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Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Chain of command concerns raised in Iraq

Amira Eidan, center, director of Iraq's National Museum, shows Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recovered antiquities on the day the museum was formally rededicated in Baghdad.
Enlarge image Enlarge By Khalid Mohammed, AP
Amira Eidan, center, director of Iraq's National Museum, shows Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recovered antiquities on the day the museum was formally rededicated in Baghdad.


By Jim Michaels, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's effort to have a special military unit report directly to him is raising concerns that he is accumulating too much power and following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein.

Al-Maliki's government proposed legislation that would make permanent the placement of Iraq's special forces outside the purview of the Defense and Interior ministries, which supervise most security forces.


Ayad Allawi, a former prime minister and critic of the current government, said the proposed law is a dangerous throwback to Saddam's days. "It mimics very much the old days of darkness," Allawi said.

The legislation would institutionalize a power shift. In April 2007, al-Maliki issued a directive establishing the counterterrorism bureau separate from the Defense and Interior ministries. A law would establish a separate budget for the agency.

The bureau controls about 4,000 Iraqi special forces, which are among the best-trained forces in the nation's military. They are used to target high-level al-Qaeda and Shiite militia leaders.


"The Americans used to talk about our officials being too weak," said Abbas al-Bayati, a Shiite member of parliament and al-Maliki supporter. "Now that al-Maliki is strong, they fear him."


U.S. officials in Iraq did not want to comment on Iraqi legislation but said the current arrangement is not subject to abuse.

"It's for (the Iraqis) to decide how they want to set up their agencies," said Lt. Col. Gary Kolb, a military spokesman in Baghdad.

"Right now they are not part of the (Defense or Interior ministries), but they do have their own checks and balances," Kolb said of the counterterrorism bureau. "They still need warrants and have to go through series of approvals at different levels. They can't just do things on their own."


Recent changes in Iraqi law require a warrant issued by a judge before suspects are detained.

Al-Maliki is a Shiite Arab who rules over a country still divided by mistrust among rival Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Efforts to circumvent the military chain of command often are viewed as a way to target personal enemies.

"The danger is … he'll use it to target his political enemies," said Peter Mansoor, a retired Army colonel who served as a brigade commander and top staff officer in Iraq.


Iraqi security forces have grown more professional in recent years but are still accused of carrying out sectarian agendas, particularly in Diyala province, a mixed Sunni-Shiite region.

Moderate Sunnis last year suspected Iraqi security forces and U.S. troops of using operations to intimidate moderate Sunni leaders and self-defense groups, according to the latest quarterly Pentagon report on Iraq.

The report mentions an incident in which members of Iraqi special forces detained a prominent Sunni leader in Diyala, provoking Sunni outrage.

Iraqi and U.S. officers have reviewed and improved "targeting procedures" following operations last summer in Diyala, the report said.

The streamlined command structure allowed for the quick deployment of forces and prevented meddling from factions within the government when Iraq was in the middle of a tough fight against al-Qaeda and Shiite militia.

A force directly under the prime minister's control also can defend against challenges to his authority.

Iraq's special forces have worked closely with their U.S. counterparts since the war started and have become Iraq's most capable troops.

"The Iraqi special forces are without a doubt the finest, most capable military unit in the Iraqi army today," Mansoor said.

Contributing: Aamer Madhani and Alan Gomez in Baghdad

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