عودة التهجير الطائفي إلى بغداد

ودة التهجير الطائفي إلى بغداد | english | کوردی نقاش | أحمد هادي | بغداد | 24.07.2014 مرة أخرى يقف عمار العامري مدمع العينين وهو يشرف على بعض العمال الذين استأجرهم لحمل أثاث منزله إلى سيارة حمل كبيرة بعد تهديدات تلقاها من قبل إحدى المليشيات الناشطة في مناطق شرقي العاصمة. يحمل العامري ذو الأربعين ربيعاً الذي ينحدر من مدينة بعقوبة بديالى ذكريات أليمة عن عام تهجيره الأول عام 2006 حين بقي يدور في حلقة مفرغة لعله يجد طائفة تحتظنه وتقبل به وزوجته التي تنتمي لطائفة أخرى. يقول عمار لـ"نقاش" أنه انتقل عام 1996 لبغداد بعد زواجه من زينب ابنة منطقة الصدر لكنه لم يكن بحسبانه حينها إن زواجه وأسمي أولاده سيكونان سبباً في بقائه متشرداً. عمار تم نهجيره عام 2006 من مدينة الصدر فعاد حينها إلى ديالى لكن عودته هذه لم تكن موفقة بعد مداهمة عناصر من القاعدة منزله وتخييره بين الذبح أو مغادرة المدينة بعدما عرفوا أن ولديه يحملان أسماء كرار وسجاد وإن زوجته من طائفة أخرى فعاد ليسكن في مدينة الشعب. وبعد مرور ثمان سنوات على تلك المعاناة طرق عناصر مليشيا معروفة وقال له احدهم دون مقدمات "شفعت لك زوجتك وإلا كنا قتلناك دون تحذير وعليك ان تغادر المكان". بحث العامري كثيراً عن منطقة يستطيع الخلاص فيها من نار الملسحين والمليشيات على حد سواء ويقول"لم أجد سوى المنطقة الخضراء حيث ساعدني القاضي الذي أعمل كحارس شخصي له منذ أكثر من عقد على السكن فيها مؤقتاً" يختتم العامري حديثه. حامد الجبوري شخص آخر تم تهجيره من منطقة أبو دشير جنوبي العاصمة في السادس من تموز الجاري بعدما قضى اأكثر من ست سنوات في تلك المنطقة. لم نستطع الحديث مع الجبوري الذي غادر العاصمة متوجهاً إلى مدينة الموصل مسقط رأسه وأهله إلا إن زوجته عبير التي فضلت البقاء في بغداد بين أبناء طائفتها خوفاً من بطش داعش روت لنا ماجرى. جهشت عبير بالبكاء وهي تتحدث لـ"نقاش" عن ما حدث لزوجها على أيدي إحدى المليشيات حين اختطفوه من أمام المطعم الذي كان يعمل فيه وبعد توسلات ووساطات من شخصيات مؤثرة من المنطقة والأقارب رموه على باب البيت وهو فاقد الوعي من شدة التعذيب. تزوج الجبوري الذي تجاوز عقده الثلاثين بعام عبير بعد تخرجه من جامعة بغداد التي ارتادها وتعرف خلالها عليها ليسكن العاصمة انصياعاً لرغبة زوجته ويستقر فيها تقول عبير " لم يشكل انتماء حامد المذهبي أي مشكلة لدينا في المنطقة على مدى ست سنوات مضت، حتى إن علاقاته كانت جيدة مع أبناء المنطقة جميعهم رغم اختلافهم مذهبيا معه". ويبدو إن تأثيرات سيطرة داعش بعد العاشر من حزيران الماضي على العديد من المدن العراقية وعودة الشحن الطائفي من قبل الأطراف السياسية كان له تاثيرات سلبية كبيرة على النسيج الاجتماعي والسلم الأهلي لاسيما في المناطق المختلطة مذهبياً. داعش هجّرت آلاف العوائل الموصلية من التركمان الشيعة بمنطقة تلعفر والشبك القاطنين في قرى بازوايا وعلي رش والقبة وغيرها في مناطق سهل نينوى للأسباب ذاتها الأمر الذي أثار ردة فعل عنيفة ضد العائلات السنية في بغداد. غادر الجبوري العاصمة لكنه لم يستطيع أخذ عبير وطفليه محمد وحسين معه لأن أهله حذروه من القدوم للمدينة لمعرفة أهالي المنطقة التي يعيشون فيها في الموصل بأن زوجته تنتمي لغير مذهبهم، وبالتالي الخشية من استباحة داعش لدمها ودم أطفالها. محمد مهدي الشاب العشريني الذي يحمل في ذهنه توجهات مدنية بعيدة عن الأحزاب والطوائف والأديان تعرض هو الآخر للتهجير. اشترطت زوجة محمد السكن قرب أهلها بمنطقة السيدية ذات الغالبية السنية جنوبي بغداد للموافقة على الزواج به وقبل بشرطها حتى تغير واقع الحال بعد ثلاث سنوات وقبل أيام وجد رسالة في ظرف صغير مع رصاصة تطالبه بمغادرة المنطقة دون رجعة. محمد حمل أثاث منزله فور تلقيه التهديدات لينتقل إلى بيت والديه بمنطقة القاهرة شرقي العاصمة التي تقطنها الغالبية الشيعية ويقول "لم أنسَ تلك الأيام الجميلة التي قضيها في تلك المنطقة ومحبة الأصدقاء لي". عمار والجبوري والكثيرون غيرهم غادروا بغداد بانتظار عودة الأمن إليها وربما لن يعودوا مجدداً. == People walk through the rubble of the tomb of the Prophet Jonah (Yunus) in Mosul after it was destroyed in a bomb attack by militants of the Islamic State, July 24, 2014. (photo by REUTERS) Islamic State destroys sacred shrine in Mosul The Islamic State (IS) bombed and destroyed the tomb of the Prophet Jonah east of Mosul on July 24. Summary⎙ Print The shrine of Prophet Jonah was held as sacred by Jews, Christians and Muslims. Author Ali Mamouri Posted July 25, 2014 Translator(s)Cynthia Milan Previously, IS had carried out numerous bombings, destroying important cultural sites such as the shrine of the Prophet Daniel west of Mosul, the shrine of one of the grandchildren of the second Caliph Omar Bin al-Khattab, as well as mosques, various shrines and numerous other churches. These sites are not only for Shiite Muslims or