The Arab War on Terror

US bombs IS jihadists in Syria: Pentagon Friendly Capitals using World's and Arab's to justify launching another War on Syria. Enough to know #FriendsOfSyria, #EnemyCapitals Washington (AFP) - The United States and "partners" have launched bombing raids against Islamic State extremists in Syria, the Pentagon said. "I can confirm that US military and partner nation forces are undertaking military action against ISIL (Islamic State group) terrorists in Syria using a mix of fighter, bomber and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles," spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby said in a statement. The decision to conduct the air strikes was undertaken earlier on Monday by the head of US Central Command, General Lloyd Austin, "under authorization granted him by the commander in chief," Kirby said. "We will provide more details later as operationally appropriate." The bombing raids, including Tomahawk missiles fired from naval warships at sea, came after President Barack Obama warned in a speech on September 10 that the United States was prepared to attack IS militants in Syria. Washington began air strikes against IS targets in Iraq on August 8. ======= Obama's Middle East allies are signing up for the fight against the Islamic State. But it's not for the reason you think. BY James Traub SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 Arab states have a new defining cause: the war on terror. Almost four years ago, popular uprisings across the region upended an old order and created a new set of aspirations and a new collective meaning. That was the Arab Spring; save in Tunisia, where the spirit survives, it lasted for two years at the most before giving way to chaos and violence, backlash and regret. What was the new meaning and direction of the Arab world? At the time, no one could be sure. Now, however, it's become clear. The imperative -- the felt imperative, that is -- to fight terrorism has relegated the demands for personal dignity and political rights to the quaint preoccupation of youthful malcontents. I've just returned from a long visit to Alexandria (of which I'll have much to say in a subsequent piece) and it's clear that the one thing all parties in Egypt agree on, save for the malcontents, is the need to stand united against the terrorist menace. This is not, however, exactly the same menace that Americans worry about. When Egyptians say, "We're in a terrorist phase now," they are referring not to the Islamic State (IS) but to Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which has been killing policemen and soldiers in the Sinai; to the Muslim Brotherhood, which they see as the political face of jihadi violence; and to the civil war next door in Libya. Sameh Shoukry, Egypt's foreign minister, recently denied that Cairo has agreed even to join the U.S.-organized military campaign against IS. "The mission of the Egyptian army is to protect the Egyptian people and the country's borders," he said tartly. Let's take a tour of the region: Lebanon is now scared stiff about the Islamic State, which has beheaded two captive Lebanese soldiers, but it's just as worried about other Islamist groups which have crossed the border from Syria, including al-Nusra Front. The Emiratis fear IS, and are eager to join the American coalition, but they're so worried about the Islamists in Libya, fighting under the name Libyan Dawn, that, along with Egypt, they have reportedly bombed rebel forces there (to no discernible effect). The Turks fear IS, but not much more than they fear the Kurdish separatists who might take advantage of an anti-jihadist coalition to press their own campaign for independence. The Saudis may have agreed to host training bases for moderate Syrian rebels, but they fear Iran more than anyone. It's no wonder that Secretary of State John Kerry got such an equivocal response when he toured the Middle East looking for expressions of support. I recently raised this issue with a senior diplomat from a Gulf country, who said, "Our fears for the region obviously go beyond IS." He's not sure his American friends share those fears. "Is this a one-off?" he asks, "Or are we going to see a true partnership to go after terrorism?" It's a fair question: Why should Arab states lend their support to America's bête noire if the United States won't reciprocate? bête noire One that is particularly disliked or that is to be avoided: The problem, however, is the way regional states define the swamp which they would like the United States to help them drain. The chief swamp-dweller is the Muslim Brotherhood. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have banned the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The UAE convicted 69 Brotherhood members of plotting to overthrow the state. In Egypt, it is an article of faith shared by secularists and Salafists alike that the Brotherhood is responsible, directly or indirectly, for terrorist violence and sabotage -- despite the lack of evidence tying the organization to Ansar Beit's murderous campaign. The great organizing principle of the current Egyptian regime is simply this: Crush the Brotherhood. The Gulf diplomat I spoke to was quite explicit on this score. The Brotherhood and al Qaeda, he said, "are shades of the same thing." The Brotherhood is "a gateway to further extremism." When he asks whether the United States sees Libya as "another domino," as those in the region do, he is asking in part whether Washington understands that the Brotherhood is seeking to knock over regional dominoes, as American policymakers once said about international communism. The answer is no. Barack Obama offered American support to Mohammed Morsi of the Brotherhood when the Egyptian people elected him president. It seemed, at the time, like an important endorsement of the right of Egyptians to decide for themselves who should lead the country. Administration officials quickly concluded that Morsi was a complete incompetent, but he was obviously no terrorist. In fact, Morsi proved to be a useful and effective interlocutor with Hamas. Since then, neither he nor the other Brotherhood leaders who have been jailed and now face the death penalty based on absurdly trumped-up charges have called on their followers to take up arms against the state. Despite decades of repression, the Brotherhood has never deviated from a policy of nonviolent change. The organization has been singled out in part because of its own secrecy and parochialism, as well as its endorsement of violence when practiced by allies like Hamas. It is also the object of a paranoia Americans will quickly recognize as a new form of the Red Menace. The terrorism label increasingly looks like a flimsy rationale for authoritarian control. After the European Union used a session of the U.N. Human Rights Council to call for a "thorough, independent and transparent investigation" of the killing of several thousand protestors by Egyptian security forces since the overthrow of the Brotherhood government in July 2013, Egyptian officials accused the Europeans of adopting a hypocritical "double standard" that called on Cairo to join the fight against terrorism while undermining its efforts to do so. Foreign Minister Shoukry summoned EU ambassadors to personally object to the "negative message" they had conveyed. Americans are probably in no position to criticize Arab states for overreacting to the terrorist threat by adopting harsh domestic legislation. If the United States whipped through the Patriot Act and gave itself leave to waterboard suspected terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11, how surprised can we be that nations with no tradition of democracy criminalize dissent and prohibit demonstrations, as Egypt is in the process of doing? Nevertheless, it's deeply disheartening to see the dark mass of the national security state so utterly eclipse the beautiful celebration of freedom that adorned the public spaces of the Arab world only a few years ago. What's more, the brutal reaction to dissent is surely self-defeating in the long run. Killing unarmed Islamist protestors has proved to be surprisingly popular among Egyptians, but doing so is far likelier to foster terrorism than to deter it. And it undermines the new war on terror by conflating domestic political rivals with a genuine transnational threat. The Arab world really does face a growing threat of terrorist violence; it really does need to forge a partnership with the West to confront the Islamic State as well as more localized forces. But the West is not about to join a campaign to crush political opponents on the pretext of fighting terrorism. Egypt and its new friends in the Gulf will have to do that on their own. BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP

