The Theory of “Mental Disturbance”: Ahmedinejad's Holy Light

August 3, 2009

Hossein Bastani
h.bastani(at)roozonline.com

Let us together review some of the news that was published in Iran on June 26 and 27th:

1-Iranian official news agencies reported that the President had dismissed the Minister of Guidance and the Minister of Intelligence.

Let us together review some of the news that was published in Iran on June 26 and 27th:
1-Iranian official news agencies reported that the President had dismissed the Minister of Guidance and the Minister of Intelligence. 2-Pro-government media reminded their readers that with the two ministerial dismissals, the cabinet would not have the necessary legal quorum. 3-The President’s website announced that the only cabinet minister who had been dismissed was the Minister of Intelligence. 4-The Minister of Guidance wrote that he took the president’s “first order” seriously and therefore would not continue his work. 5-The President’s office announced that the statement of the Minister of Guidance did not constitute a resignation, and that “even if there was an implied resignation message in it, then the President does not accept it.”
One should bear in mind that all of these reports were published in just two days. As for the reasons for their publication, all the conservative news outlets had the same explanation: At the June 22 cabinet meeting, the Minister of Intelligence and the Minister of Guidance both expressed dissatisfaction over the President’s delay in carrying out the orders of the leader of the Islamic state to remove Rahim Mashai from his vice-presidential position. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s swift response to this criticism was to fire both ministers. Then he realized that according to article 27 of the Constitution (which basically says that the cabinet requires the parliament’s vote of confidence if half the cabinet members are replaced), his cabinet would lose its legality if there were two less ministers in the cabinet. So, he decided to rescind the decision to fire one of the two ministers, and he even rejected the resignation of the Minister of Guidance.
Many observers ask what goals are being pursued behind the scenes in these presidential measures. I would like to raise the question differently: Is Ahmadinejad’s mind so well organized that we must expect clear and complex “goals” for his announcements and decisions? Probably not.
Let’s look at an example. During the presidential election campaign in 2005, when Ahmadinejad talked of his life, he mentioned that his father had died in 1993 “as a result of an accident.” Ten months after he became president, Ahmadinejad again announced that his father had just died, prompting all senior officials to express their condolences to him and to participate in the memorial services that were held for his father. Ahmadinejad too was present in that memorial service. But is it possible for his father to have died on two separate occasions? Or is it that he was referring to two different people? Logically neither. So why would Ahmadinejad state such a lie? One can understand why Ahmadinejad would lie about the achievements of his administration. But is there a political benefit in his father’s death as well?
Here is another example: We know that in 2005, Ahmadinejad made claims that the hidden Shiite Imam would appear within the next two years. These comments were expressly confirmed by the former head of Iran’s National Security Council Hassan Rowhani and the deputy president of the Etemad Melli (National Trust) party Rasool Montakhabnia. At first glance, one can imagine that Ahmadinejad made these political claims to portray the work of his government to be the foundation for the reappearance of the Shiite hidden Imam. But one point is not clear in this explanation: Why did Ahmadinejad pinpoint the return of the Imam to exactly two years, and not let’s say four or five? Was it not important for him that in just two years, i.e. before the next presidential election, his claim would fall flat, and he would be discredited on his way to prepare for his own reelection?
This is where a disturbing theory gains strength: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s mental Disturbance. The presentation of this notion is not for the purpose of disrespecting him but for issuing a warning about such a possibility because it explains - albeit in a dangerous manner - much of his behavior. Although it seems that Mr. Ahmadinejad has no problem being untruthful, but it is quiet probably that when he says that the hidden Imam would re-appear in two years, he actually believes he is being truthful and is knowledgeable about the future and the hidden world. Similarly, when he talks of his father’s death on two separate occasions and time lines, he is doing this not because of some complex deliberation for a personal gain, but because of a mental disorder.
Let us take another look at the infamous video in which Ahmadinejad makes remarks to ayatollah Javadi Amoli regarding the presence of a light hallow around himself when he was presenting his speech at the United Nations General Assembly. It appears that he genuinely believes that he was enveloped by such a light at the UN. But even if we assume that he did not believe in this at the time and wanted to deceive the cleric, then another question gains importance: When someone believes that he can convince ayatollah Javadi Amoli of being surrounded by a holly light, can we accept him to be in his full sanity? It would be difficult to respond to this question in the positive.
Similar confusion exists about other actions undertaken by Ahmadinejad. One can easily look at the tensions that were repeatedly created over such decisions as the appointment of Mashai, the removal of cabinet ministers, etc from the same perspective of a disturbed mind.
Could Ahmadinejad not have counted the number of his cabinet ministers before announcing his dismissals so that he would not jeopardize his cabinet? He probably could have. But out of anger, he may have lost his mind so much that he did not pay attention to the issue.
Does Mr. Ahmadinejad not understand that if the leader of the Islamic republic did not throw his support behind him, and get directly involved in the electoral fraud issues, he would not have become president? He probably does. But apparently until six days after the order of the leader for the dismissal of Mashai, there was still an unclear trend of thought in his mind that prevented him from taking action against his brother in law, forcing him to take action only after the publication of the leader’s letter.

Did Mr. Ahmadinejad not understand that by elevating Rahim Mashai’s position to the level of vice-president he would create serious problems for himself, while senior clerics in Qom, 50 deputies from the 88-man Experts Assembly, and 200 Majlis representatives from 290-strong national assembly had all expressly called for Mashai’s dismissal? So why did he mobilize all of these people against himself? Apparently, the line that separates reality from dreams in his mind is so disturbed that he cannot see such simple reality.
I would like to say again that this writing is not for the purpose of insulting Ahmadinejad. Still, one cannot stay away from warning Iranian officials that leaving their destiny in the hands of someone who is mentally imbalanced threatens the government that they have undertaken to protect.
Can a president who makes such instantaneous decisions about his own cabinet ministers, which can destroy his administration, be trusted with such important issues as Iran’s nuclear question or the current security crisis that has erupted since the June 12 presidential election, which are tied to the very survival of the Islamic republic?