non-Muslims. Most of them are sacred places for Sunni Muslims as well, and some are even only affiliated with them, in addition to a significant number of statues of famous figures and other cultural sites that also were destroyed. Sources inside the city confirmed this information to Al-Monitor. Activists on social media networks uploaded pictures and several videos showing the magnitude of the destruction of cultural sites around the city. Sources told Al-Monitor that a state of sorrow and regret reigns in the city and that they have seen plenty of people crying while witnessing the destruction of Jonah’s tomb. Jonah is considered sacred by all Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. What these groups are doing is based on an endemic Salafist principle common to most Salafist movements, whether they are jihadists or not. This principle underlines the need to purify the earth of polytheism and disbelief. These groups consider religious shrines or any other sites related to a certain person to be a kind of sanctification, which is, according to them, a true sign of polytheism. The destruction of these sites is part of the process of returning to the authentic Islam and eliminating all alien elements, according to the Salafist understanding. This contradicts the traditional understanding of Islam by all Muslim confessions, which means that Islam does not contradict other sanctities, but rather understands them and considers them sacred, especially when the people of these sacred places are prophets of the Quran, such as the prophets Jonah and Daniel and many others from both the New and Old Testaments. 1 The tomb of the Prophet Jonah before its destruction. (Twitter/@IraqPics) Therefore, international Muslim figures, such as the mufti of Egypt, condemned the destruction of sacred places by IS. The mufti also called for an urgent intervention from the authorities in Iraq and international organizations such as UNESCO to protect these sacred places. The destruction of sacred places also happened during the establishment of Saudi Arabia, which was described as the first political entity for Salafists in the Islamic world. Hundreds of shrines of the prophet’s companions and family have been destroyed, in addition to other important historical sites related to different eras of Islamic history, from the establishment of the first and second Saudi states until this day. These actions also occurred in Afghanistan, Syria and certain areas in Iraq that fell under the control of Salafist groups. IS threatened to continue the process of destroying sacred places of other confessions and religions, as well as others related to Sunnis. These threats raised the concerns of most Iraqis, especially the Shiites and the religious minorities, in addition to Sunnis who share the same respect and sanctification for these shrines and religious places. It's mandatory for the international organizations concerned about human rights and preserving religious freedom and heritage, specifically UNESCO, to work harder and on a larger scale to put an end to this destruction. This is essential since a large number of these places are sanctified and respected by Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The concerns about the destruction of sacred places are not limited to them being historic and cultural sites; they include forgiveness and coexistence between different religions and confessions in Iraq. Such destruction harms the long history of coexistence among Iraqi religions. It targets the symbols and main sites which attracted and gathered all confessions and paved the path for communication and understanding, and thus, their coexistence. It also heightens intolerance and religious hatred and hostility between different confessions. This usually does not quickly fade away, and could create social divisions and demographic subdivisions on a large scale across Iraq. This could eliminate any sort of communication between the various elements of society and create severe conflicts between them. Iraq is heading toward total destruction of its historic and human heritage, which will turn it into a barren desert isolated from its time-honored cultural and religious history. This is taking place in light of chaotic circumstances involving terrorism that is on the offensive, Iraqi government ignorance, global silence and an international letdown — specifically from the United States, which completely abandoned its responsibilities toward the situation in Iraq.