Brotherhood leaders leave Qatar for Libya: Report

GCC panel preparing plan to be implemented by Doha before envoys are reinstated Gulf News Report Published: 16:05 April 25, 2014 Dubai: Dozens of Muslim Brotherhood leaders reportedly deported by Qatar have arrived in Libya, a London-based daily said. The leaders have landed at Maeetiqiya international airport in the Libyan capital over three days, Libyan political, military and security sources told Al Arab newspaper. They were ferried away to unidentified places in cars waiting at the airport located around 11km west of Tripoli and dominated by an armed Islamist group, the sources added. According to the daily, Qatar has been looking for a country that would host the senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood following intense pressure by fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries — Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to change its policy of supporting the movement. The three countries on March 5 pulled out their ambassadors from Doha to protest against what was seen as Qatar’s meddling in their domestic affairs and its backing of the Islamist movement rejected by some GCC countries as an illegal organisation. The three countries insisted their ambassadors would not be reinstated until Qatar complied fully with an agreement it signed on April 17 in the Saudi capital Riyadh. Although the details of the accord have not been made public, reports citing “well-informed sources” said that the three countries wanted Qatar’s alignment with GCC common policies and the deportation of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders from Qatar who should be denied access to all Qatari or Qatar-supported media. Other conditions included deporting around Qatar-based 15 Gulf nationals whose activities have been considered suspicious. The agreement was signed in Riyadh following an intense mediation by the Emir of Kuwait that has been richly acknowledged. Kuwait and Oman, the other two GCC members, did not recall their ambassadors from Doha. In separate statements, the foreign ministers of Oman and Qatar have said that the divergences between Qatar and the three other GCC countries that constituted the most serious political crisis within the alliance since it was founded in 1981 were over. Khalid Al Atiyyah, the Qatari minister, said last week that the “divergences in opinions are over and it is up to the countries to decide on sending their ambassadors back to Doha.” However, Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s foreign minister, on Wednesday said that the reinstatement of the ambassadors was linked to Qatar’s commitment to the implementation of the Riyadh agreement. “The GCC foreign ministers meeting in Riyadh on April 17 was the start of a process for the direct application of the agreement, so results will not be immediate,” he said. “We have drawn up reconciliation measures and an action plan that is being fine-tuned right now in Riyadh. The timeline will be linked to the progress of the process,” he told reporters on the sidelines of a GCC security conference in Bahrain. A GCC Executive Committee is holding meetings in the Saudi capital to prepare the points that will help with the implementation of the Riyadh agreement, Al Arab said. Quoting diplomatic sources, the daily said that the points would be reviewed by the GCC foreign ministers before they are implemented by Qatar. The committee would then monitor the application process with a three-month deadline, it added. Some of the points include deportation of Muslim Brotherhood leading figures to their home countries and reviewing the policies of the Doha-based pan-Arab satellite channel Al Jazeera. The three countries also want Qatar not to allow religious preachers to use mosques or media to attack other GCC countries and to cancel all forums by organisations seen by the GCC as having links with terrorism. They also insist that Qatar must shut down research centres directed by Saudi nationals who had been given the Qatari citizenship.

The Saudi-Brotherhood divide

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal gestures during a joint news conference with his Egyptian counterpart in Riyadh Jan. 5, 2013. (photo by REUTERS) Author: Caryle Murphy Posted April 21, 2014 RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Few Saudi decisions have provoked as much mystification as the recent one designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, a move described by some Saudis in recent interviews as “weird,” “emotional” and “stupid.” Summary⎙ Print Saudi Arabia’s designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization has mystified many Saudis and complicated the kingdom’s regional policies. Author Caryle Murphy Posted April 21, 2014On March 7, the Interior Ministry statement formally overturned a partnership of more than half a century that despite some rocky periods had benefited both the Saudi government and the Islamist movement. The relationship’s abrupt rupture has created confusion and fear, say many Saudis. While the Brotherhood has no overt organization in the kingdom — all political parties are banned — its ideology enjoys widespread sympathy. And several generations of Saudis were raised in an educational system whose curriculum was heavily influenced by Brotherhood ideas.

“There are many people who are not in the Brotherhood but think it is an OK organization,” said a Saudi university professor who asked not to be named. “We’ve had the Brotherhood here without any terrorism for 50 years.”

The government now risks alienating this sector of the population that is generally well-educated and prominent among the staff of state, religious and media organizations. Despite sporadic demands from Brotherhood-inspired activists for political restraints on the monarchy, the sector has never openly challenged the government — and at times supported it against violent Islamists. The Saudi decision also created a new divide in the Sunni world at a time of deep tensions in the faith, as well as rising sectarian feelings pitting Sunni against Shiite. It is likely to complicate the kingdom’s relations with many other countries where Brotherhood-affiliated organizations are significant political players, such as Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait. The Saudi rift with Qatar centers on differing views of the Brotherhood. Riyadh’s break with the Brotherhood will be another point of disagreement in already strained ties between Saudi Arabia and Washington, whose diplomats openly engage with Brotherhood-affiliated groups in many countries. So far, only Egypt, which declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group in December, and the United Arab Emirates have fully endorsed the Saudi designation. In a recent interview, Jeddah-based lawyer Bassim Alim said, “It’s going to severely backfire in the sense that throughout the Arab and Islamic world, the Muslim Brotherhood is known to be a nonviolent entity and ideology. Up to now … even the Salafi movements around the world that have been traditionally close to Saudi Arabia have rebuffed the Saudi position ​vis-a-vis the Brotherhood.” Some observers said they are concerned that with the Brotherhood off-limits, Saudi and Egyptian youths may gravitate to more militant underground groups. “It is a big, very shocking decision that I don’t think has been absorbed yet by the people in the region or the international community,” said Radwan Masmoudi, president of the Washington-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. “At a time when Saudi Arabia wants to be the leader of the Sunni world, I think it’s very, very damaging to their own interests. … I don’t think it was well thought out.” Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamist political organization in the Muslim world and one of the most controversial. Some see it as a group of dedicated, pious Muslims promoting a nonviolent Islamic identity and worldview. Others regard it as a threatening, totalitarian-like incubator of violent Islamic militancy. Depending on one’s view of the group, the Saudi move was akin to banning Rotary International or the American Communist Party.

“The decree was really weird and strange because it’s against reality," said Salman al-Oadah, a religious leader and critic of the Saudi government’s crackdown on dissent, in an interview in Jeddah. "The Muslim Brothers are not terrorists. They don’t believe in violence.” “I have spent the last 10 years criticizing al-Qaeda continuously” for being a terrorist group, Oadah added. “But the Muslim Brotherhood … to be objective, calling it a terrorist group, it’s unjust. You can call them a political group, but I don’t think for practicing politics they can be called terrorist.”

