Why the Islamic State Is Losing

Car bombs kill 24 across Baghdad as violence rages Fri, Oct 17 16:22 PM EDT BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A string of car bombs killed at least 24 people across Baghdad on Friday night, medical and police officials said, amid a surge of violence in the capital. No one immediately said they were responsible for the blasts, but other attacks in recent weeks have been claimed by Sunni Muslim militant group Islamic State, which is battling the Shi'ite Muslim-led government and has seized large parts of neighboring Syria. A parked car blew up near a coffee shop in the Shi'ite area of Baladiyat, killing nine people and wounding 28, the officials said. Another blast killed nine and wounded 28 in the Sunni neighborhood of Slaikh, while a third car bomb blew up by a row of liquor stores in the affluent Karrada neighborhood, killing six and wounding 14 others, the officials added. The attack came the day after bombs killed 36 in Baghdad and areas bordering the capital. (Reporting By Ned Parker) ================================ Why the Islamic State Is Losing The pundits have it wrong—the terrorists’ move toward Baghdad is a sign of desperation. By MICHAEL KNIGHTS October 14, 2014 Many in the world media seem to be concluding, with alarm, that the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is at the gates of Baghdad. ISIL has made dramatic gains in Anbar province, Iraq’s perennially troubled “wild west,” and Anbar is next to Baghdad. Ergo, Baghdad must be next to fall. It was probably no accident that, on Tuesday, President Obama convened an urgent conference of defense officials from 21 countries at Andrews Air Force Base to coordinate strategies and tactics. Everyone should calm down. The reality is that ISIL and its forerunners have always been in Baghdad. The Iraqi capital and its rural exurbs – the “Baghdad belts” — have been a desperate battleground since 2003. True, ISIL has been posing much more of a direct threat to Baghdad since the beginning of 2014, when the movement took control of Fallujah, a city of 300,000 that is located just 25 miles west of Baghdad International Airport. But Baghdad won’t fall to cascading panic the way that Mosul did in June 2014, no matter how many towns and cities ISIL overruns in the Euphrates River Valley to the northwest of the capital. Here’s why. Mosul was a predominately Sunni city of one million people where the Shia-led security forces were despised and where the bulk of Iraq’s security forces were hundreds of miles away. Baghdad is a predominately Shia city of more than seven million and the hub of a gargantuan popular mobilization of Shia militias and regular security forces. Mao Zedong said that the guerrilla “must swim among the people as the fish swims in the sea,” but ISIL would be swimming with piranhas if it tried to recreate Mosul in Baghdad. In truth, the threat posed to Baghdad this autumn is emerging less because ISIL is winning the war in Iraq and more because it might be slowly but steadily losing it. All across north-central Iraq, ISIL is being challenged by joint forces comprised of Sunni tribes, Shia militias, Iraqi soldiers, Iranian advisors and U.S. airpower. ISIL is struggling to maintain its grip on this battlefield of strange bedfellows, and it could be moving on Baghdad now out of a desperate need for a big victory more than anything else. Even as ISIL appears to be making progress in marginal places like Kobane, the Syrian Kurdish border town, inside Iraq the group has been faltering and needs a new front to rejuvenate its campaign. Among the less-noted victories against ISIL recently: In early October, Kurdish peshmerga forces and local Sunni tribesmen of the Shammar confederation – usually bitter rivals – cooperated in a three-day blitzkrieg that recaptured the vital Rabiya border crossing that links the ISIL territories in Iraq and Syria. In Dhuluiya, 45 miles north of Baghdad, Sunni tribesmen of the Jabouri confederation are pushing ISIL back from their lands in collaboration with both Iraqi Army forces and, stunningly, Iranian-backed Shia militiamen from the Kataib Hezbollah movement. Near Kirkuk, the Obeidi confederation, another conglomeration of Sunni tribes, is starting to cooperate with Shia Turkmen tribes and Kurdish security forces against ISIL. For the first time since June, the Iraqi government is able to drive tanks and supply columns all the way from Baghdad to Kirkuk, allowing the security forces to open a new front on ISIL’s eastern flank.