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/iraq-is-destruction-shrines-abrahamic-religions.html##ixzz38bmhuSac ===== Join the discussion… − ⚑ Avatar Armando Logic • a day ago I don't know what reaction should one show towards these filth? there are no words, these barbarians did the same thing in Afghanistan with the Buddha statues, the same in Syria and now in Iraq, on another note when Islam spread through out this region they did a lot of the same things, they left many Christian and Jewish sites intact as they considered them "the people of the book" but they showed no mercy to the other religions, they destroyed all the other religious sites, in Kurdistan and Iran it was Zoroastrian and Ezidi sites, many other small religions and sects in Syria Iraq etc. going back many millenia disappeared, even historical sites 4 △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar The Technical Analyst • 21 hours ago These such shrines have been the centers of Polytheism, Witchcraft and voodoo practioners all across Iran and where ever Shias live. These Shias have been adept in cheating innocent people threatening them with useless witchcraft and good for nothing voodoos and managed to rob innocent people of money - even to this day. And the Islamic State in its aim to completely purge itself of 'Shias' across Syria and Levant seems to have chosen to have destroyed the real 'Shia Barracks'. Shia or no Shia - such useless, witchcraft and voodoo practicing centers have no place in Modern World - let alone in Islam. Period. △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar Terence Darby > The Technical Analyst • 15 hours ago Says the 'analyst' with a picture of a sacred site as his/her avatar 7 △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar The Technical Analyst > Terence Darby • 8 hours ago Thank you very much for helping me set a mistake of mine right. And by the way your criticism of my reply also goes to show how much 'Shias' have infiltrated 'Muslims' - that United Arab Emirate fellows have been condoning and following the Shia religion for their own benefits. No wonder than Dubai lost itself after being indebted to bankruptcy and came under the control of Abu Dhabi - changing the name of its tallest building as 'Burj Khalifa'. Allah never allow such people who relinquish Islam in favor of Grave Worship - no matter what. United Arab Emirate is famous for many things anti-Islamic and condoning Shiism and Grave Worship is one of that is sure to be opposed. Thank you very much for pointing out my blunder - I am changing the picture to an Islamic Architecture bereft of any 'graves' or 'shrines' into it right away. △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar Faux-News > The Technical Analyst • 3 hours ago lol again. The UAE follows the maliki madhab and all their official fatwa boards are maliki. You have no clue at all. 1 △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar Faux-News > The Technical Analyst • 9 hours ago This actually is a typical example of wahhabi misinformation. When they cant justify their destruction from Islam and traditional scholarship and history, they invent these totally ignorant and false stories about how these sites are places of voodoo, magic, criminals, prostitution and other excuses and use it as blanket excuse to destroy these relics, as though if someone in his own house practiced voodoo would these people take a bulldozer and destroy his own house. In any case this is much needed article. Because of Saudi Salafi funding causing their Salafi Islam to be loud, there has come a misunderstanding among many non-muslim that what these Wahhabists do are actually something that Islam teaches and something that was practiced by pious Sunni Muslims and orthodoxy for 1400 years of Islamic history and that those who say otherwise are some unorthodox sufi group, when in reality its the total opposite. Because of this misunderstanding many non-muslims are showing reluctance to condemn and take action against this massive scale historical and religious genocide being perpetrated against Islam by these cult criminals under garb of Islam. 