Mohsen al-Awajy, who was active in the 1990s Saudi opposition movement Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), which was shaped by the Brotherhood’s vision of political Islam, called the Interior Ministry statement an “emotional decree." He said, "This is why I haven’t announced any reaction to that.” Seated beneath a bank of more than a dozen televisions in his Riyadh office, Awajy added, “We advised all of our brothers, all of our friends, to remain calm and not to react against this emotional action. We believe it’s not going to last for a long time.” Riyadh’s decision was partly a show of solidarity with Egypt’s military junta, which dislodged the Brotherhood-dominated government there in a coup last July. It was also meant to silence internal criticism of the government’s support for the coup. Awajy, for example, said he posted an online petition denouncing the coup — and implicitly Riyadh’s backing for it — that garnered thousands of signatures before the government forced him to remove it. The government’s terror designation also appears to have been influenced by the discovery that Sahwa networks were allegedly recruiting youths to join the Syrian rebels, said a Saudi researcher. While the Saudi government supports the Syrian rebellion, it has forbidden young Saudis from joining the rebels, some of whom are linked to al-Qaeda, fearing they will become radicalized by the experience. “The Muslim Brotherhood is sending [and] encouraging people to go to fight in Syria from Saudi Arabia and from outside,” said Saud al-Sarhan, director of research at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. “It’s the first time this group of the Sahwa goes in a very obvious way to fight in Syria and to ask people to join them,” Sarhan added, noting that some young Saudis killed fighting in Syria were from families active in the Sahwa movement. The ministry statement makes even the mildest demonstration of sympathy for the Brotherhood — as well as al-Qaeda-linked groups — a criminal offense, including the use of supportive slogans or symbols. Soon after the statement came out, many Saudis cleansed their Twitter and Facebook profiles of the four-finger image meant to show solidarity with the Brotherhood and the families of those killed by Egyptian troops in the August 2013 attack on protesters in Cairo’s Rabia al-Adawiya Square. A senior government official said in an interview that Brotherhood networks in the kingdom had “started organizing people,” but that sympathizers would not be arrested unless they “do actions.” Several Saudis said the government could not possibly arrest all Brotherhood sympathizers, but that it might use the new terror label selectively to silence critics or alleged troublemakers. In a statement from its London press office, the Brotherhood said it was “surprised” and “distressed” by the Saudi move, which “contradicts entirely with its historical relations with the Muslim Brotherhood.” It added, “History has proven that the Muslim Brotherhood has always been a pioneer when it comes to spreading correct Islamic ideologies that are free from extremism, and this is what a lot of trustworthy scholars from within Saudi Arabia have testified for.” The Brotherhood’s origins in the kingdom go back to the 1950s and 1960s when the monarchy welcomed members being persecuted by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and other Arab leaders. Although not permitted to formally organize, they flourished in a spiritual environment congenial to their Islamic ideology. They also found jobs in the expanding Saudi bureaucracy and raised funds for their work. However, relations between the Brotherhood and the monarchy grew increasingly tense over the years because of the Sahwa’s activities, including its opposition to US troops in the kingdom during the Gulf War. More recently, Riyadh was angered by the Brotherhood’s role in helping unseat its old ally, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and mismanaging the Egyptian economy. It also feared that the Brotherhood’s electoral victory in Egypt would inspire the Sahwa to begin agitating again for political reform. Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/saudi-brotherhood-divid.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter#ixzz2zbOonsdw ==================================== 28 killed in attack on Shi'ite political rally in Iraq Fri, Apr 25 18:59 PM EDT 3 of 4 By Raheem Salman BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A series of explosions killed 28 people and wounded more than 40 at a Shi'ite political organization's rally in Iraq on Friday, police and medical sources said. The militant group Asaib Ahl Haq (League of the Righteous) was presenting its candidates for elections on April 30 at the rally in eastern Baghdad. Three bombs exploded in succession as people were leaving, Reuters reporters at the scene said. A roadside bomb went off near the main gate, followed by a suicide car bomb after a few minutes and then a final explosion. Al Qaeda offshoot the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement posted on the Internet. The group said it had carried out the bombings in response to "murder, torture and displacement" of Sunnis by Shi'ite militias which "massacred children and women". The attack came as tensions ran high in Iraq in the runup to a national election on April 30 and as the Iraqi security forces are locked in a four-month battle with ISIL in western Anbar province. It appeared to be the work of ISIL aimed at baiting the group to strike Sunni neighborhoods or communities in hopes of provoking a full-fledged civil war. SPEECH AGAINST SUNNI RADICALS Asaib's main leader Sheik Qais Khazaali had just delivered a speech accusing some politicians of aiding terrorism and vowed his movement was ready for any action by ISIL. "To all ISIL ... we are ready. We are prepared," he said. "We are the defenders of this country. You will never reach us." He added: "If ISIL is the sickness, were are the medicine." As people started to leave the stadium, the first bomb exploded. Grey smoke rose in the air and people ran or scrambled for cover. The a white mini-van raced to the stadium's main gate and detonated, unleashing a massive ball of fire. Army and police shot in the air and a final explosion shook the ground. Asaib members commandeered cars to rush the injured to hospital. A wounded man limped away, stained in blood, while people hunted for missing friends or relatives. Asaib, which has formed its own party, al-Sadiqoon (the truth seekers), is accused by some Sunnis and Shiites of carrying out killings and driving families from their homes. Khazaali denies the allegations but says his movement defends Iraq against terrorism. Some of Asaib's members are in Syria defending the shrine of Sayyida Zainab in Damascus. Pictures of its slain fighters from Syria can be seen around Baghdad and Shi'ite cities across the south. Khazaali was an aide to Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr and led his own faction of fighters, who broke away from Sadr's Mahdi Army militia. At the height of sectarian violence in 2006 and 2007, some of the worst attacks on Sunnis were blamed on Asaib. The group also carried out attacks on the U.S. military. (Reporting by Raheem Salman; Editing by Ned Parker and Andrew Roche) =====================

العودة من الدوحة تراود 5 آلاف سعودي... «والريال القطري» مرفوض في الأحساء

