Muslim Brotherhood bloc was formed with the patronage of both Qatar and Turkey; the latter had some issues to settle with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. Ankara refrained from providing support against then-Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, despite its decision later to give full support to the revolution in Syria and to post-revolution Egypt. The Palestinian resistance group Hamas was also part of the coalition, yet it showed a bit of uncertainty by keeping one leg in the resistance and resilience bloc. In Libya the Islamists lost the election, while in Tunisia they lost their influence after a comeback by leftists and nationalists, without being removed from power, while in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood was toppled after the June 30, 2013, demonstrations that led to the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-backed Cabinet. Qatar, Turkey and Hamas once again found themselves alone with greater pressure from the moderation bloc, given the historic rivalry between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. Attempts to recast the resistance bloc were made and pressure was exerted, but many differences blocked confidence building, mainly due to the ongoing bloodshed in Syria. Turkey, Qatar and Hamas built their own bloc, which enjoyed strong influence in the region thanks to its effective media reach and the influence the Muslim Brotherhood still has on the ground in several areas around the region. The revolution turned into a civil war in Syria, reflecting the iron bond that brought together Syria, Iran and Hezbollah. Later, with the spillover of the Syrian crisis into Iraq, Baghdad became the fourth pillar of this bloc, maintaining what Jordan's King Abdullah once described as the Shiite crescent. The grouping changed its name from the resistance and resilience bloc to the resistance and confrontation bloc, a clear indication of the strategy the bloc decided to adopt. Tehran, Damascus and Baghdad, along with Hezbollah, reiterated their accusations against the Qatari-Turkish bloc and the moderation bloc of backing the militants in Syria and Iraq; meanwhile, the other blocs continued to accuse the resistance bloc of committing crimes in Syria and Iraq. After the removal of Morsi as president, the moderation bloc regained Egypt, while retaining control over Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. The monarchies showed immunity toward change, except for Bahrain and the eastern parts of Saudi Arabia, yet this wasn’t a game-changing element. Riyadh and Manama accused Iran of fueling the uprising by giving support to the opposition. Iran’s media played a vital role in showing the world what was happening in Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia, though there was no solid proof that its support involved anything more than media coverage. With a seeming maximum number of conflicts and crises, a new Middle East order has taken form. The new scenario sees three main blocs fighting each other on several fronts, with each looking to weaken its foes to prevail. The fact is that all three blocs are today facing a tougher enemy that poses a threat to all of them. The Islamic State (IS), which each bloc accuses the other of backing, supporting and financing, seems to be watching the struggle for victory among the warring sides with much content and happiness — for the more they fight and weaken each other, the greater the odds are for IS to prevail. Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/region-blocs-new-middle-east-order.html##ixzz3CJExnorG ============================= EXPERT VIEWS: Is Islamic State a flash in the pan? Source: Thomson Reuters Foundation - Wed, 27 Aug 2014 16:00 GMT Author: Alex Whiting More news from our correspondents hum-war hum-peo hum-aid Enlarge image Displaced people from the minority Yazidi sect, fleeing violence from forces loyal to the Islamic State in Sinjar town, walk towards the Syrian border, on the outskirts of Sinjar mountain, near the Syrian border town of Elierbeh of Al-Hasakah Governorate August 10, 2014. REUTERS/Rodi Said Tweet Recommend Google + LinkedIn Email Print Leave us a comment LONDON (Thomson Reuters Foundation) – Is Islamic State a flash in the pan, or is it here for the long term? What impact is its expansion in Iraq having on the war in Syria, and the region as a whole? Thomson Reuters Foundation asked three experts for their views: Nigel Inkster is director of transnational threats and political risk at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, chair of the World Economic Forum’s committee on terrorism, and former director for operations and intelligence at MI6; Noah Bonsey is International Crisis Group’s senior analyst on Syria, based in Lebanon; and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a distinguished senior fellow at the Gatestone Institute, and a student at Oxford University. Islamic State (IS) was formerly called ISIS. It took control of key Iraqi cities like Mosul and Fallujah as part of a broad coalition of groups earlier this year, but it went it alone when it expanded into Kurdistan. 