3 △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar The Technical Analyst > Faux-News • 8 hours ago Fool the world has changed and every 'Duplicate Muslim' who condoned 'Grave Worship' in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, UAE, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Central Asia and Qatar are standing 'naked' with their anti-Islamic private part displayed to a world that 'spits on them'. Why is that so? Because Shia Grave Worship brought in its way Allah's curse and Shias are being punished with disgrace and loss of face in all these nations. Allah gives Satan and his follower a reprieve and when the appointed time comes - these anti-Islamic Criminals would find what they deserved for their subversion and trickery. △ ▽ • Reply • Share › Avatar Faux-News > The Technical Analyst • 7 hours ago Yea showing more that you have nothing to do with Islam and that you are some badly mutated product of a modern day changing world and you have to come up with more weird arguments that are not even factually true let alone rationally sound. Either way go on, you are proving exactly the point for us what type of twisted mentality you have. Just reminded that last time you made this drivel you said you were shafi and your mother was following shafi madhab. Well here are the fatwa of pillars of shafi scholarship permitting what you call as "grave worship". Imam Ghazzali (d.505) in al-wasit: وَلَو أوصى بعمارة قُبُور أَنْبِيَائهمْ نفذناه لِأَن كل قبر يزار فعمارته إحْيَاء زيارته وَيجوز ذَلِك فِي قُبُور مَشَايِخ الْإِسْلَام أَيْضا Imam Nawawi in Rawdah-Talibeen: يجوز للمسلم والذمي الوصية لعمارة المسجد الاقصى وغيره من المساجد، ولعمارة قبور الأنبياء، والعلماء، والصالحين، لما فيها من إحياء الزيارة، والتبرك بها Ibn Hajr al Haythami in his Tuhfa : Imam Ramli in his Nihaya: وشمل عدم المعصية القربة كعمارة المساجد ولو من كافر وقبور الأنبياء والعلماء والصالحين لما في ذلك من إحياء الزيارة والتبرك بها ، ولعل المراد به كما قاله صاحب الذخائر ، وأشعر به كلام الإحياء في أوائل كتاب الحج ، وكلامه في الوسيط في زكاة النقد يشير إليه أن تبنى على قبورهم القباب والقناطر كما يفعل في المشاهد إذا كان الدفن في مواضع مملوكة لهم أو لمن دفنهم فيها لا بناء القبور نفسها للنهي عنه ، ولا فعله في المقابر المسبلة فإن فيه تضييقا على المسلمين خلافا لما استوجهه الزركشي من كون المراد بعمارتها رد التراب فيها وملازمتها خوفا من الوحش والقراءة عندها ، وإعلام الزائرين بها لئلا تندرس . Hafiz al-Munawi (d. 1031) in Fayd al-Qadir: أما من اتخذ مسجدا بجوار صالح أو صلى في مقبرته وقصد به الاستظهار بروحه أو وصول أثر من آثار عبادته إليه لا التعظيم له والتوجه نحوه فلا حرج عليه ألا ترى أن مدفن إسماعيل في المسجد الحرام عند الحطيم؟ and tons more too long to quote here. ========= Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog Reflections on Methods by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Jul 22, 2014 at 3:41 pm Over the course of the past year or so, I have intensely tracked the jihadist group the Islamic State (formerly ISIS). I did this on both Twitter and in my analytical articles, such that I attracted the attention of primary sources in my role of what the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization would term a 'disseminator'. To gain the confidence of these circles, I feigned sympathy for their views and adopted a 'jihadi persona' in communications with them. While this indeed garnered some valuable information (eg it helped me first identify Moroccan ex-Gitmo detainee Muhammad Mizouz and his presence in Syria), it was also unethical, pure and simple. Not only that, but the jihadi persona and a desire to seem humourous on Twitter led to other unethical actions, such as a silly tweet in December 2013 calling for JM Berger's account to be reported, even as I quickly deleted it. Though I did not think much of it at the time and believed I had resolved the issue, it was nonetheless wrong and the tweet would not have necessarily appeared as an immature joke to those who saw it, which is why I deleted it, but it should be admitted. Accordingly, I apologize unequivocally for these mistakes. They can only come across as weird to those who do not know me, and I regret not