العودة من الدوحة تراود 5 آلاف سعودي... «والريال القطري» مرفوض في الأحساء A+ a-تعليق (7) اسم المرسل عنوان بريدك الإلكتروني عنوان البريد الإلكتروني للمرسل إليه الرجاء ادخال​عنوانالبريد الالكتروني النسخة: الورقية - سعودي الأربعاء، ٢٦ مارس/ آذار ٢٠١٤ (٠٠:٠) آخر تحديث: الأربعاء، ٢٦ مارس/ آذار ٢٠١٤ (٠٣:٢٣) الخبر – عمر المحبوب في الطريق بين العاصمة القطرية الدوحة، ومحافظة القطيف، تتصارع الأفكار في عقل رأفت عبدالمحسن الصويمل. وطوال المسافة التي يقطعها، والتي تربو على 400 كيلومتر، تحل الخطة «ب»، مكان الخطة «أ»، لكنهما سرعان ما يتبادلان المواقع. والخطة «ب» لدى الصويمل، الذي أكمل عامه العاشر منذ استقر في الدوحة، هي «العودة إلى أرض الوطن عودة نهائية، للاستقرار فيه». فيما تقوم الخطة «أ» على مواصلة العيش في الدوحة، التي أصبح فيها «مستثمراً»، يدير مصنعاً. وعلى رغم أن هذا الأربعيني، الذي كان يعمل «خبيراً اقتصادياً» في «منظمة الخليج للاستشارات الصناعية» وضع الخطتين قبل سنوات، إلا أن «ب» كانت حتى ما قبل أشهر قليلة، «ضرباً من الخيال». إلا أنه يقر بأنه بدا يفكر «جدياً» في العودة إلى مسقط رأسه في محافظة القطيف. ولعل الخطوة التي يفكر رأفت في اتخاذها، يقاسمه إياها كثير من السعوديين المقيمين في قطر، الذين تقدر السفارة السعودية في الدوحة عددهم بما بين 4 آلاف إلى 5 آلاف سعودي، مؤكدة أن «أوضاعهم مطمئنة بعد قرار سحب السفير السعودي من قطر»، لافتة إلى أنها «لم تتلق أي معلومات، سواءً بشكل رسمي، أو ودي، عن نية سعوديين مقيمين في قطر، العودة إلى المملكة». وبين هذا وذاك، يعترف الصويمل لـ»الحياة»، أن الخطة «ب»، أصبحت «المهيمنة على تفكيري، أي العودة إلى المملكة، ونقل نشاطي الاستثماري من الدوحة إلى المنطقة الشرقية»، مضيفاً «كانت هذه الفكرة بالنسبة لي أشبه بالمستحيل، لأنني اعتدت الحياة في قطر، وبرمجت نفسي وأسرتي على ذلك. بيد أن التطورات السياسية الأخيرة أجبرتني على التفكير في العودة إلى المملكة بشكل عملي». يستدرك رأفت بالقول: «مضى أسابيع على سحب السفراء الثلاثة (السعودي والإماراتي والبحريني) من الدوحة، والإعلان عن التوتر في العلاقات بين هذه البلدان وقطر. وعلى رغم ذلك لم ألمس أي تغير في تعامل القطريين معي، سواءً الرسميين أو المواطنين العاديين. كما لم أسمع من سعودي آخر خلاف ذلك»، مضيفاً «السعوديون كانوا وما زالوا موضع ترحيب في قطر». ولم يكن رأفت الوحيد الذي فكر في هذه الخطوة، إذ شاركه سلمان أحمد، الذي يعمل في الأعمال الحرة، في إبداء «الخوف من خطوات أخرى قد تتخذ بعد قرار سحب السفير، قد تصل إلى حد إغلاق الحدود، أو أي قرارات قد يطالنا (السعوديون في قطر) تأثيرها وتداعياتها»، بحسب قوله. ومع أن الكثير من السعوديين والقطريين قد لا يصدقون أن يتم اللجوء إلى هذه الخطوة، وبخاصة أن هناك «علاقات اجتماعية وترابطاً أسرياً بيننا، قد تجعل من حدوث هذا الأمر أشبه بالمستحيل» كما قال سلمان، مضيفاً أن «هذا ما دفعنا إلى رفض مجرد التفكير في أن يتم أي شي من هذه الخطوات على أرض الواقع». إلا أن بعض المتغيرات بدأت تشير إلى أن هناك «بوادر تغير». إذ رفضت بعض المستوصفات في محافظة الأحساء، وهي الأقرب إلى قطر، جغرافياً واجتماعياً، برفض التعامل بالريال القطري. وهو ما فعلته بعض محطات تعبئة الوقود على الطريق من الأحساء إلى منفذ سلوى، حيث تنتشر على الطريق البالغ طوله نحو 180 كيلومتراً، عشرات المحطات، التي رفض بعضها قبول الريال القطري، مصرين على السعوديين والقطريين الراغبين في ملء خزانات مركباتهم بالوقود، الدفع بالريال السعودي. ووثق مسافر قطري رفض عمال آسيويين في إحدى محطات الوقود السعودية، قبول الريال القطري، بمقطع مصور، تم تداوله على نطاق واسع عبر موقع «يوتيوب»، ويظهر من خلاله عامل المحطة وهو يرفض أخذ الريال القطري من صاحب المركبة، متذرعاً بأن هناك «تعليمات من قبل مالك المحطة، بعدم التعامل مع العملة القطرية». ويعود رأفت الصويمل، ليسرد حكايته وقراره «المفاجئ»، حين بدأ التفكير أخيراً في الانتقال إلى مسقط رأسه في القطيف، موضحاً أنه لم يكن يخطر بباله أن يفكر في هجر الدوحة، التي يقطنها منذ 10 أعوام. وقال: «إن أسرتي اعتادت على العيش هنا. إلا أن المخاوف من التبعات التي قد تحدث بعد قرار سحب السفير السعودي، قد يكون لها تأثير كبير علينا، في حال تم إغلاق الحدود، أو حدثت تطورات أخرى، وهو ما أجبرني على التفكير بالعودة». وإذا كان الصويمل «قليل الاهتمام في السياسة» كما يصف نفسه، فإنه وسعوديين آخرين مقيمين في الدوحة، عكفوا أمس على متابعة وقائع القمة العربية في الكويت، «على أمل أن نلتقط بارقة أمل، تتسرب من خلف كواليس القمة، توحي بأن ثمة مصالحة سعودية – قطرية في الطريق». إلا أن ما تسرب من «قصر بيان» حيث تعقد القمة العربية، لا يوحي بذلك. ويمكن تلمس «القلق» و»الخوف» في نبرة صوت الصويمل، من أن «تتصاعد الأمور، وتدخل نفقاً مظلماً». وهو ما يردده نحو 5 آلاف سعودي آخر يقيمون في قطر، والذين لا يعرفون مصيرهم في حال «ساءت الأمور». ومع ذلك تجمع غالبيتهم على أن هذه القرارات هي «سياسية بحتة، ولا يمكن أن يصل تأثيرها إلى الشعوب الخليجية». وبالعودة إلى الأحساء، اختفى منظر العائلات القطرية التي كانت ترتاد سوق القيصرية الشعبي وسط مدينة الهفوف، بشكل أسبوعي، للتبضع من أشهر المحال التجارية المختصة في بيع البهارات والمواد الغذائية، التي أكد باعة فيها «حدوث انخفاض ملموس في عدد الزبائن القطريين». فيما لم تعد تشاهد المركبات التي تحمل اللوحات القطرية، كما كان في السابق. إذ كانت تعج شوارع الهفوف والمبرز وحتى القرى والمدن الأخرى في الأحساء بالقطريين. كما تأثرت حركة العبور عبر منفذي سلوى وأبو سمرة الحدوديين. وانخفضت معدلات المسافرين عن السابق. ويبقى السؤال العالق في أذهان السعوديين والقطريين: ماذا سيحدث مستقبلاً؟ وهل سيعود السفير السعودي إلى الدوحة، أم أن هناك أموراً أخرى قد نشهدها في الأيام المقبلة. السفارة السعودية في قطررعايا سعوديينأحمد المحبوب خطوة سحب السفراء الخليجيين من الدوحة خطوة جيدة كان يجب القيام بها منذ وقت الطويل بسبب تآمر الدوحة ضدنا وضد اشقائنا الخليجيين ، وتعريض امننا ووحدتنا الخليجية للخطر بسبب تصرفاتها الصبيانية . لا يمكن ان يلوم احد ما قامت به المملكة والأشقاء في الامارات والبحرين ، ويجب ان تختار الدوحة بين البقاء في البيت العربي معززة مكرمة أو النشاز للشقق الاسرائلية والامريكية والايرانية . الأربعاء 26 آذار 2014 12:27 ص الجهني استغرب ممن يطالب المملكة والامارات والبحرين باعادة النظر في خطوة سحب السفراء!!!!!!! ويغضن الطرف عن التآمر القطري الأخواني الايراني على الخليج !!! أرجو أن تتخذ الدول الثلاث خطوات أكثر حزماً مع الدوحة . الأربعاء 26 آذار 2014 1:58 ص سعودي يعمل في قطر أولا.. عدد العاملين أكثر من 5000 في جميع القطاعات اضافة لعوائلهم وأولادهم وبعضهم مقيم منذ أكثر من 30 عام, ومن يفكر في قطع العلاقات عليه يوفر لهم البديل في السعودية بدل أن يضمهم إلى قطاع العاطلين, ثانيا للجهلة المعلقين على الخبر في المغرب اخوان فلنسحب السفير في الكويت اخوان فلنسحب السفير في بريطانيا اخوان فلنسحب السفير في تركيا اخوان فلنسحب السفير في تونس اخوان فلنسحب السفير, ما هذا *****! ثالثا لو ساءت الأمور وحدث ما يتردد فعلا من اغلاق الحدود فليتذكر الجميع ان قطر ستصبح محاصرة من الجنوب والشرق والغرب ولن يبقى لها حدود مفتوحة سوى ايران! وعندها والله لا عليها لوم اقامت جسرا بينها وبين ايران واقامت قواعد عسكرية ايرانية على حدود سلوى واعتمدت في غذائها واقتصادها على ايران بدل السعودية!! وأخيرا اعرف ان ******* هي أكثر من يحرض *******في هذا الموضوع "ومتأكد" أنها حينما تحقق مرادها سترمي نفسها في حضن ايران ولن يهمها أحد وعندها لن ينفع اصلاح المكسور مع قطر ولا غيرها.. فاتمنى من في **** *** *** أو سياسة أن يفكر بهذه الأمور أكثر من مرة ****** هو الذي عندما يغضب يضر نفسه أكثر مما يضره أعداءه! الأربعاء 26 آذار 2014 6:00 ص ابو فهد للمعلومية قرار سحب السفراء جاء متأخر من عام 95 بعد انقلاب حمد على والده ونفيه خارج قطر,والامور في توتر بين العلاقات الخليجية تجاه قطر, بصراحة ما ألوم سحب السفراء قطر سياستها تدار من الخارج وشفنا اسباب سحب السفراء والى الان لم تبرر الاسباب قيادة قطر. الوطن خط احمر وما فيه مجاملة , واتمنى إغلاق الحدود وحظر جوي. الأربعاء 26 آذار 2014 6:51 ص وضاح العفيفي ما ينبقي منكم بمبادرة الآراء تجاه دولة قطر والتدخل في سياسة سحب سفراء ﻻ بد ان نرتقي بآراء في مبادرة سديمه ونضهر نواياه الحسنة في الأشقاء وعدم تسرع بالحكم بالمقاطعة وتنويه بسلبيات ولكل حدثا حديث والممكلة السعودية والإمارة المتحدة ومملكة البحرين محل ثقة وريادة وسوف تحل المبادرة بينهم ﻻ ينبقي ان نهاجم دولة قطر لماذا هنعاديها هل أجل تقدم دولة قطر في سياستها دائماً. دولة قطر ترتقي على دول محل تعاون بسبب نجاحها، نحن أخوة يجمعنا دين واحد وشريعة وعقيدة واحدة ونسب وموطن واحد وهذه سحابة وبتزول وبإذن الله هذا ما اردت ان أعقب على اخوتي القراء ولكم الحب والتقدير عاشت دولة قطر قيادة وشعباء وحفظ الله امير دولة قطر سمو اأمير تميم حفظه الله ورعاه بما يحبه ويرضاه. الأربعاء 26 آذار 2014 12:45 م أبو راشد قطر وأهلها من أطيب الناس واحترمهم ومحبتهم للسعوديين كبيرة، والسياسة لن تفرق بيننا وسنبقى أهل وأحبة ولا ينفعنا أحد خارج مجلس التعاون، عرب أو غرب أو فرس. الأربعاء 26 آذار 2014 1:28 م راعي جميرا شعب قطر شعبنا Back from Doha inspire thousands of Saudi ... 