1. Is IS a flash in the pan, or is it here for the long term? Nigel Inkster: Obviously we can’t know for certain, but I’m inclined to think it’s going to be around for some while to come. I think that what we’ve got here is one manifestation of what quite a few analysts have been thinking ... since before 9/11, (that) it’s a generational issue that is going to take a generation, maybe more, to work through. It may mutate, it may take different forms ... but it’s really in many ways the latest manifestation of a jihadist ideology that’s been evolving for quite a few years now. Noah Bonsey: It’s not a flash in the pan. This is a group that has been around in one form or another since the U.S. invasion of Iraq (in 2003). The question is, how big and how powerful will they remain? And that will depend largely on choices made by IS opponents within Iraq, within Syria and by the United States, and regional states who oppose it. In Iraq you have rising animosity among many of ISIS’s Sunni opponents, including (those) that initially welcomed ISIS’s advance against the Iraqi government. But it’s not yet at a stage where it would be easy for an external actor such as the United States to exploit, and so that situation will likely develop. You don’t have an American strategy to deal with Iraq and Syria, or even the ISIS problem within Iraq and Syria, and other actors in the region similarly lack a strategy. What’s important to remember when talking about the region as a whole, is you have to keep in mind the level and extent of political division in this region right now. You have multiple fault lines where tensions are very high. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi: I talk about a timescale of years, rather than over the next year or so ... they’ve amassed so much resources, so much territory, so much manpower now. Other insurgent groups (in Iraq) ... are completely unwilling to confront Islamic State ... And the longer they put off confronting IS, the more IS’s power is going to grow and they really face the situation where they could end up like the rebels in Syria in various areas ... where they are confined to marginal resistance. The Naqshbandi Army (a Baathist group in Mosul which is the second most influential group in the Iraqi Sunni insurgency) don’t even want to mention the Islamic State by name in their statements. They go so far as to blame the blowing up of shrines on the “sectarian government”, referring to the central government in Baghdad, and they seem to want to pretend Islamic State doesn’t exist. 2. Will IS be able to hold onto the territory it controls? Nigel Inkster: Possibly not. At the end of the day this was always more about politics in Iraq than anything else. And a lot of the rise of Islamic State was a function of some very dysfunctional politics that were taking place within Baghdad – very, very sectarian and very exclusionary policies have alienated significant constituencies, and it remains to be seen whether, now that (former prime minister) Nuri al-Maliki who was the architect of these policies has stepped aside, something better may take their place. That I think is going to be key to addressing this problem. If we talk about Islamic State ... we’re talking about a hard core of jihadists, but we’re also talking about a pragmatic coalition of disenchanted groups who have attached themselves to Islamic State, more than anything out of despair with the politics of Iraq. And it’s certainly true that Islamic State has taken a lot of territory and commands more real estate and resources than any other Islamist group has yet managed to do, how durable that will prove to be is an interesting question. I suspect actually to some extent it will, because Islamic State achieved a high degree of penetration in cities like Mosul before they actually physically occupied them. There had been a lot of subversion, a lot of extortion taking place within Mosul by Islamic State or the predecessor organisation (ISIS). They’ve tried with some effect to provide some services to the populations they now control, and they’ve not done too badly in some respects, albeit from a pretty low base of expectation. So it’s possible they will be able to maintain some of the territory they’ve occupied. I don’t think all of it. Noah Bonsey: At times it’s easy for us to overstate IS’s power because people look at maps and they see this giant swath (in Syria and Iraq) that’s controlled by IS. Well a lot of that area is sparsely populated, and in general much of IS’s power comes from the weakness in terms of organisation, in terms of arms ... among its opponents. For that reason I think it’s important to take IS seriously but also we don’t want to exaggerate its military capabilities. Even if we assume that that number (of 15,000 to 25,000 IS fighters) is accurate, there is such a dramatic range not just in the level of training and efficiency, but also in the level of commitment to the group and to the cause within those ranks … We’re not talking about a level of manpower that is immovable or irresistible. 3. Given there’s a coalition of rebel groups fighting IS in Syria, and government forces and militias in Iraq, plus Turkish PKK fighters and Western airstrikes, what chance does IS have? Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi: They (IS) are very militarily effective, they have advanced weaponry and equipment, they have co-opted people, they span borders. Each of these actors in themselves prove themselves insufficient on a number of counts. The Syrian rebels have their own problems of divisions within their ranks, the fact that they’re fighting on multiple fronts as well, and that their priority is very much for example on making sure that Aleppo doesn’t fall to (Syrian President Assad’s) regime, they don’t have the manpower to push eastwards and retake substantial bits of IS territory. Militarily the (Iraqi) army is quite incompetent at urban warfare, the Shia militia really aren’t much better either. They have been fighting in areas like the surroundings of Fallujah and Tikrit for months now but they still haven’t dislodged IS from either. So really I think the key issue is the IS would have to break up internally. There could be a number of scenarios that could trigger that – let’s say (IS leader) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi got killed, there’s a very big question of who would succeed him. Other Sunni insurgents in Iraq really do have to turn against IS as soon as possible and have a coordinated effort against them, and there’s no sign of that happening at the moment and the longer they put that off – if they do plan to fight IS – then the worse it will become. Ultimately the IS is ruling a failed state. They might be the world’s richest terrorist group, but they are one of the world’s poorest states. They’re ruling a vast population spanning borders and it’s not like they have the resources to improve quality of life in a substantial way. But also you would really need to have internal breaking up of the IS from within, or someone is going to have to put troops on the ground to deal with this problem – it’s not going to go away through air strikes, and arming those you want to support. 4. Has IS lost wider Sunni support in Iraq as a result of the atrocities it has committed? Nigel Inkster: These (atrocities) in and of themselves may not necessarily alienate populations depending on what else happens (and whether their own needs are being met), which at the moment to some extent they are. I suspect at the end of the day, Islamic State policies will end up alienating substantial sections of the population they’re aspiring to control, but we’ll have to see. I don’t think we should assume that a re-run of the 2007 Anbar awakening (a rebellion of Sunni tribes against al Qaeda in Iraq) is likely to happen, because the conditions that made that possible simply don’t exist any more in the form of a very substantial U.S. military commitment. If it does happen I suspect it is likely to be more piecemeal this time around. It probably will happen at some point, there are signs it already is in some areas. We have to bear in mind that a lot of the effect of Islamic State has been psychological through a very carefully thought out and executed media campaign (to spread fear). Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi: Some of those who might have welcomed them into Mosul, for example, have regrets now when they see IS blow up shrines and things like this. On the other hand, (IS) can intimidate people, but they can also co-opt people with some forms of social outreach ... distribution of gifts during Eid, provisions of meat and other commodities. 5. How has IS’s expansion in Iraq affected the war in Syria? Nigel Inkster: They’ve established a significant presence within the northeast of (Syria). But there they are much more one of a number of contending parties, and it’s not axiomatic that they have or can expect to continue to have the upper hand. And we’ve now seen that an Assad regime that was broadly content to let these jihadist groups run on the basis that they proved the essential Assad argument that this was a fight against jihadist extremists, we’ve now seen the Syrian state starting to attack IS positions in Syria for the first time. I think that the Iranians will simply not let the Assad regime fold ... The Syria we had before 2011 has gone and it’s not coming back, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that Assad will be driven out or lose territory to the point where his regime is no longer tenable. Noah Bonsey: Its gains in Iraq have fuelled subsequent gains in Syria to the extent that it was able to defeat a pretty strong alliance of rebel forces throughout the province of Deir al-Zor within the space of a few weeks. IS is now fighting to expand westward, fighting to take back areas north of Aleppo that they had lost. There’s no question that gains in Iraq have strengthened the group overall and helped fuel its expansion in Syria. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi: It’s really reinforced the break-up of the country. The rebels in particular are now by far the weakest force. They are suffering a huge amount of fragmentation. For example, the Islamic Front is pretty much on the verge of collapse. Assad doesn’t have the ability to crush (IS). He doesn’t have sufficient manpower ... He could crush the rebels in the west of Syria and re-take Aleppo, but he couldn’t re-conquer the entirety of Syria. 6. Is there a danger that the conflict will spread to Turkey? Nigel Inkster: In a situation of such instability as we’ve now got, pretty much anything is possible. But I think that Turkey probably has the capacity to keep this within bounds – it certainly has got the technical capability to do it. I think again it’s going to be more about politics. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi: Not yet. IS know that many of the goods (basic commodities) they end up distributing come in via the Turkish border, and they wouldn’t want to disrupt that ... Although they took Turkish hostages in the Mosul area, there is no evidence that they want to start attacking Turkish territory yet. There are charity organisations that for the sake of humanitarian services go into IS territory to distribute things to locals, and IS doesn’t interfere with that. 7. What impact is IS having on the region as a whole? Nigel Inkster: One of the things that IS has majored on and very, very consciously emphasised in their own propaganda is the end of the Sykes-Picot era, the destruction of that line on a map. And I think the geography of this region looks as if it is going to be rearranged for better or worse. Effectively I think that the Kurdish region has become more autonomous, less attracted to remaining part of Iraq, I think the Shia and the Sunni (in Iraq) are more alienated from one another than before, and the post-World War One borders I don’t think are coming back. What does that mean? Very hard to say. But what I think it means is a very fluid and very messy situation which is going to take quite some time to settle down. ===== In northeast Syria, Islamic State builds a government Thu, Sep 04 01:38 AM EDT image By Mariam Karouny BEIRUT (Reuters) - In the cities and towns across the desert plains of northeast Syria, the ultra-hardline al Qaeda offshoot Islamic State has insinuated itself into nearly every aspect of daily life. The group famous for its beheadings, crucifixions and mass executions provides electricity and water, pays salaries, controls traffic, and runs nearly everything from bakeries and banks to schools, courts and mosques. While its merciless battlefield tactics and its imposition of its austere vision of Islamic law have won the group headlines, residents say much of its power lies in its efficient and often deeply pragmatic ability to govern. Syria's eastern province of Raqqa provides the best illustration of their methods. Members hold up the province as an example of life under the Islamic "caliphate" they hope will one day stretch from China to Europe. In the provincial capital, a dust-blown city that was home to about a quarter of a million people before Syria's three-year-old war began, the group leaves almost no institution or public service outside of its control. "Let us be honest, they are doing massive institutional work. It is impressive," one activist from Raqqa who now lives in a border town in Turkey told Reuters. In interviews conducted remotely, residents, Islamic State fighters and even activists opposed to the group described how it had built up a structure similar to a modern government in less than a year under its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Reuters journalists are unable to visit the area for security reasons. The group's progress has alarmed regional and Western powers - last month U.S. President Barack Obama called it a "cancer" that must be erased from the Middle East as U.S. warplanes bombarded its positions in Iraq. But Islamic State has embedded itself so thoroughly into the fabric of life in places like Raqqa that it will be all but impossible for U.S. aircraft - let alone Iraqi, Syrian and Kurdish troops - to uproot them through force alone. BRIDE OF THE REVOLUTION Last year, Raqqa became the first city to fall to the rebels fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. They called it the "Bride of the Revolution." A variety of rebel groups ranging from hardline Islamists to religious moderates held sway in the city, although Islamists clearly dominated. Within a year, Islamic State had clawed its way into control, mercilessly eliminating rival insurgents. Activists critical of the group were killed, disappeared, or escaped to Turkey. Alcohol was banned. Shops closed by afternoon and streets were empty by nightfall. Communication with the outside world - including nearby cities and towns - was allowed only through the Islamic State media center. Those rebels and activists who stayed largely "repented", a process through which they pledge loyalty to Baghdadi and are forgiven for their "sins" against the Islamic State, and either kept to their homes or joined the group's ranks. But after the initial crackdown, the group began setting up services and institutions - stating clearly that it intended to stay and use the area as a base in its quest to eradicate national boundaries and establish an Islamic "state". "We are a state," one emir, or commander, in the province told Reuters. "Things are great here because we are ruling based on God's law." Some Sunni Muslims who worked for Assad's government stayed on after they pledged allegiance to the group. "The civilians who do not have any political affiliations have adjusted to the presence of Islamic State, because people got tired and exhausted, and also, to be honest, because they are doing institutional work in Raqqa," one Raqqa resident opposed to Islamic State told Reuters. Since then, the group "has restored and restructured all the institutions that are related to services," including a consumer protection office and the civil judiciary, the resident said. BRUTALITY AND PRAGMATISM In the past month alone, Islamic State fighters have broadcast images of themselves beheading U.S. journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff as well as captive Kurdish and Lebanese soldiers, and machine-gunning scores of Syrian prisoners wearing nothing but their underwear. But the group's use of violence has not been entirely indiscriminate. The group has often traded with businessmen loyal to Assad when it has suited its interests, for instance. According to one fighter, a former Assad employee is now in charge of mills and distributing flour to bakeries in Raqqa. Employees at the Raqqa dam, which provides the city with electricity and water, have remained in their posts. Islamic State's willingness to use former Assad employees displays a pragmatism residents and activists say has been vital to its success holding onto territory it has captured. They have been helped by experts who have come from countries including in North Africa and Europe. The man Baghdadi appointed to run and develop Raqqa's telecoms, for instance, is