listening earlier to those who counselled me against these approaches and the adoption of multiple personas in which I got caught up. I would like to stress nonetheless that this did not affect the quality of the final product of my work. I only analyse this subject out of personal concern for my family's country's future (Iraq). A full analysis of the insurgent dynamics- and thus have I aimed for a full analysis of all insurgent groups in Iraq for thoroughness- is essential in that regard. I stress that my personal views are solely reflected on this site in 'ارائي الخصوصية' and anything I have written not put up on this site is disowned, as made clear in 'Reflections on my writings'. Update In light of the Business Insider article, I should like to respond as follows: Much of the article is focused on the allegation that my actual analysis has been tainted and compromised by being 'played' by IS fighters. On this, I would note the following: - It is interesting to note that the authors don't cite something from the body of my articles to show this. - Contact with IS fighters and their supporters was not an integral part of my work. I made occasional reference to such contact but their testimony did not largely inform my overall anlaysis of the group: in fact my primary interest in contact with IS fighters was to illustrate their ultimately global ambitions (one may criticise me for accepting too readily the idea of a fight against the UK as a distant dream, of course) I could not have cared less what they like for breakfast or how they enjoy their spare time, unlike some who have been too eager to put a spin on IS fighters as simply ordinary guys like others- an image I have never accepted or endorsed. In any case, here I disputed their narrative of a pre-planned 'Sahwa' against them in Syria, pointing largely to IS' own expansionism, dictated by its own self-perception as a state, as the cause of this infighting, such that it largely overrode the reconciliatory tendencies of e.g. Ahrar ash-Sham. It is certainly true that I underestimated the timescale of wider infighting, but that was not because of testimony IS fighters or supporters relayed to me, but rather conservatism in my analysis (cf. in 2012 I certainly underestimated the timescale, if at all, of an unravelling in the security situation in Iraq), with heavy focus on localization, a dynamic I saw as distinguishing Syria from Iraq in terms of grand 'Sahwa' narratives. Even so, I stand by my assertion from 2013 that an international troop presence in the long-run is needed to roll back IS and bring some kind of stability, and draw attention to the Libyan experience if anyone thinks militias will simply go away and form a new strong state post-regime overthrow. A key error of mine was my presumption in autumn 2013 that Jabhat al-Nusra and IS would steer clear of wider infighting, primarily because I accepted the idea of IS and Nusra as part of al-Qaeda and therefore 'brothers' in ideology and organization who would not come to blows. As it happens, that presumption was wrong precisely because IS was de facto independent by this point, something that was not in fact widely recognized at the time. I shifted my view on that matter in January 2014, citing testimony on both sides while also accepting that one had to be careful of IS spin of "always independent" since the founding of ISI in 2006. Further, despite IS spin on jizya as a benign institution, I made it abundantly clear that it should be seen as no such thing here (i.e. it is the equivalent of a Mafia extortion racket), and that it was a sign of Baghdadi's projection of himself as a caliph, which turned out to be correct. I also stress that when IS' announcement of the caliphate came out, I emphasized that this phenomenon should be seen in terms of the wider idealization of past Caliphates but such idealization is ultimately as detached from reality as glorifying the Roman Empire and its conquests, something I affirmed on Twitter. - I again stress that contact with IS circles and the wider jihadi community also offered insights: for example it is in fact the case that Suqur al-Izz, as I noted, is an al-Qa'ida front project, despite its official claims to be independent, as illustrated by its recent