Haddad: One of the most important issues driving violence in Iraq is the identity and ownership of the state

Haddad: One of the most important issues driving violence in Iraq is the identity and ownership of the state 9 February 2015 JTW Interview with Fanar Haddad JTW has conducted an in-depth interview with Fanar Haddad on political and social developments in Iraq. Dr. Haddad is Research Fellow at National University of Singapore Middle East Institute. His main research topics are identity, historical memory, nationalism, communal conflict and minority politics. 1.What are the challenges to enduring reconciliation between Iraq’s feuding factions and thereby the establishment of a durable political foundation of a stable, inclusive and sovereign Iraqi state? There is a fundamental lack of trust between Iraq’s main political actors and after 11 years this has had an echo at the societal level as well. Furthermore, some of these political actors carry irreconcilable visions of what Iraq is and where it should be heading. This is what makes calls for the Iraqi government to reach out to the likes of JRTN rather vacuous: there is literally no common ground upon which the two can build a dialogue much less a constructive relationship. Indeed the post-2003 order is viewed so dimly in some sections of Sunni society and by some Sunni actors that at one point they viewed a genocidal group like ISIS as the lesser of two evils – the other being the Iraqi state. Whether Iraqis like to admit it or not their country is currently in a state of civil war that is itself part of a broader conflict that began in 2003. As with any conflict, there is no single driver but I think one of the most important issues driving violence in Iraq is the identity and ownership of the state. As far as Arab Iraq is concerned, one of the characteristic features of this struggle has been the mutually reinforcing, cyclical interplay between Shi’a-centric state building and Sunni rejection. There are political forces that are too entrenched in this interplay to be able to break out of it or to support efforts to break the cycle. This will be one of the chief challenges to PM Haider al Abadi’s efforts to steer Iraq away from the abyss and closer to stability. The PM does not operate in a vacuum and will have to work with and appease forces that are a fundamental part of the Shi’a-centric state building/Sunni rejection dynamic. One thing that was always needed, and that PM Abadi seems to be achieving, is better relations with Iraq’s neighbors and the Arab world. Whatever grievances Iraqi politicians may have against some Arab states as a result of their sometimes destructive role over the past 11 years, score settling and grudges must be abandoned in favor of turning the page and building mutually beneficial relations. Otherwise, and as demonstrated by the last 11 years, Iraq will not stabilize without the goodwill of regional states. On this front, the new Iraqi government’s performance is cause for some optimism thus far. Internally, however, the challenges remain immense and their resolution is not totally within the PM’s ability. A glaring example is the vacuum in Sunni political leadership. This has always been an issue since 2003 but never more so than after the summer of 2014 when the Islamic State took over most Sunni majority areas of Arab Iraq. It is not for Abadi to create Sunni political representation: Sunni political representation must emerge from within Sunni Arab communities and this will not happen before the internal struggle regarding the question of whether to accept or reject the post-2003 order and whether the post-2003 state (and not just the government of the day) is regarded as legitimate or not is resolved. 2.Considering Basra province’s demands for autonomy and the calls for establishing Shiite and Sunni regions, what will be the future of regionalism in Iraq? There is much talk of decentralization and federalism these days, and perhaps some form of genuine decentralization may lead to the emergence of representative Sunni political actors and an acceptance of the post-2003 order by providing a political space they can call their own but that is nevertheless linked to the Iraqi state. Regarding the formation of federal regions in Sunni majority areas, I think one of the problems is the somewhat ambitious understanding of what federalism entails amongst advocates of such plans. Many of them think that a new federal region will have the same status and powers that the Kurdish Regional Government has. I do not think that any government in Baghdad will allow this to happen, in part due to the absence of the trust necessary for the implementation of such plans and in part due to the questions that such decentralization would raise regarding state sovereignty, Iraqi territorial integrity and statehood (as such, this applies as much to any new federal formations in Arab Iraq regardless of sectarian identity). As for Basrawi regionalism, unlike other parts of Iraq there is a history of regional tendencies regarding Basra but as with other parts of Arab Iraq Basrawi federalists have struggled to attain mass appeal. Given Basra’s economic importance I think Baghdad will do its utmost to forestall any drive to Basrawi federalism and this