a Tunisian with a PhD in the subject who left Tunisia to join the group and serve "the state". Reflecting Islamic State's assertion that it is a government - rather than simply a militant group that happens to govern - Baghdadi has also separated military operations from civilian administration, assigning fighters only as police and soldiers Instead, Baghdadi has appointed civilian deputies called walis, an Islamic term describing an official similar to a minister, to manage institutions and develop their sectors. Administrative regions are divided into waliyehs, or provinces, which sometimes align with existing divisions but, as with the case of the recently established al-Furat province, can span national boundaries. Fighters and employees receive a salary from a department called the Muslim Financial House, which is something like a finance ministry and a bank that aims to reduce poverty. Fighters receive housing - including in homes confiscated from local non-Sunnis or from government employees who fled the area - as well as about $400 to $600 per month, enough to pay for a basic lifestyle in Syria's poor northeast. One fighter said poor families were given money. A widow may receive $100 for herself and for each child she has, he said. Prices are also kept low. Traders who manipulate prices are punished, warned and shut down if they are caught again. The group has also imposed Islamic taxes on wealthy traders and families. "We are only implementing Islam, zakat is an Islamic tax imposed by God," said a jihadi in Raqqa. Analysts estimate that Islamic State also raises tens of millions of dollars by selling oil from the fields it controls in Syria and Iraq to Turkish and Iraqi businessmen and by collecting ransoms for hostages it has taken. BAGHDADI CALLS THE SHOTS At the heart of the Islamic State system is its leader, Baghdadi, who in June declared himself "caliph", or ruler of all the world's Muslims, after breaking with al Qaeda. Residents, fighters and activists agree Baghdadi is now heavily involved in Raqqa's administration, and has the final word on all decisions made by commanders and officials. Even the prices set for local goods go back to him, local sources say. Residents say Baghdadi also approves beheadings and other executions and punishments for criminals convicted by the group's Islamic courts. On the battlefield, fighters describe him as a fierce and experienced commander. The Syrian fighter said Baghdadi led major battles, such as one to retake a Syrian military base known as Division 17 in July, the first in a series of defeats the group dealt to Syrian government forces in Raqqa province. "He does not leave the brothers. In the battle to retake Division 17 he was also slightly wounded but he is fine now," the fighter said. "He is always moving. He does not stay in one place. He moves between Raqqa, Deir al-Zor and Mosul. He leads the battles." NEXT GENERATION JIHAD Although pragmatism has been a key to the group's success, ideology is also vital to the group's rule. By declaring the caliphate and setting up a "state", Baghdadi aimed to attract foreign jihadis and experts from abroad. Supporters say thousands have responded. At the same time, wealthy Islamists from across the world have sent money to Raqqa to support the caliphate, jihadis say. According to sources in Raqqa, the group maintains three weapons factories mainly designed to develop missiles. Foreign scientists - including Muslims from China, fighters claim - are kept in a private location with bodyguards. "Scientists and men with degrees are joining the State," said one Arab jihadi. The group has also invested heavily in the next generation by inducting children into their ideology. Primary, secondary and university programs now include more about Islam. The group also accepts women who want to fight - they are trained about "the real Islam" and the reasons for fighting. Islamic education groups are held in mosques for newly arrived fighters, who, according to militants in Raqqa, have flocked to Islamic State-controlled territory in even greater numbers since Baghdadi declared the "caliphate". "Every three days we receive at least 1,000 fighters. The guest houses are flooding with mujahideen. We are running out of places to receive them," the Arab jihadi said. (Editing by Alexander Dziadosz and Giles Elgood) === Islamic State kidnaps 40 men in Iraq's Kirkuk region: residents Thu, Sep 04 10:20 AM EDT image BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Islamic State militants kidnapped 40 men from a town in Iraq's northern province of Kirkuk on Thursday, dragging the men into cars before driving off, residents said. Residents of the Sunni Muslim town of Hawija said by telephone they did not know why the men had been taken, from a district on the edge of the town. They added that Islamic State, which controls Hawija, had not faced any resistance from its inhabitants. Islamic State has seized hundreds of Iraqi and Syrian soldiers as well as members of other insurgent groups, journalists and civilians. Some have been sold for ransom and others have been killed. The group launched a lightning advance through northern and central Iraq in June, declaring an Islamic caliphate. With the help of U.S. air strikes, Iraq's army and Kurdish forces have been able to push the fighters back from some areas. The Ministry of Defense said on Thursday on state television Iraqi forces had killed three "leaders" of Islamic State in three separate attacks on Mosul and Tel Afar in the north. (Reporting by Raheem Salman and Oliver Holmes; editing by Andrew Roche)