Reidar Visser says: It makes sense to start with the choice of ministers for interior and defence. These important posts were a stumbling block for Maliki’s two cabinets. In 2006, they took a month extra to decide, whereas in 2010 they weren’t decided by parliament at all, as Maliki continued to control them himself or through acting protegées. This time, the candidate for minister of interior, in particular, had caused controversy. For a long time the frontrunner was Hadi al-Ameri, a militia figure from the Badr organization with particularly close ties to the Iranians, whose candidacy caused uproar among many Sunni MPs who remain critical of his conduct during the previous sectarian crisis period of 2005-2007. Today, Ameri gave way to Muhammad Salim al-Ghabban, who shares his Badr background but possibly is seen as less toxic to non-Shiite MPs simply because he is younger and has less baggage than Ameri. For his part, Khaled al-Obeidi who is the new defence minister, had been a candidate back in 2010 as well, when he was nominated by Iraqiyya but quickly was criticized for having moved too close to Maliki. Maybe that sort of person – a Sunni with ties in both sectarian camps – is the best Iraq could hope for in a time when urgent work needs to be done to reorganize the Iraqi army and make it more resilient against the Islamic State terror organization. Both ministers achieved more than acceptable levels of backing by MPs, with Yes votes from the 261 MPs present reported at 173 (Obeidi) and 197 (Ghabban), which is considerably more than what many other ministers got back in September. Rosch Shaways thereby continues to serve as deputy prime minister, and foreign minister Hosyar Zebari becomes minister of finance.

Iraqi parliament approves defense, interior ministers: state TV Sat, Oct 18 10:42 AM EDT BAGHDAD (Reuters) - The Iraqi parliament on Saturday approved a Sunni Muslim to become defense minister and a Shi'ite to be interior minister, state television said, as part of a more inclusive government to help tackle Islamist insurgents. Six Kurdish members of the cabinet were also sworn in after the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had held out for a larger share of ministries than the three offered when Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi unveiled his government on Sept.8. The moves provide a stronger political foundation for Abadi to try to counter Islamic State's grip on most Sunni areas of the country to the north and west. They also help to repair relations with the country's Kurds strained by quarrels over budget allocations and disputes over oil rights and land in the north. For the defense portfolio, parliament voted in favor of Khaled al-Obeidi, a Sunni from the northern city of Mosul that is now under Islamic State control. Mohammed al-Ghabban of the powerful Shi'ite political party, the Badr Organization, which has a militia wing, is to take over the interior ministry. Obeidi belongs to the party of Vice President Usama al-Nujaifi and is a confidant of his brother Atheel al-Nujaifi, the governor of Nineveh province that was overrun by Sunni Islamic State forces. Ghabban was seen as a compromise for interior minister after Badr chief Hadi al-Amri drew the objections of Sunni parties. MORE POSTS FOR KURDS The Kurds, who originally had been offered the ministry of finance, a post of deputy prime minister and minister of culture, were also given the posts of a minister without portfolio, minister of women's affairs and the ministry of displacement and migration. "The new government will be inclusive and address core issues of reconciliation, establishing security and stability in the country... and resolving the outstanding KRG issues of oil and the disputed territories," new Finance Minister Hoshiyar Zebari, a Kurd, told Reuters. The United States, which has sent US military advisers to Iraq and has conducted air strikes against Islamic State, applauded the announcement. “We had a very positive step forward in Iraq today with the selection of the minister of interior and the minister of defense,” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters in Boston, where was meeting China’s most senior diplomat, State Councillor Yang Jiechi for talks on Islamic State and other issues. “These were critical positions to be filled in order to assist with the organizing effort with respect to ISIL (Islamic State)." Obeidi, a general in Iraq's army before 2003, was in Mosul in the final hours before the city fell to Islamic State in June. He said his own house in Mosul had been occupied by Islamic State militants. His appointment has symbolic value for the Iraqi government, as it looks to persuade Mosul residents to rise up. Obeidi has been deeply critical of the military under Abadi's predecessor Nuri al-Maliki and has called for major reforms in the security institution. The naming of the security ministers had largely been slowed by the internal debate among the Shi'ites on whether they could name Amri, who is close to both Maliki and Iran, as interior minister. The Badr Organization's armed wing is blamed by Sunnis for carrying out sectarian killings in the early years after Saddam Hussein fell in 2003. Badr members deny the allegations. The choice of Ghabban was seen as less controversial than Amri. (Reporting By Ned Parker and Ahmed al-Rasheed, David Brunnstrom; Editing by Mark Heinrich and Stephen Powell)