5 « The Qatari Riyal » Rejected in Al-Ahsa A + a- Comment ( 7) the sender's name E-mail address E-mail address of the consignee Please enter your e- Anwanalbraid Version : paper - Saudi Wednesday, March 26th / March 2014 ( 00:0 ) Last Updated : Wednesday, March 26th / March 2014 ( 03:23 ) News - Omar beloved On the way between the Qatari capital of Doha , and the province of Qatif, grappling ideas in mind Raafat Abdel Mohsen Alsoiml . Throughout the distance traveled by , and that of more than 400 kilometers , replace the plan « B » , place the plan « a » , but they quickly exchange sites. The plan « B » with Alsoiml , who turned the tenth since settled in Doha , is «Back to the final return home , to the stability of the » . As you plan « a » to continue living in Doha , which has become the « investors » , runs a factory . Despite the fact that this Lent , who was working « economists » in « Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting » put plans a few years ago , but the « b » what was until a few months ago , « fantasy » . However, he admits that he began to think « serious » to return to his hometown in the province of Qatif . Perhaps the move that thinks Raafat in taken, Davis shares her many Saudis residing in Qatar , who estimated the Saudi embassy in Doha to number between four thousand to five thousand Saudi Arabia, stressing that « their reassuring after the decision to pull the Saudi ambassador from Qatar » , pointing out that they « did not receive any information , either formally , or Woody , about the intention of Saudis living in Qatar , to return to the kingdom » . And between this and that , admits Alsoiml for » life » , said the plan « B » , became the « dominant on my mind , any return to the Kingdom , and the transfer of my activity investment from Doha to the eastern region » , adding that « This idea was for me like the impossible , because I used life in Qatar , and programmed myself and my family on it. However, recent political developments forced me to think back to the Kingdom in a practical way » . Corrects Raafat , saying: « weeks ago to withdraw the three ambassadors ( Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Bahrain ) from Doha , and the announcement of the tension in the relations between these countries and Qatar. Although it did not touch any change in the Qatari deal with me , whether officials or ordinary citizens . As I have not heard of another Saudi otherwise » , adding that « the Saudis were and still are welcome in Qatar » . Raafat was not the only one who thought of this step, since participate Salman Ahmad , who works in entrepreneurship , to express « fear of further steps may be taken after the decision to withdraw the ambassador , may amount to close the border , or any decisions that may Italna ( Saudis diameter) impact and implications » , he says. Although many Saudis and Qataris may not believe that is resorting to this step, and in particular that there is a « social relations and interconnected familiarly with us , you may make of this happens like the impossible » as Salman said , adding that « this is what led us to reject the mere thought of be anything of these steps on the ground » . However, some changes began to suggest that there are « signs of change » . It rejected some clinics in the province of Al-Ahsa , which is closest to Qatar , geographically and socially , refusing to deal in Qatari Riyals . It is what I have done some filling stations on the road from Al-Ahsa to port Salwa , where the spread on the road the length of about 180 kilometers , dozens of stations , which he refused , some accept the Qatari riyal , insisting on the Saudis and Qataris wishing to fill the tanks of their vehicles with fuel , payment in Saudi Riyals . Documented passengers diagonal refused Asian workers in one of the gas stations Arabia , to accept the Qatari riyal , passage photographer , were traded widely across the site « Youtube » , and which shows that factor station which refuses to take the Qatari riyal from the owner of the vehicle , citing that there is « instructions from by the owner of the station , not to deal with the currency of the country » . Raafat Alsoiml and back , for his story and his decision lists « sudden » , when he began thinking about finally to relocate to his hometown in Qatif , explaining that it did not occur to him to think of the abandoned Doha , which is home to 10 years ago . He said: « My family used to live here . However, the fears of the consequences that may occur after the decision to withdraw the Saudi ambassador , may have a significant impact on us, in the event of closure of the border , or other developments have occurred , which forced me to think back » . If Alsoiml « little interest in politics » , as he describes himself , he and other Saudis living in Doha , embarked yesterday to follow up on the facts of the Arab summit in Kuwait , « in the hope that we pick up a glimmer of hope , seeping from behind the scenes of the summit, suggest that there is a reconciliation, Saudi Arabia - country in the way » . But what of the leak « Bayan Palace » , where the complexity of the Arab summit , does not suggest so. It can touch the « concern » and » Fear » Alsoiml in the tone of voice , that « things escalate , and the intervention of a dark tunnel » . Which is reported by about 5 thousand another Saudi living in Qatar , and who do not know their fate in the event of « things go wrong » . However , most of them gathered that these decisions are « purely political , and can not be up to the impact of the Gulf peoples » . Returning to the Al-Ahsa , disappeared stock Qatari families were faring market Caesarean popular downtown Hofuf , on a weekly basis , to the shop of the most famous shops competent in selling spices and foodstuffs , which confirmed the vendors « marked decreases in the number of customers Qatari » . With no longer see the vehicles that carry the paintings of country , as it was in the past. It was bustling streets of Hofuf and extruded and even villages and other cities in Al-Ahsa Balqtrien . Were also affected by the transit traffic across the perpetrators and Salwa Abu Samra border . The rates fell from the previous travelers . The question remains stuck in the minds of the Saudis and Qataris : What will happen in the future? Did the Saudi ambassador will return to Doha , or is there other things may we see in the coming days . Saudi Embassy in Qtrraia beloved Saudianahmd Step withdrawal of ambassadors from the Gulf Doha was a good step to be done a long time ago because of a conspiracy against us and our brothers Doha Gulf , and exposing our security and unity of the Gulf because of the risk of childish behavior . No one can blame what was done by the brothers in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Doha must choose between staying at home or an honorable Arab cacophony Apartments Alasiraelih the U.S. and Iran . Wednesday 26 March 2014 0:27 Juhani Surprised at who demanded Kingdom and United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in a move to reconsider the withdrawal of ambassadors ! ! ! ! ! ! ! And corrugated party for conspiring Qatari The Muslim Brotherhood on the Iranian Gulf ! ! ! I hope that the three countries take firmer steps with Doha . Wednesday 26 March 2014 1:58 Saudi working in Qatar I. .. the number of employees more than 5000 in all sectors, in addition to their families and their children , some of them resident for more than 30 years , and is thinking of cutting ties it provides them with alternative in Saudi Arabia rather than enlisted into the Gaza unemployed , Second ignorant commentators on the news in Morocco Brothers Flanshab Ambassador Brothers in Kuwait Flanshab Ambassador in Britain Brothers Flanshab Ambassador in Turkey Brothers Flanshab Ambassador in Tunis Brothers Flanshab Ambassador , what is this ***** ! Thirdly , if things went wrong and what happened hesitate to actually seal the border all readers must remember that Qatar will become the besieged from the south , east and west borders will remain open but Iran ! And then God does not blame them set up a bridge between Iran and set up military bases on the border of Iran and Salwa adopted in their diet and economy on Iran rather than Saudi Arabia ! ! Finally, I know that is more than ******* ******* incites in this issue, " and sure" when they achieve their goal will aim itself in the lap of Iran will not be interested in one , and then it will not benefit the repair broken with Qatar or any other .. I wish from the ********** or policy to think about these things more than once , which is ****** hurt himself when he gets angry more than hurt his enemies ! Wednesday 26 March 2014 6:00 Abu Fahd For the