Najaf, Qom take different approaches in Iraq

Najaf and Qom have taken two different approaches in dealing with general political affairs in Shiite communities since the introduction of the idea of ​​velayat-e faqih. Although this idea was put forward for the first time in Najaf by the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, it has not been welcomed by the Shiite hawza (seminary). Finally, Khomeini managed to attain his wish to implement velayat-e faqih on the ground after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which made this idea widely popular within the Iranian seminary of Qom. Summary⎙ Print The two religious authorities Najaf and Qom have divergent views on Iraq's political affairs, with Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi

— the religious authority in Qom — identifying various actors in the Iraqi crisis, praising Shiite militias and accusing Sunni politicians.

Author Ali Mamouri Posted July 20, 2014 Translator(s)Pascale el Khoury The period after 2003 was a great challenge for both Najaf and Qom, during which competition emerged between them on how to deal with the political affairs of Iraq. Qom tended to implement its religio-political vision in Iran on the situation in Iraq, while Najaf had a different perspective over the situation in Iraq — which has a wider religious and ethnic diversity than that of Iran — therefore considering it impossible to have a narrow Shiite perspective over Iraq. Najaf thus opted for dealing positively with the change by building an inclusive civil state in Iraq that does not only take into consideration the Shiite majority. On the other hand, Qom only saw in Iraq an American threat to Iran’s interests on the one hand and the Shiite majority on the other. According to it, the American threat must be eliminated and the Shiite authority must be in control. The difference also appeared during the recent Iraqi crisis. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani contented himself with issuing a fatwa urging the support of the army in all of its religious and ethnic components against terrorists, while at the same time repeatedly emphasizing the need to completely ban militias and unofficial armed groups. He never mentioned the word Shiites, or anything else related to Shiism, in his statements and in the declarations made by his office and spokesman. He was very careful when confirming the need to protect the holy places since he did not mention any specific description portraying these sanctuaries as Shiite shrines. His statements were broad and mentioned Christian and Yazidi temples and others in the areas falling under the control of the Islamic State (IS) — formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Meanwhile, Qom authorities focused their attention on the subject of Shiites and the expansion of Shiism in Iraq. Their statements and denouncements made toward the various parties in this crisis were based on this sectarian ideological perspective. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi issued a fatwa for jihad on June 23. The fatwa contradicted Sistani's vision in the following aspects: Makarem linked the Iraqi situation to the Syrian situation to set a comprehensive fighting front based on the sectarian conflict; he adopted the style of the Iranian regime by throwing accusations against the United States and Arab countries blaming them for the crises in Iraq; he only referred to the Shiite holy sites; and he called for a general mobilization of all Shiites in the world urging them to form armed forces along with the Iraqi army, which implies the promotion of militias. In a similar context, the provisional president of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi — who immigrated from Najaf to Iran after the Islamic Revolution — issued a lengthy statement indicating that the Iraqi crisis has three axes: the United States and Israel; the Arab countries and others loyal to the United States, specifically Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey; and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, whom he accused of dealing with IS to control the disputed territories. He also praised the work of Shiite militias such as the Badr Army, which managed to carry out military actions in conflict areas with the Sunni-armed groups. He also accused some Sunni politicians of supporting the terrorists. It is worth mentioning that Shahroudi enjoys good relations with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — he presided over the judiciary in Iran for 10 years. Several preparations were previously undertaken for his transfer to Iraq as a pro-Iranian authority in Najaf, but this did not occur for undisclosed reasons; probably to avoid collisions with Sistani. Shahroudi also has broad historic ties with the Islamic Dawa Party, which the Iraqi prime minister of the caretaker government, Nouri al-Maliki, is affiliated with. This implies that Shahroudi would enjoy political support in the event his name is put forward as a religious authority in Iraq. It is expected that the issue of announcing Shahroudi as the religious authority in Iraq will be postponed until the post-Sistani period to ensure his success and eliminate any strong competitor. In this case, the Iranian guide would have a significant presence in Najaf and Najaf policy would shift from the civil state project sponsored by Sistani to the project of Shiite Islamist parties loyal to the idea of ​​velayat-e faqih. Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/iraq-crisis-najaf-qom-different-views.html#ixzz38GHAIgmj =========================== Iran, Hezbollah break with Assad to support Hamas GAZA CITY, Gaza Strip — The current war in Gaza has witnessed renewed contact between Hamas on the one hand, and Iran and Hezbollah on the other, following two years of a chill in relations. Summary⎙ Print Hezbollah and Iran have publicly declared support for Hamas in the Gaza war against Israel, but Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains critical of Hamas and is reluctant to reconcile. Author Adnan Abu Amer Posted July 25, 2014 Translator(s)Rani Geha A political official in Hamas confirmed to Al-Monitor that Khaled Meshaal, head of Hamas’ politburo, has recently received phone calls from Tehran initiated by Ali Larijani, chairman of the Shura Council, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and a senior Revolutionary Guard officer whose name he did not mention. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah called Meshaal on July 20. This was the first official contact between Hezbollah and Hamas since April, a Hamas official informed Al-Monitor. Hezbollah’s official website reported that, during his phone call with Meshaal, “Nasrallah praised the steadfastness of the resistance fighters in Gaza,” stressing that he “stands next to the Palestinian resistance and supports its conditions to end the battle.” Al-Monitor contacted a Palestinian official in Lebanon who mediated Hamas’ troubled relationship with Hezbollah, who said, “It is no secret that the relationship between the officials has not been great because of the crisis in Syria. But Iran contacting Meshaal through the head of the Shura Council Ali Larijani, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and a senior Revolutionary Guard officer on July 7 encouraged Nasrallah to call Meshaal despite the Syrian boycott of Hamas. Therefore, Nasrallah contacting Meshaal has not had positive echoes in Damascus.” The Palestinian official in Lebanon was probably alluding to the accusations of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against Hamas on July 16, when Assad commented on the Gaza war and urged “the distinction between real resistance fighters, which we support, and amateurs who wear the mask of resistance according to their interests in order to improve their image or to consecrate their authority,” referring to the Hamas leadership. A Hezbollah media official told Al-Monitor via phone from Beirut, “Syria has reasons that led it to have a rigid position when considering any reconciliation with Hamas, but we are confident that the Iranian diplomacy can find a formula between the two sides.” Sources from Hamas and Hezbollah revealed that there were attempts made in the last couple of months — before the Gaza war — to restore the axis of resistance and restore communication between Hamas and the Syrian regime. However, these attempts failed as the conditions were not ripe. A former member of the Iranian Shura Council and close associate of the decision-making circles in Tehran told Al-Monitor by phone, “Iran and Hezbollah’s contacts with Hamas did not find positive echoes in Syria, as Assad ‘vetoes’ the return of Hamas to the axis, which includes Damascus, Tehran and Beirut. However, Iran cannot remain idle as war rages in Gaza, while Hamas has made ​​a remarkable military effort. Although Iran was absent from the current military scene — despite the training it offered — it wants to keep up with the political and diplomatic developments, even if this was to anger the Syrian president.” In response to a question by Al-Monitor about whether Meshaal may be invited to visit Lebanon soon and meet with Nasrallah, he said, “The party welcomes every ally and opens its doors to everyone. The Gaza war will have a major role in warming the relations between Hamas and Hezbollah, including providing assistance and support in all required fields.” The same Iranian source told Al-Monitor, “The Gaza war was a suitable opportunity for Iran and Hamas to pump more blood into their chilled relationship. Meanwhile, Tehran wants to regain its alliance with any regional power in the region, and Hamas has proven to be a party that should not be underestimated, regardless of our differences over other issues. The movement has actually showed steadfastness that lasted more than two weeks in front of the Israeli war machine.” The Iranian source he expected Meshaal to visit Tehran soon, which Iran has repeatedly postponed this year. "I expect Meshaal to visit Tehran very soon, after this visit was postponed several times, either to congratulate him on the Gaza victory or to renew the support that has recently declined. [Meshaal] will be warmly welcomed by the Iranian state, namely by the supreme leader-general of the revolution and all the decision-making departments,” the official added. Another angle may help to improve the relations between Hamas and the axis of Iran and Hezbollah, which is Hamas’ tense relations with Egypt during the war. A Hamas official in Gaza told Al-Monitor, “Hamas did not object to the renewal of the relationship with Iran and Hezbollah, as they are our allies and we share with them many years of cooperation and coordination, be it in political positions, financial support or military assistance, and despite the chilled relationship with them, we are keen to overcome any differences in order to support the resistance and confront Israel.” The current regional pressure on Hamas to acquiesce to Israel’s terms in a cease-fire will push the movement closer to Tehran, the Hamas official said. “The pressure that has been placed by some regional countries on Hamas to defer to Israel’s conditions for truce during the current war in Gaza, promotes improving the relationship with Iran, not at the expense of anyone, but out of a desire to expand the circle of friends and supporters,” he added. The Israeli aggression on Gaza might have the counterproductive effect, as far as Israel is concerned, of restoring the broken ties between Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. All three, despite the objections from Damascus, sense an opportunity to seize the regional circumstances and renew alliances. According to a Palestinian official based in Lebanon that has taken part in talks to revive ties between Hamas and Hezbollah, this also comes amid the flirtation between Qatar and Iran that may expedite the restoration of an alliance with Hamas, albeit still plagued by a number of problems. Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/nasralla-relation-renewed-hamas.html#ixzz38cWL5WTn =========