joining of Jabhat al-Nusra as part of the new emirate project. Similarly I was the first to identify Moroccan ex-Gitmo detainee Muhammad al-'Alami as having fought and died in Syria. This was so before the video release from Harakat Sham al-Islam. - The article completely omits the extensive body of my work going beyond IS: that contacts with other factions turned up far more extensively in my work on Iraq and Syria than IS. Here for example on Druze militias; here on the Alawite Muqawama Suriya; here and here on Christian militias; here on the factions of Albukamal (at the time none of them including IS). In none of these cases did I let contacts 'play' me, with the possible exception of being too willing to accept brotherology claims with IS: for instance despite Qamishli Sootoro's official claim to be neutral, it is apparent they are aligned with the regime. It is of course true that I accept the pro-Assad Druze activists' claims that the community is generally aligned with the regime, but there is little ground to dispute that. I have also analyzed the non-IS insurgent groups in Iraq and have not been 'played' by any of them. - Taking articles from 2010-11 as indicative of a 'confused' outlook is misleading, especially as I disowned my 2010 writings as part of 'Reflection on my writings' in 2013. Further Update In light of controversies over my background, I affirm the following: As to now, I do not disclose a personal religious stance (whatever experiments I made with other identities), but my real background is as follows: my father's side of the family was Shi'a and my mother's side Sunni (given the latter is ultimately from Mosul, not really surprising). I do not deny my struggles with identity here (going back to my mid teens) and people are right to draw this to attention as transparency is needed at the personal level. I emphasize that none of this affected the final product of my analytical work (i.e. I did not use any claimed identities to give a certain point more credibility or to fabricate a point). Regardless, I should not have claimed different identities, which is wrong and disturbing in any circumstance. In this context, I should also stress that my family's history has played almost no role in the actual analysis, but at this stage, it is important to affirm one aspect of it that motivated me to want to look into what is now IS. The Islamic State of Iraq- ISI, a predecessor of IS- took one of my uncles hostage in Baghdad in 2007 for 3 weeks, eventually being released for a ransom of $40,000. Unless I am suffering from a curious case of Stockholm syndrome, then the logical conclusion is that I am an opponent of IS and aimed to gather intel on the group. I oppose IS, simple as that. So, once again, I apologize to everyone for my mistake of trying to extract info under my real name from IS sources by feigning sympathy for their views, and all other issues regarding multiple personae. Further Update (II) Business Insider has also put out some past tweets attempting to show I uncriticially echo IS positions. Those tweets were actually mocking IS spirations to global domination, which as I wrote previously are indeed delusional. The third tweet meanwhile is taken out of context from the thread. However, I readily admit that these were irresponsible tweets to an audience of more than 9000 followers, not all of whom will have understood what I was trying to get at. The General Military Council is arguably the main new name in the Iraqi insurgency to have emerged in 2014. Though there is an official claim to separation from the Naqshbandi Army (JRTN), the distancing, as I have outlined before, needs to be treated with the same caution as the Kurdish PYD's official distancing of the YPG militias, and the Syriac Union Party's distancing of the Syriac Military Council as "independent." I translate below a sample of their daily operations, this one from 22nd July. "The revolutionaries of the military council in Salah ad-Din undertook to strike a gathering of the Maliki army and militias aiding him in the al-Ishaqi region with a shower of 120mm mortar rounds leading to a direct and exact hit with the killing of 13 soldiers and wounding of a great number of them." "The revolutionaries of the