information of the decision to withdraw ambassadors came late in the year 95 after the coup Hamad on his father and his denial of outside diameter , and things in tension between the Gulf relations towards Qatar , frankly, what I blame the withdrawal of ambassadors Qatar policy managed from abroad and Vena reasons for the withdrawal of ambassadors and so far did not justify the reasons for the leadership of Qatar . Home is a red line and a compliment , and I hope to close the border and fly . Wednesday 26 March 2014 6:51 Wadah Al-Afifi What Anbaka of you at the initiative of views towards the State of Qatar and intervention in policy to withdraw ambassadors must live up views of the initiative Sdima and Ndahr good intentions in siblings and non- rush -governing provincial and Disclaimer shadows and the light for each event , modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Emirate United Kingdom trustworthy and leadership will solve the initiative , including not Anbaka the attack Qatar Why Are Henaadea for the progress of the State of Qatar in its policy always . Qatar elevate the states replace cooperation because of its success , we are brothers brings us one religion , and the law and the doctrine of one lineage and home to one of these cloud and Ptzul and , God willing, this is what I wanted to comment on my brothers readers and your love and appreciation lived Qatar's leadership and Haaba and God Save the Emir of Qatar His Highness the Amir of Tamim may God protect him , including love and satisfactory . Wednesday 26 March 2014 12:45 Abu Rashid Qatar and its people from the best people and respect them and their love for the Saudis large , and politics will not divide us and we will keep parents and loved ones does not benefit us one outside the GCC , Arab or West or mare . Wednesday 26 March 2014 13:28 Patron Jumeirah Our people, the people of Qatar ==================================== http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8a965110-b4c0-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2xKRtMRYt March 26, 2014 6:09 pm Saudi Arabia: A kingdom on guard By Roula Khalaf Alarmed by the rise of political Islam, the House of Saud is increasingly hardline at home and aggressive abroad ©AFP In the background: the 90-year-old King Abdullah, right, is said to have reduced his workload, allowing his aides to implement a more uncompromising policy     The reaction was almost instant. On the same day that the Saudi government announced a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, the four-finger sign of sympathy with Egypt’s Brothers disappeared from Twitter picture displays. No one in the kingdom was willing to take the risk of being accused of supporting the Islamist group, even if the yellow symbol was sometimes just an expression of pity for the victims of the Cairo regime’s repression of Islamists. MoreOn this story Obama meets Saudi king to mend relations Gulf states withdraw Qatar ambassadors Editorial Time for frank US talk with Saudis David Gardner Qatar stands firm Lunch with the FT Prince Turki al-Faisal On this topic Saudi rulers face dilemma on reforms Saudi women defy tradition to enter work European court backs UK in torture case Saudi deportations gain momentum IN Analysis Technology All eyes on the future Brittan on Britain Indian election Generational shift Japanese debt – Still climbing This month’s ban, it was clear, would be enforced under harsh antiterrorism regulations that had been introduced just a few weeks earlier. So sweeping were the new laws that any hint of support for outlawed groups could be deemed a criminal offence. The actions taken by the Saudi leadership reflect an increasingly hardline attitude in Riyadh that has rattled political activists and puzzled Middle Eastern and western officials. The Muslim Brotherhood certainly has followers in Saudi Arabia. And they were emboldened by the sudden, if shortlived, success of their brethren in Egypt and Tunisia after the 2011 uprisings. But in an absolute monarchy, where no right of assembly is recognised, it has been impossible for a group to emerge that could pose a threat to the House of Saud. Casting a wide net against a group’s sympathisers is not the usual Saudi way of doing business. The government’s preferred method is to combine subtle co-option and not-so-subtle punishment on a narrow band of leaders and agitators. “It’s strange. Nothing has dramatically changed in Saudi Arabia to justify this,” says a Riyadh-based lawyer. Around the same time as the legal crackdown, Saudi Arabia stepped up a long-running dispute with Qatar, accusing its smaller neighbour of destabilising the Gulf. Along with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Riyadh withdrew its ambassador from Doha. It also hinted at more stringent measures, including closing its borders and airspace, in what is shaping up to be one of the worst crises within the Gulf Cooperation Council, the regional group that includes both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. People close to the Riyadh government say Saudi Arabia is assuming regional responsibility and will no longer tolerate those who spread chaos across the region. “We are becoming an initiator of policy and defining our interests,” says one. Others, however, say the moves are a sign of growing insecurity at a time when an ageing leadership is desperate to return the Arab world to a more comfortable pre-Arab awakening status quo, however intolerant that might seem. This apparent nervousness has been accentuated by the suspicion among Saudi officials that the US is abandoning the Kingdom while seeking better relations with Iran, Riyadh’s regional rival. President Barack Obama will seek to assuage these fears when he visits Saudi Arabia this week. “Saudi Arabia has changed. Before it was more cautious, more diplomatic. Now it’s more assertive and more paranoid,” says a Saudi political analyst who asked to remain anonymous. Islamist threat There is much to trouble a conservative regional leader in a Middle East that is in a state of permanent ferment. Three years after the outbreak of Arab uprisings that sent ripples of panic through the autocratic Gulf, Saudi Arabia is operating in a more threatening environment. The biggest blow in 2011 was the loss of Hosni Mubarak, Riyadh’s reliable Egyptian ally. Worse yet, his demise ushered in a Saudi nightmare: the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. It might seem ironic for a Wahhabi theocracy to oppose so forcefully a party that mixes religion with politics. But it is precisely because the monarchy bases its legitimacy on Islam that it fears Brotherhood rivalry. If political Islam were to be rooted in power in the largest Arab country, it could become an exportable commodity to the Gulf. Fortunately for the kingdom, the Brotherhood’s rule in Cairo came to an abrupt end last summer in a military coup that had popular support. Saudi Arabia quickly embraced the new military regime and propped it up with billions of dollars of economic aid. The effective restoration of the old Mubarak order was an opportunity the Saudis were now determined to preserve. “There is a conviction in Saudi that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only power that could have exploited the Arab spring, and so they think that without the Brotherhood there can be no revolutions,” says the Saudi political analyst. The Saudi government’s fretting over Islamists in the kingdom, however, did not end with the fall of Mohammad Morsi, Egypt’s Islamist president. As Cairo’s crackdown on the Brotherhood escalated, many Saudis were at odds with official policy as their sympathies lay closer to the Islamists than to the Egyptian army. The anxiety over Islamists in the UAE also added to Saudi concerns. Last year the UAE government accused dozens of alleged Islamists of plotting a coup backed by the Brotherhood overseas. In July the supreme court handed down long prison sentences to the alleged plotters in a trial criticised as unfair by western human