This is not to say that ISIL is just rolling over. The Islamic State certainly landed some good punches in early October, overrunning a handful of small garrisons in Anbar, capturing parts of the 100,000-strong city of Hit and driving security forces out of much of Ramadi city, the Anbar’s provincial capital. But overall, ISIL’s reaction to Sunni tribal uprisings – suicide bombings and assassinations against the tribes – will only reinforce tribal resolve. ISIL still needs to relieve pressure on its northern Iraqi territories and open a new front. Which is where Baghdad comes in. Regardless of what happens in Anbar, ISIL needs to punch back somewhere vital, somewhere sensitive, if it is to regain the initiative in Iraq. Iraq-watchers have been waiting for an ISIL thrust against Baghdad for many months, and many are scratching their heads as to why it has not landed yet. It is not for lack of opportunity. ISIL was well-established in the inner suburbs of Baghdad even before June 2014: With great fanfare, Islamic State militants held a 75-vehicle parade in Abu Ghraib, just 15 miles from the U.S. Embassy, in May. Terrifyingly, there’s little to prevent missile attacks closing down Baghdad’s sole international airport. So what is ISIL waiting for? They cannot capture the Shia metropolis of Baghdad outright and have been putting their effort into consolidating control of Sunni areas in northern and western Iraq. As counterterrorism analyst Daveed Gartenstein-Ross adroitly notes, they also seem to have become fixated on Kobane, perhaps at the expense of higher-priority missions in Iraq and Syria. One option could be an uprising in the Sunni neighbourhoods of west Baghdad, areas that are open to the ISIL-dominated Jazeera desert to the northwest of Baghdad. The uprising need not succeed or get much backing from Baghdad’s Sunnis: ISIL’s gambit would rely upon sparking sectarian cleansing by Shia militias, thus dragging all Sunni men in Baghdad into the fight. ISIL could also try a spectacular terrorist attack like its July 22, 2013, assault on the heavily defended Abu Ghraib prison, when 800 inmates were freed. Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) nestled in vulnerable west Baghdad and adjacent to insurgent-infested farmlands, would be a prime target. On Oct. 12, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told ABC’s “This Week” that Apache gunships flew strike missions from the airport in early October because ISIL had come “within 20 or 25 kilometers of BIAP” and had “a straight shot to the airport.” But most likely, ISIL is simply readying for its annual killing spree against Shia pilgrims during the Ashura and Arbaeen religious festivals. In the week before Ashura begins on Nov. 3, Baghdad will swell with millions of pilgrims making their way to Karbala, just southwest of the capital. Many of these pilgrims make the 50-mile walk from Baghdad to Karbala, which passes within seven miles of Jurf as-Sakr, a heavily-contested ISIL stronghold to the south of Baghdad. We can expect mortar attacks, car bombings and suicide-vest detonations inside the crowds. This is the real meaning of ISIL being at the gates of Baghdad – that the movement is poised perilously close to key religious and transportation hubs, and may be intent on mounting sectarian outrages at the most sensitive moment of the year for the Shia. The Iraqi security forces view Ashura and Arbaeen as an annual trial – and in recent years they have achieved significant success in limiting the mayhem caused by ISIL and its forerunners. This year the Iraqi military and allied Shia militias have been fighting hard, with U.S. air support, to clear ISIL back from the pilgrim routes between Baghdad and Karbala – and with some success. Protecting the pilgrims and blunting ISIL’s gambits in Baghdad will be the next great test for Iraq’s recovering security forces – because the enemy is truly at the gates of the Shia world. Michael Knights, fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, regularly travels to Iraq and has worked in all of the country’s 18 provinces. Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/why-islamic-state-is-losing-111872.html#ixzz3GYOc6rTw