military council in Salah ad-Din undertook an ambush set between two regions (Al-Oweinat-Al-Awja)* on a Maliki army military convoy and militias aiding him...leading to the destruction of 9 Hummer vehicles and killing of those inside it." "The revolutionaries in south Baghdad undertook an IED operation on a Hummer vehicle in the Mada'in area, leading to the destruction and killing of all inside it." "Anbar: al-Khalidiya: the revolutionaries in Ramadi hit a Maliki army point near the al-Sadiqiya bridge with three 120mm mortar rounds, leading to an exact and direct hit." *- Note that in al-Awja today, the Islamic State also claimed operations against the security forces. ========= Bound by Bridge, 2 Baghdad Enclaves Drift Far Apart By ALISSA J. RUBINJULY 26, 2014 Continue reading the main story Slide Show Slide Show|12 Photos Two Baghdad Neighborhoods, a World Apart Two Baghdad Neighborhoods, a World Apart CreditBryan Denton for The New York Times Continue reading the main story Share This Page email facebook twitter save more Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story BAGHDAD — Al Imams Bridge spans the Tigris River between two of the oldest communities in Baghdad — one Sunni, the other Shiite — and on Ramadan evenings it can seem as if the mosques near either bank are calling to each other as their muezzins sing prayers. But the two neighborhoods, the Sunni Adhamiya and the Shiite Kadhimiya, once inextricably joined in the imagination of Baghdad residents, are drifting further and further apart. To walk through each as they break the daily fast during Ramadan is to glimpse the diverging realities of Baghdad: a vibrant and expanding Shiite way of life, and a subdued and dwindling Sunni one. “Now we have two Ramadans,” said Yassin Daoud, 35, a Sunni boat operator who works at an amusement park in Adhamiya on the banks of the river. He made his living taking pleasure cruisers to Al Imams Bridge and back, but no one has asked for a ride yet this year. The two neighborhoods are each anchored by a renowned mosque and shrine nearly as old as Islam itself: Abu Hanifa on the Sunni side, which began to be built in the late 700s, and Imam Kadhim on the Shiite side. Both areas still share some of the character of old Baghdad: the crafts shops, leather workmen and cobblers, halal butchers and gold workers. Continue reading the main story Two Communities in Baghdad Tigris IMAM KADHIM MOSQUE Baghdad AL IMAMS BRIDGE Kadhimiya ABU HANIFA MOSQUE IRAQ Adhamiya Area of detail Baghdad Tigris 5 miles Although the ebb and flow between the two was once as natural as the Tigris’s tides, the past 11 years have taken a deep toll, eroding both the routes that people walked from one community to the other and the trust they once had. Ali al-Nashmi, a professor of history at Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, who grew up in Adhamiya, dates the period of sectarian division to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the American-led coalition in 2003, with the most recent chapter coming after the fall of Mosul to Sunni militants in June. “The Shia people used to walk through Adhamiya to Imam Kadhim,” said Mr. Nashmi, thinking back to his youth. “But then the sectarian troubles started after 2003 and they were attacked in Adhamiya and they stopped coming that way.” As the Shiites vanished from Adhamiya’s streets, many young Sunnis there, and elsewhere, angered by the sudden loss of Sunni hegemony with Hussein’s exit, joined the insurgency and either were killed or imprisoned or fled. And there were fewer and smaller families to take Mr. Daoud’s boat or lay out their evening meals on the carefully tended grass of the amusement park where his small craft were tethered on the banks of the Tigris. Now almost every table is empty at the Adhamiya park, where hundreds of families every year for more than three decades had spread out their iftar dinners to break the Ramadan fast. Not a single child is on the swan ride; the Ferris wheel seats are empty; the bumper cars clatter round, but no children are in them. Mustapha al-Qaisi, a Sunni taxi driver, brought his family with trepidation to the park, and only because it was a tradition they could not quite bear to give up. “The difference between now and 2006 was that before, we were targeted by militias, but now we are targeted by militias backed by the government,” he said. Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story “I am afraid all the time now that I will be targeted because of my identity,” he said, meaning that a militia checkpoint would recognize that his tribal name was Sunni and abduct or even kill him. If he has a problem with his taxi or an altercation with a customer, he no longer dares to go to the police station to complain, because with his Sunni name, he is fearful the police might detain him. When he saw a foreigner at the park, the first thing he thought was that they might be with a refugee agency. “Are you with the International Organization for Migration?” he asked. “Is it possible to help us get out of Iraq?” Across the river lies a different world. In Kadhimiya, where nearly everyone is Shiite, Ramadan feels like a monthlong street party. Even during the hours of fasting in the heat of the day, when temperatures often reach 115 degrees, people are hard at work preparing for the meal that breaks the fast. They stir vast vats of rice in communal kitchens, shred lamb into small pieces to mix with it, chop tomatoes and cucumbers for salad and slice wheelbarrows of watermelon. At dusk on Kadhimiya’s outskirts, the main entrance is closed for safety because the neighborhood has been attacked so many times. (Just last Tuesday, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-packed car near the gate, killing 33 people and wounding more than 60.) Accordingly, the road follows a back route. It winds through urban palm groves and crosses an irrigation canal where boys are swimming, whooping as they plunge into the water and splash each other. When visitors reach the long pedestrian street that leads to the shrine, paces quicken with eagerness to get through the line of friskers who check for bombs and weapons and stroll on to the long esplanade ahead. This shimmering, glimmering main street leads to the Imam Kadhim shrine, its gates outlined in gaudy, jubilant green and white neon. “It’s very good this year,” said Shahad Hamed Harbi al Khafaji, 70, smiling broadly and showing a mostly toothless mouth as he sat on the edge of one of the many long carpets that serve as picnic mats for the iftar meal. “There are very many people; it’s very beautiful here. We are just asking the American people to come and kill ISIS, take them away from us,” he said, referring to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Sunni militant group that has taken over large areas of northern and western Iraq. Now Shiite militias help protect the road from his family’s village in Diyala Province to the highway, and the family came to the shrine to celebrate Ramadan. “We all feel safe to come,” he said, nodding at his five daughters and their children. A few yards away, the Sadr Foundation, founded by the family of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, offered an iftar meal, and some 150 men were digging in. Nearby were families bringing their own simple picnics of homemade yogurt that they ladled into glasses to eat with a basket of dates. Groups of children ran back and forth, tugging at their mothers to buy the balloons and tufts of cotton candy that hawkers sell. Those same mothers threw on the special black abbayas used for prayers in Shiite shrines, handed their cellphones to their eldest sons, and slipped away for a few minutes at the Imam Kadhim shrine. Ruminating on all this, Mr. Nashmi sees a deepening divide that will not easily be halted, much less reversed. “It will get worse: the Sunnis will leave Baghdad and the Shias will leave the north, the Christians are almost gone and we will face really a separated country,” he said. “We cannot find any solution now, and I am very sad.” He continued: “The world lost Iraq, but we must fight, you and me and all the friends, to do something, something mysterious and very far off. We must teach history in the primary school and show our kids Iraq’s great civilization.” A version of this article appears in print on July 27, 2014, on page A5 of the New York edition with the headline: Bound by Bridge, 2 Baghdad Enclaves Drift Far Apart. Order Reprints|Today's Paper|Subscribe =