rights groups. As pressure on the Brotherhood widened, however, Saudi relations with Qatar grew frostier. Qatar, the only Gulf state to have been traditionally sympathetic to Islamists and to have backed the Morsi government, refused to join the regional crackdown on the Brotherhood. Saudi pressure for a change of policy in Doha, however, has continued to intensify, climaxing in the withdrawal of the three Gulf ambassadors this month. According to Gulf sources, the main Saudi demand has been for the closure or the drastic curbing of the coverage of Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based network and only remaining popular channel that gives ample airtime to Brotherhood members. Qatar, however, has insisted it will not be bullied. It has argued that it is neither committed to the Brotherhood nor able to dictate to Al Jazeera how it should cover the Egyptian story. Regional rivalry Saudi Arabia might have handled Egypt with a softer touch had it felt more secure in its neighbourhood. But the stand-off between the Sunni kingdom and Shia Iran has intensified over the past three years, as the two regional heavyweights backed opposite sides in the Syrian war. To Saudi Arabia’s chagrin, moreover, Iran’s image in the world has improved with the election of Hassan Rouhani. The centrist president favours engagement with the west and has embarked on negotiations with world powers that are designed to curb Iran’s nuclear programme and ensure it remains peaceful. The prospect of a resolution of the nuclear dispute – bolstered by the Rouhani government’s signing of an interim nuclear agreement in November – has sparked a profound rift in Saudi-US relations. The growing production of shale gas in the US, along with its reduced dependence on Gulf oil, has deepened Saudi fear that the era of a special relationship with the US – one based on an exchange of oil for security – was nearing an end. Saudi officials have been uncharacteristically vocal in their criticism of the US, which they also blame for failures in Syria. And they have made no secret of their opposition to a nuclear deal with Iran, which they suspect would lead to western acquiescence of Iranian regional hegemony. “With the warming of US relations with Iran and the reduction in Saudi Arabia’s strategic oil importance, the Saudis are concerned about losing out,” says the Riyadh-based lawyer. What Saudi officials do not express, however, is that the sense of vulnerability and anxiety about the future might be exacerbated by something closer to home: the state of the monarchy. King Abdullah is about 90 years old and is said to have considerably reduced his workload in the past year. Crown Prince Salman, his brother, is also believed to be in fragile health. Analysts and diplomats say that some princes and aides, including Khalid al-Tuwaijri, the king’s “gatekeeper”, have assumed greater authority and pushed for a more uncompromising policy. Internal disarray appears to have affected Saudi decision-making, particularly in policy towards Syria. Saudi backing for a nebulous rebel movement has also led to a flood of Saudis joining extremist groups – potentially forming a new wave of jihadis who might return to the kingdom and wage a domestic jihad, much as they had done after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Last month Riyadh sought to stem the flow of Saudi militants (at least 1,000 have gone to Syria, according to the interior ministry, and many more according to western sources) by imposing 20-year jail terms on those travelling to fight abroad. Until recently Syria policy was led by Bandar bin Sultan, the hawkish national security chief and former ambassador to Washington. Saudi watchers say that although Prince Bandar might still be involved, the Syria file has now been handed to Mohammed bin Naif, the more restrained interior minister whose focus in on antiterrorism at home. Security gamble It is not only in Syria, however, that Saudi Arabia has taken a dangerous gamble. As the kingdom flexes its muscle, it risks provoking broader turmoil in the region while also breeding resentment at home. With the new antiterrorism laws, even the small political space that had been opened by King Abdullah is at risk of vanishing as freedom of expression is restricted. Western diplomats say that Riyadh and other Gulf states financing Egypt’s economy should be using their leverage to counsel reconciliation and reform instead of replicating Egypt’s harsh measures against the Brotherhood. With the Gulf, too, there are similar concerns. As one senior Gulf official says: “The message that’s now being given to political Islam is go underground, and that’s after 25 years of telling them to learn about democracy.” The fear for Egypt and beyond is that the repression of the Islamist group that had renounced violence long ago might moderate some of its leaders but also unleash radicalised splinter groups. This could further swell jihadi ranks at a time of resurgence for al-Qaeda franchises in north Africa and Syria. Saudi Arabia’s attempt to force a united Gulf front towards Egypt could also backfire, undermining a GCC alliance on which it hopes increasingly to rely to counter Iran’s authority. New fissures are already apparent in the region. As Tarek Osman, author of Egypt on the Brink, says, two camps are emerging: one led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which maintains that political Islam is a perilous force that should be confronted; and the other led by Qatar and Turkey’s ruling party, which believes in political Islam’s ability to transform the region. “This confrontation has not reached its peak yet,” he says. Saudi Arabia’s policies might be pursued in the name of stability. But they could well achieve the opposite. ------------------------------------------- Gulf Cooperation Council: Minnows frustrate Riyadh’s plans for alliance In the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia looked to protect itself through the Gulf Cooperation Council, the loose political and economic alliance of six oil-rich Sunni monarchies of which it is the most powerful member. By working through the GCC, Riyadh managed to advance policies it favoured, including a peaceful transition of power in Yemen and support for the Nato military intervention in Libya. It was also nominally a GCC force, though one largely made up of Saudis, that was dispatched to Bahrain to shore up the Sunni monarchy threatened by an uprising by the Shia majority. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to bolster the authority of the GCC, however, have been frustrated on other fronts. Smaller Gulf states have been willing to co-operate when their interests converged with those of the Saudis, mindful of the benefits of closing of ranks to counter regional turbulence. But they have also continued to guard their independence carefully. So when the kingdom suggested that Jordan and Morocco, two other Arab monarchies, should be added to the GCC club, the smaller members of the alliance balked. Another Saudi plan to upgrade the alliance into a full union was also rebuffed, receiving enthusiastic support only from Bahrain. Oman took the unusual step of making its opposition public in a statement by its foreign minister. The Saudi vision of a more coherent and united GCC has appeared to unravel in recent months, as Riyadh sparred with Doha and Oman was revealed to have hosted secret US-Iran talks. Only two other states joined Saudi Arabia in withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha this month, with Kuwait and Oman apparently unconvinced by the accusations against Qatar. Gulf officials insist that rifts will not destabilise the GCC. But so sensitive are Gulf tensions that when Arab leaders met at their yearly summit this week in Kuwait, the Saudi-Qatari dispute was not even put on the agenda. This article has been amended since initial publication, to reflect the fact that the Shia population is the majority in Bahrain =================================== Saudi royal guards in