Source: Reuters
* Al Qaeda in Iraq now an Iraqi insurgency
* Campaign of bold assaults, intimidation
* Iraqi Qaeda exploits weaknesses in Iraqi systems
By Suadad al-Salhy
BAGHDAD, Oct 26 (Reuters) - Al Qaeda's Iraqi branch has evolved into a homegrown, more lethal and bolder insurgency comprised of Iraqi fighters hardened in U.S. prisons and posing a challenge to Iraqi forces, military officials say.
The insurgency has been strategically weakened by the deaths of leaders, and both its numbers and the territory in which it can manoeuvre have shrunk since 2006-07, when Sunni tribal chiefs turned on it and joined forces with the U.S. military.
But what Iraqi officials call the "third generation" of al Qaeda in Iraq may be more difficult to fight than before because its fighters can blend in, know the weaknesses of Iraqi society, and are more interested in making a spectacular splash with their attacks than in battlefield victories.
Their assaults are aimed at grabbing attention and rattling the population at a time when sectarian tensions are fraught because of the failure of politicians to agree on a new Iraqi government seven months after an inconclusive election.
"We face the third generation of al-Qaeda now, a generation that mostly graduated from (U.S. detention camps) Bucca, Cropper and other such places," said Major General Hassan al-Baidhani, chief of staff for the Baghdad operations command.
Al Qaeda has shown "a new type of boldness," attacking heavily protected targets and security forces head on, Baidhani told Reuters. "This strategy depends basically on shock. They are not looking for success as much as looking for attention."
Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is battling to retain his job, opposed by the Sunni-backed, secular Iraqiya alliance of ex-premier Iyad Allawi and some erstwhile Shi'ite allies.
If Iraqiya ends up being sidelined, the Sunnis who voted for it in March may react in outrage and return to supporting the Sunni Islamist insurgency, security officials say.
In the run-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, the Bush administration accused Saddam Hussein's regime of having links to al Qaeda as part of its campaign to bolster support for war.
No ties were ever proven but al Qaeda was quick to take advantage of the post-invasion chaos to establish a presence in Iraq.
The first generation of al Qaeda on Iraq's battlefields were primarily Arabs from abroad. The second was a mix of foreign and Iraqi Sunnis angered by the invasion and the rise to power of Iraq's Shi'ite majority after the fall of Saddam, Sunni.
Now as Iraqi security forces take centre stage after U.S. troops halted combat operations in August prior to a full withdrawal in 2011, they face a homegrown threat composed of young radicals who fervently believe in jihad, or holy war.
WEAKNESS OF SOCIETY
"And therein lies the danger because they know the weak points of Iraqi society," said Baidhani, who has documented al Qaeda activities over the last four years.
On June 13, al Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq, sent a wave of suicide bombers against the well-guarded Central Bank in Baghdad, killing 15 people. The following month, a suicide bomber attacked Saudi-owned al-Arabiya news channel, another well-protected, high-profile target.
On Sept. 5, suicide bombers killed 12 when they swarmed a Baghdad army base, where just two weeks earlier a lone suicide bomber had managed to kill 57 army recruits and soldiers.
The attack on the army base took officials by surprise, said a senior police official who asked not to be named. Up till then, military strategists had believed insurgents would have no success using suicide bombers against military installations.
"The problem is our enemy's intelligence is stronger than our intelligence," the official said. "They know the timings of our duties, food, rest, hours when patrols switch, the type and the number of weapons at our bases."
U.S. military leaders say the transformation of al Qaeda in Iraq coincided with strikes against it, including the killing of its top two leaders Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and the cutting of its links to al Qaeda abroad, this year.
"They have attempted to wean themselves off a foreign leadership structure," U.S. Brigadier General Ralph Baker said.
Al Qaeda cells are trying to move back into strongholds like the districts of Adhamiya and Fadhil in the capital, and distributing threatening leaflets to cow the public.
But the group is unlikely to be able to succeed at its long-term goal of bringing down the government and Iraq's nascent democracy, and establishing a Sunni Islamist caliphate.
"We don't see al Qaeda as an existential threat to the Iraqi government any more," Baker said. (Additional reporting by Jim Loney, Editing by Michael Christie and Angus MacSwan)
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Gunmen kill eight in Iraq gold market attack
26 Oct 2010 17:02:54 GMT
Source: Reuters
BAGHDAD, Oct 26 (Reuters) - At least eight people were killed, including five policemen, when gunmen attacked a goldsmiths' market in the northern Iraqi oil city of Kirkuk on Tuesday, police and hospital sources said.
Police said there were clashes between the armed men and security forces. Twelve people were wounded, including two policemen.
The gunmen armed with hand grenades and other weapons robbed gold shops at the busy market in Kirkuk, 250 km (155 miles) north of Baghdad, a hospital source said.
It was not immediately clear whether the suspects were insurgents or a criminal gang.
While overall violence in Iraq has dropped since the height of sectarian warfare in 2006-07, bombings and shootings remain a regular occurrence.
Gold markets have been a target of major attacks in past months. An attack on a gold market in Baghdad in May killed 14 people. Around half a dozen gunmen attacked and robbed a goldsmiths' market in Basra in June, killing three people and wounding four others.
Security officials had said some of the insurgent groups that took up arms after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion have turned to crime to finance their operations, attacking banks, gold markets and jewellery shops. (Reporting by Mustafa Mahmoud; Writing by Serena Chaudhry; Editing by Peter Graff)
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