will likely involve making economic and administrative concessions to the Basra provincial government. Ultimately, calls for regional autonomy and federalism in Arab Iraq are based on how the central government is seen and whether people feel they have a fair share of the national pie or not. Better governance, better service delivery and more equitable relations between Baghdad and the provinces is the surest way to preempt calls for new federal formations in Arab Iraq. 3.Considering the rise of Iranian-backed Shiite militias, how do Najaf hawza and the secular and nationalist Shiites perceive Iranian involvement in Iraq? I think that, given the scale of the threat to Iraq in the summer of 2014, most Shi’as accept Iranian involvement – and this would range from begrudging acceptance of a ‘necessary evil’ to full acceptance of the involvement of a ‘strategic partner’. The more distant the threat of state collapse the more the differences amongst Shi’as regarding Iranian involvement become evident. Conversely, the higher the perceived threat, the more that spectrum gets constrained. For now, whatever their personal views, I think the vast majority of Shi’as see Iran as an indispensable part of the fight against the Islamic State. The discrepancy of views towards IS, Iran and the mobilization that was witnessed in the summer of 2014 is very interesting. It revealed just how deep the divide was in views regarding the legitimacy, not just of the second Maliki government but of the entire post-2003 order. As is well known, in response to the challenge of IS, a call to mass mobilization was issued by Shi’a clerical authorities. As far as the Iraqi government, the Shi’a clerical authorities and the vast majority of Shi’as were concerned IS was an existential threat to themselves and to the existence of Iraq overall. In other words, it was a national emergency that required a response as dramatic as the nature of the threat. A significant body of Sunni opinion saw it rather differently: the fall of the post-2003 order was not a national emergency but a potential opportunity. Far from being an existential threat to Iraq, the events of the summer of 2014 were initially viewed by some Sunnis as a chance to ‘liberate Iraq’, hence, all the talk of ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘tribal revolution’ and the persistent denials in the summer of 2014 of the centrality of IS to the entire episode. These views were expressed by Sunni religious figures and by Sunni political actors both from within and without the political process (even Osama al Nujaifi talked of ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘revolution’). For me, this discrepancy is rooted in a divergence regarding state legitimacy: whatever their dissatisfaction with post-2003 governments and politicians, Shi’a Iraqis believed that defending the state was a national sacred duty. As such, Iranian offers of assistance were to be welcomed. For many Sunnis the state was simply not something to be defended. As for the idea of allowing Iran to help lead the fight against IS, some Iraqis view their compatriots’ acceptance of an Iranian presence in Iraq with the same disbelief, horror and disgust that other Iraqis would reserve for those of their compatriots who tolerate or support IS. In both cases the opposing view is seen as nothing short of treason – testament to the depth of division regarding the contours of what Iraq and Iraqi nationalism constitute. 4.Many Iraqi militant groups are led or inspired by religious figures. How do you assess the impact of the rise of “militant clergy” on religious identities in the country? This is hardly a new phenomenon. I see it as an acceleration and proliferation of something that has been there in one form or another for years (are ISCI and Badr – two integral components of the post-2003 order – not examples of ‘militant clergy’?). It is part and parcel of the deterioration of events since the summer of 2014. There can be little doubt that communal relations have been further poisoned since the fall of Mosul. The ‘militant clergy’ that you mentioned are a symptom rather than the cause of the mobilization of sectarian identities. Of course ‘militant clergy’, alongside a host of other factors, further intertwine perceptions regarding the state with ethnic and religious identities. It scarcely needs pointing out that when trying to mobilize Shi’as to fight IS and defend the Iraqi state, appeals were made to both their Iraqi and their Shi’a-Iraqi identities. On the one hand, this is difficult to avoid given the realities of the past 11 years and the overtly sectarian nature of the threat (as was made abundantly obvious in IS spokesman Adnani’s message following the fall of Mosul). It is difficult to keep sectarian identity out of the equation when the enemy is openly promising sectarian genocide! On the other hand, however, this naturally complicates the fight-back against IS by linking defense of the state with defense of Iraqi Shi’as. This may partly explain why Sunni tribes and areas fighting IS have been more the exception than the rule. By Ömer Faruk Topal This interview was firstly published in the February 2015 Issue of Analist Monthly Journal in Turkish language. 9 February 2015 Journal of Turkish Weekly