Riyadh stand on duty in front of portraits of King Abdullah (R), Prince Salman (C) and Prince Muqrin, Feb. 18, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Fayez Nureldine) The coming Saudi decentralization Author: Madawi Al-Rasheed Posted March 28, 2014 King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia adhered to the unpredictable succession rule that dominates the Saudi system when he appointed Prince Muqrin as deputy crown prince on March 27. Muqrin, an ex-intelligence chief, will become crown prince after Prince Salman, and eventually king when both the king and current crown prince pass away. The Saudi Press Agency reported the appointment as a royal decree that cannot be challenged under any circumstances in the future. The royal statement must have come after months of deliberation among royals, who, like the rest of Saudia Arabia and the world, are impatiently waiting for a resolution of the mystery of succession in the kingdom. Summary⎙ Print The appointment of Prince Muqrin as deputy crown prince reveals a trend toward multiple power centers within the royal family.Author Madawi Al-Rasheed Posted March 28, 2014 Abdullah missed an opportunity to resolve the succession issue, which sooner or later will have to be passed on to the second-generation princes awaiting their turn to shape the future of the kingdom. He overlooked the seniority principle and chose to elevate a close and loyal aide above not only other surviving brothers of the king, but also the new generation of princes. It was reported that the decision had the consent of 75% of the Oath of Allegiance Committee members, the 34 princes appointed by the king when it was established in 2007. The committee was meant to ensure a smooth succession to the throne as the king urged its royal members to "stand united, settling any differences by transparent dialogue and without allowing external forces to interfere in their private affairs." But the committee was meant to become active only after the death of Abdullah and the crown prince at the time, Prince Sultan. The king lived through the death of two crown princes, Sultan and Naif. Consequently, it became urgent to deal with the unexpected, mainly the succession moving to the second generation as a matter of necessity under the pressure of old age. It seems that the king did not want the committee to meet after his death, as stipulated in the committee’s constitution, and "elect" the future king. He may have anticipated a possible rift and resolved the matter in favor of Muqrin. Moving the succession to the second generation seems to threaten the balance of power between the various Al-Saud clans and will inevitably sideline a number of them if the succession is to move from its current horizontal line between brothers to a vertical one from father to son. The founder of the kingdom, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, marginalized his brothers when he appointed his own son, Saud, as crown prince in 1932. But this all happened at a time when it was possible to do so. Several decades later, the move is bound to be problematic for a simple reason: The founder’s many sons had already placed their own sons in key positions, and a handful of these sons are now key players in domestic and foreign policy. Take, for example, the son of Naif, Muhammad, who controls almost all aspects of Saudi internal affairs, or the king’s son Mitab, who has established control over the Saudi National Guard. Other clans within the family revolve around the sons of King Faisal, Sultan and Fahd, with several of their sons in control of important positions in the kingdom. Given the proliferation of royal positions and power holders, it is time to think of Saudi Arabia as a kingdom with multiple heads or several fiefdoms. In this context, the kingdom is no longer a centralized absolute monarchy as it used to be under King Faisal (1964-1975), but a cluster of clans under an honorary king, and over which Prince Muqrin will preside in due course. He will have to acknowledge the interest of each one of these clans and keep balancing the various factions in ways that do not undermine their privileges, positions and wealth. He can only do that by creating more positions that will absorb the growing number of princes within each clan. He will also have to be seen as a neutral arbiter between the various competing factions while not undermining their inherited control over key ministries and government arms. The pluralism that is currently unfolding among those in power is a mixed blessing. Internally, Saudis are trying to navigate this change and hope to place themselves in a patron-client relationship with at least one clan. They have been denied any say in the way their government is run, and the only available option is to become part of a princely circle of power. If one prince proves to be remote and uninterested, they may seek another, one more in need of developing his own clients to boost his popularity. The multiple princely actors within the state offer opportunities for a population denied any political representation or pressure groups. Despite the proliferation of state bureaucracy and institutions, politics in the kingdom remain personalized and revolve around the princes. The more Saudi princes there are, the more opportunities are believed to be available. The system works as long as the monarchical myth is sustained. This myth centers on the illusion that in this large pool of princes, there is always going to be one who listens and delivers. This pluralism may work, but it can also reach a dead end and generate chaos. The segmented nature of princely politics can be frustrating and counterproductive among a growing population that needs efficient and rational bureaucracy to deal with its various needs and welfare. The appointment of Muqrin as deputy crown prince may solve the mystery of succession, but it does not resolve the perils of multiple centers of power, each of which is in control of a ministry or branch of government. Externally, the princely pluralism is a challenge not only to foreign governments but also to anyone who deals with the kingdom. The personalized nature of politics undermines established long-term relationships, as outsiders are not confronted with established institutions but with princes who may or may not be in the same position when it comes time to sign a contract or close a deal. The constant shuffling of princes between various institutions and the competition between them are bound to create uncertainty and undermine the credibility of the regime. It certainly makes Saudi Arabia one of the most opaque countries to do business with, and it is difficult to maintain stable political relations that survive the lifespan of a prince. Countries and businesses find themselves baffled by these reshuffles and desperate for clues to decipher Saudi mysteries. Appointments to government positions are more a tool to balance the Saudi clans rather than a reflection of the prince’s credentials. This will remain a challenge to outsiders, especially those dependent on access to Saudi resources and investment opportunities. The multiple Saudi clans that are in control of the government and Saudi resources offer real opportunities for their members, but undermine the evolution of the kingdom into a state with institutions that are durable beyond the life of the prince. The king was expected to regulate the transfer of power to the second generation, but he can only deliver an honorary future king to rule over flourishing multiple centers of power, each of which thinks it has a divine right to monopolize the top position. For the moment, the multiple clans will continue to coexist because no one wants to rock the boat, given that the stakes are so high. The alternative to coexistence is internal strife that will no doubt undermine the future of the kingdom. Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/saudi-prince-muqrin-decentralization.html#ixzz2xLcAsH42 =======================================